A Faustian Gamble
Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos was doomed by his path of securing peace through elite pacts.
The approval of the Colombian peace deal in Sunday’s referendum was expected to be a foregone conclusion. This was supposed to be the most successful attempt at peace in 52 years of armed conflict: four years of intense study and debate had produced a 297-page document outlining a comprehensive proposal for restorative justice that emphasized truth, reconciliation, and reparation, which was renowned as an exemplary model of an integral peace agreement. Polls had predicted an easy win for the “Yes” camp at 66 percent of the votes.
But what the results in fact conveyed was a highly polarized society: at 50.21% to 49.78% — a difference of 54,000 votes — the “no” vote won out. Rather than simply rubber-stamping the deal, the outcome revealed to the world the longstanding crisis of Colombia’s archaic political system, which for decades has served to alienate the majority of the population from mainstream politics. With a turnout of 37 percent, the abstention rate was the highest in 22 years — a sign of indifference of the electorate to four years of intense debates in Havana.
The biggest losers of this outcome are the rural communities at the center stage of the armed conflict. It was these marginalized areas, home to most of the victims of the conflict, that voted overwhelmingly in favor of peace: in Bojayá, Chocó the “yes” vote reached 96 percent, in Caloto, Cauca, 73 percent, in San Vicente del Caguán, Caquetá, 63 percent and in Miraflores, Guaviare, 85 percent. Meanwhile, it was urban centers where far-right groups have their main base of support such as Medellin and Bucaramanga, that provided the strongest force behind the “no” vote. In other words, the further the voter from the epicenters of conflict, the more likely they were to vote against its resolution.