In May, Ghana received a $3 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was the 17th time the country had borrowed from the fund since its independence in 1957. After accepting a $918 million IMF loan in 2015, Ghana was described as Africa’s “shining star”: its multiparty democracy was healthy, its per capita income had risen almost 1000% over two decades, and it was set to pay the IMF back on schedule. By 2019, Ghana had the world’s fastest-growing economy.

Then, in 2020, disaster struck. During the COVID-19 pandemic, government revenues fell and spending rose; the state began taking on a ballooning debt load, which would grow to 92.4% of GDP by late 2022. After the Russia-Ukraine war disrupted global trade and delivered another shock to the economy, the Ghanaian cedi lost over half its value, making it even more difficult for the country to finance its debts. “We are in a crisis,” admitted Ghanaian president Nana Akufo-Addo in an October 2022 address to the nation. With interest payments consuming 70% to 100% of its revenue, the government defaulted on most of its external debt in December 2022. While state services collapsed, food prices skyrocketed, and foreign investors fled, an estimated 850,000 Ghanaians slid into poverty.

The mainstream press has generally blamed Ghana’s crisis on these global events and on the president’s mismanagement: Akufo-Addo made water free, slashed electricity prices, and gave vulnerable Ghanaians hot meals, running up a deficit while the IMF demanded austerity as a condition of its 2015 loan. These pressures were real, but deeper structural weaknesses made them crushing. Gold and cocoa are the basis of Ghana’s economy, just as they were under British colonization; together with crude oil discovered in 2011, these commodities account for more than 80% of its exports.