A striking feature of virtually all political developments in the Arab world today is the pivotal role of the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman. From the beginning of the Arab uprisings in late 2010, these states  — in particular Saudi Arabia and Qatar  — have been involved in a range of conspicuous financial, diplomatic, and military initiatives, acting as the most important Arab conduits of US and European Middle East policy and working to undermine and steer the orientation of struggles across the region.

Three Gulf states  — Saudi Arabia, Oman, and most notably, Bahrain  — experienced their own large-scale protests, which were met with violent state repression and quiet assurances from Western governments of continued support for the status quo. The West’s unqualified endorsement of the oil-rich monarchies, reciprocated in the Gulf’s own essential role in backing US and European policies in the region, reveals the pattern of joint interests that govern the Middle East today. It is this axis of power that must be placed center-stage in any understanding of the politics of the modern Middle East.

One consequence of the Gulf’s newfound prominence is a growing interest by many on the Left in its social, economic, and political features. This is a welcome break with times past, in which the Gulf solicited little attention beyond a narrow circle of academic specialists all too often enamored with Orientalist tropes about tribal life in the Arabian Peninsula. Nonetheless, despite this widening concern, much analysis of the Gulf and its role in the region continues to rely on simplistic theories of “rentier states,” religious and tribal factors, or the supposed rise of sectarianism  — frequently peppered with lurid tales of monarchical decadence and profligate wealth.