Rejecting Equality Is a Long-Standing American Tradition

The current version of explicitly anti-egalitarian politics adopted by today’s economic and political elites is only the latest in a long tradition of American reactionary thought that insists that all men and women are not, in fact, created equal.

A photo of Elon Musk speaking in Washington, DC, on September 29. 2026.

Against the Declaration of Independence’s radical articulation of equality, elites throughout US history, from the Founding Fathers to today’s Silicon Valley fascists, constantly restate their belief that some are built to serve and some are built to rule. (Daniel Heuer / Bloomberg via Getty Images)


Living in a country whose residents include both the world’s first trillionaire and 1.5 million homeless schoolchildren, the fact of American inequality is hard to miss. Such a reality produces countless justifications, explanations, and plans for ameliorating its worst impacts across the political spectrum. But at its sharpest edge, it also produces a coterie of intellectuals, pseudo-intellectuals, tycoons, activists, and posters who don’t merely attempt to explain or excuse inequality but rather celebrate its fruits and try to consolidate its bases.

Silicon Valley today plays host to the most prominent nest of techno-fascists, neoreactionaries, transhumanists, and “effective altruists” whose obscene wealth allows them to shape political discourse far beyond the strengths of their ideas or their personal charms, such as they are.

But as Kim Phillips-Fein demonstrates in her new book Country of Lords, the current version of explicitly anti-egalitarian politics adopted by today’s economic and political elites is merely the latest in a long tradition of American reactionary thought. Aimed squarely against the premise announced in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal,” this intellectual and political lineage has been carried forward by the lawyers, business moguls, charlatans, and academics who form the primary figures of Phillips-Fein’s sweeping tour of American political history.

Country of Lords is a highly readable book, filled with a cast of colorful characters both well-known and more obscure. It sets forth a counter-history to the sunny, West Wing–style liberal narrative in which the inevitable march of American progress toward equal inclusion only faces obstacles thrown up by the dead weight of tradition or ignorance. Instead, building upon her previous work about the role of right-wing businessmen in fighting against the New Deal, Phillips-Fein shows the strenuous and continuous efforts of reactionary figures not merely to conserve some traditional order but to transform and reestablish new hierarchies in the face of technological, social, and political change.

Action and Reaction

The book is organized into six primary chapters, arranged chronologically and each anchored around a few historical figures and their connected sets of ideas. The New England statesman John Adams and the racist pro-slavery theorist George Fitzhugh might seem an odd pairing, but Phillips-Fein links their attempts to define the roles of their respective political and racial “aristocracies” in the early decades of American Republic. Likewise with the Yale professor William Graham Sumner and industrialist Andrew Carnegie enunciating their own versions of “survival of the fittest” in the context of Gilded Age industrial society.

Next are the “utilitarian racists,” anchored by Lothrop Stoddard and his infamous 1920 book, The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy, a deeply racist cri de coeur (beloved by The Great Gatsby character Tom Buchanan) that identified World War I and the Bolshevik revolution as the tipping points against European colonial power. The interwar period ushered in the age of Henry Ford and his “Gospel of Production,” a corporatist vision of American society in which the unequal unity of proprietors and their loyal workers could box out both the (Jewish-coded) union Reds and the (Jewish-coded) financiers.

The book’s fifth chapter, perhaps its most interesting and certainly its most expansive, takes a broader view of postwar liberalism’s discontents. Particularly potent are the various debates around the rise of intelligence quotient (IQ) tests, standardized college admissions exams like the SAT, and ideas about “equality of opportunity” in the midst of the legal changes called forth by the civil rights movements of the 1950s and ’60s. The author eventually hones in on the scientist-turned-racist-crank William Shockley and the Harvard psychologist Richard Herrnstein, two figures associated with the thesis that IQ is heritable and racially differentiated. Phillips-Fein pairs the race-and-IQ crowd with the libertarians and monetarists represented by the likes of Ayn Rand and Milton Friedman. What united these seemingly disparate figures was their belief that purportedly “neutral” mechanisms (standardized intelligence tests and free-market competition) could separate the “natural elite” from those meant to be ruled. The book ends with an investigation of the antidemocratic strains within Silicon Valley that provide a surprising intellectual continuity between the countercultural 1960s to the corporate consolidation of the 1980s and ’90s to the emergence of hard-right tech anti-humanists that dominate the scene today.

Each chapter could stand on its own, a mini-history of a particular moment and the multiple strands of anti-egalitarian politics that attended it. But, taken together, they paint a larger picture. By fleshing out both the continuities and similarities between inegalitarian ideas across time, some crucial patterns emerge. Idiosyncratic though they may be, these anti-egalitarian thinkers did not develop their ideas in a vacuum. Rather, their politics are deeply responsive to the emerging shape of struggle from below. In other words, reactionary thinkers are always reactive to historically particular assertions of political power from the lower orders.

Although each chapter focuses primarily on conservative ideologues, their antagonists make consistent appearances. In each successive historical moment, new rounds of egalitarian struggle imperiled the ruling order. In response, new reactionary ideologies emerged that sought to both enshrine and update the ideological map of inequality.

The story lurking beneath The Country of Lords is that of an episodic but relatively cohesive American egalitarian tradition. From radical Enlightenment thinkers and indebted Revolutionary War veterans to abolitionists, Knights of Labor to the Socialist Party of Eugene V. Debs, garment workers on the Lower East Side to the NAACP of W. E. B Du Bois, United Auto Workers organizers to civil rights activists and beyond, American history has churned out ceaseless waves of agitators and movements seeking to overturn the social, economic, and political order and establish a more equal future.

The task of the modern reactionary, then, has not been to simply assert the God-given superiority of certain aristocratic families, but rather to counter each successive challenge with an updated and reorganized hierarchy that fits the changing social, technological, and economic landscapes that they encounter. Henry Ford’s worldview was not atavistic but distinctly modern and technologically driven, in the spirit of his age. His model of American corporatism incorporated not only the revolutionary technologies of internal combustion and the assembly line, but also cutting-edge social-scientific research into managing his workers’ lives and bodies on and off the factory floor.

Richard Herrnstein likewise did not subscribe to George Wallace–style Southern segregationism, but rather employed advanced (though subsequently debunked) statistical methods to make his arguments about race and IQ, being careful not to deny the possibility of individual black success stories. In other words, the realities of social mobility, new institutions, and new social attitudes pressurized the shape of these anti-egalitarian ideas.

Almost all of these anti-egalitatarian figures relied heavily on the discursive power of science and technology in both their explanations of inequality and their visions of how that inequality could be leveraged for social good. As the primary modern schema for adjudicating differences between things and producing causal explanations for social phenomena, the natural and social sciences loom large in the reactionary imagination as both threats and resources.

It is telling that almost all of this book’s subjects were not, themselves, born into high privilege. They ranged from working-class immigrants who worked their way up through industry or academia (Carnegie, Herrnstein, Friedman) to the children of middling farmers (Ford, Adams, Sumner) to the children of moderately successful provincial professionals (Fitzhugh, Stoddard). Interestingly, two of the techno-racists (Shockley and Peter Thiel) are the children of prosperous but highly peripatetic mining engineers.

Having gained a vantage point on American society from both outside and inside the elite, these up-and-comers were often able to craft and mobilize ideological concepts that went beyond mere defense of status quo elite configurations. Because of their personal prominence in the American economic or intellectual scene, these individuals had deep investment in both upholding the legitimacy of the system as well as opening that system up to the fresh perspectives of those coming from outside the blue-blood northeastern elite. Potential for upward social mobility of one kind or another is a load-bearing feature of most modern reactionary ideologies, because it both serves to justify the merited existence of a ruling class while also leaving open the possibility of entry. The replenishment of the upper classes and the defanging of disruptive movements from below are the dual goals of these political movements.

Constructing Equality

Because of its particular focus on the history of anti-egalitarian ideas in the United States as well as its slim profile, Country of Lords does not spend much time building up a competing, left-wing account of and response to inequality. While the Left’s primary political task is countering actual inequality in the workplace, social relations, and the state, we also have to develop our own story about the nature of inequality in order to counter some of the key arguments of the reactionaries and their liberal fellow travelers.

There are both empirical observations and normative claims at the heart of this story. First, human beings are not “equal” or equivalent in terms of our physical capacities, desires, and talents. We inhabit different bodies and life experiences. But we assert that human beings do have equal dignity and worth and thus should be given, to the greatest extent possible, equal power to determine our own lives and to participate in decision-making that shapes our societies. The question at play in modern progressive politics is determining which institutions and historical processes can cultivate flourishing egalitarian societies in the context of human diversity and nonequivalency.

Historically speaking, unequal social classes are a pretty recent human social phenomenon, only emerging around twelve thousand years ago during the Neolithic revolution. During this era, the advent of agriculture, livestock domestication, sedentary urbanism, and the complex social division of labor fed into the generation of social surplus. In other words, these societies were able to produce and store more food than was necessary to meet their populations’ immediate needs.

New elites emerged and solidified their ability to command others’ labor, coordinate production and exchange, and make decisions about how to mobilize that social surplus. These new practices enabled the development of larger human populations, more advanced technology, and greater complexity in social, cultural, and economic life.

This rough historical sketch, viewed in a certain way, lends credence to anti-egalitarian arguments: human societies, since the birth of agriculture, have depended in fundamental ways on social hierarchy. In this telling, hierarchical divisions of labor were necessary to produce the technological advancements that have propelled humanity from living as small bands of hunter-gatherers to becoming geo-engineers and star-travelers.

However, the anti-egalitarians err in misidentifying the historically functional inequality of class society as an intrinsic inequality. Unequal power over the social surplus was provisionally necessary for the class system as it has emerged, but, empirically speaking, the actual people in those dominant positions over the course of history have not shared any intrinsic biological, moral, or technical superiority over those they have dominated.

The socialist movement has thus set for itself the most ambitious task imaginable: the construction of systems that sustain a complex divisions of labor necessary for a technologically advanced mass society — which is comprised of individuals who each have unique capacities and desires — while maintaining roughly equal access to social income and roughly equal decision-making power about the production and distribution of social surplus. An equal future cannot simply be wished or asserted: it needs to be built.

Despite Karl Marx’s famous injunction against “writing recipes for the cookshops of the future,” there has been a rash of recent English-language writing attempting to sketch the contours of a socialist future. While each example deserves its own complex treatment — and there are tensions between different visions — the ideas and institutions of democracy lie at the heart of each one.

The particular combination and format of representative and direct democratic decision-making is up for contestation, as is the precise role of markets in economic life. But democratic decision-making is the key mechanism for synthesizing the reality of individual difference with the need for collective deliberation and rough equality of political power. In a socialist future characterized by social complexity, division of labor, technological advancement, civil liberties, rough equality of social income, and rough equality of political capacity, democracy is the indispensable technology.