Project 2025

At the extreme, the pro-Trump manifesto “Project 2025” calls for a dramatic rollback of direct US influence in the region. The document laying out conservative hopes for a Trump presidency demands the creation of a new “security pact” around Israel and the Gulf states, drawing Turkey and Saudi Arabia deeper into the US sphere of influence and thus also severing links with the West’s nominal Kurdish allies.

Any such shift would imperil the Kurds’ efforts to implement a unique form of women-led, grassroots direct democracy throughout the region formally known as North and East Syria, repeating the 2019 catastrophe. A small contingent of US soldiers was then stationed in Rojava to support the Syrian Democratic Forces as this multiethnic, Kurdish-led force fought to drive ISIS out of their home cities, winning international sympathy in the process.

Yet as Öztürk recalls, “Trump withdrew from the region at [Turkish president Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan’s request, deepening multilateral crises.” Chaos ensued. Turkish-backed jihadist militias, including those sanctioned by the US itself for enlisting scores of former ISIS members, were installed across swaths of northern and eastern Syria.

The Pentagon opposed the 2019 withdrawal — not out of any interest in supporting the Kurds’ aspirations to democratic autonomy, but rather fearing a return of Russian and Iranian influence to the region. The withdrawal was partially reversed, and today Russian, Iranian, Turkish, and US troops are engaged in a complex standoff throughout northern Syria, alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces, Hezbollah, and Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s own armed forces, in a frozen confrontation that has unexpectedly allowed the fragile Kurdish-led administration to endure until today.

Business as Usual

But that “frozen” confrontation is heating up by the day. Berkay Mandıracı, the senior Turkey analyst for Crisis Group, points to several factors motivating the United States’ continued presence in Syria, including the “growing grip of Iranian militia groups, Russia’s continued military presence in support of the Assad regime, and ongoing challenges with keeping ISIS remnants under check.” While Washington is drawing down its number of troops stationed in neighboring Iraq, given these pressing realities Mandıracı argues that we’re unlikely to see any “drastic shifts,” such as a total withdrawal from northern Syria.

As in 2019, a withdrawal would de facto result in a transfer of power to Turkey as its armed forces and chaotic network of militias step in to fill the power vacuum, most likely dividing up the region’s territory with the Russian-backed Syrian regime. Mandıracı argues that Erdoğan’s rhetorical opposition to Israel’s US-backed genocide in Gaza, Turkey’s well-managed and increasingly warm relationship with Russia, and in particular its controversial acquisition of a Russian S-400 missile system capable of shooting down US jets are all additional factors meaning that the United States is unlikely to hand the reins to Turkey anytime soon.

Kurdish politician Muslim is likewise confident the small rump of US forces won’t be withdrawing soon: “The US policy [in North and East Syria] wouldn’t change too much following a change of presidency, since this policy is conducted by [US security] institutions, which are looking for stability in our area.”

While a shift in power toward either Turkey or Iran/Assad would be bad news for the Kurds, the present status quo makes for grim reading too. During the present “frozen conflict,” neither the United States nor Russia has allowed Turkey to launch what would be a fourth ground operation in northern Syria, seizing more territory they would rather keep for themselves. But Turkey is allowed to conduct any operation short of direct military incursion, in particular launching repeated waves of deadly air strikes intentionally targeting energy infrastructure, bakeries, and hospitals, not only killing hundreds of locals but also leaving millions without power. These attacks, nominally linked to domestic developments in Turkey, serve as a reminder that Ankara’s own political and security establishment views any incarnation of Kurdish-led democratic autonomy as an existential threat.

Bland Recipe

Turkey constantly seeks and finds opportunities for leverage as it pursues its multifaceted war against the Kurds. “Even under a Harris administration, it wouldn’t be surprising to see Turkey playing a more active role in regional matters, not just in Gaza but also more broadly in Iraq and Syria,” says Wilson Center analyst Yusuf Can.

Unlike long-term NATO expansionist and liberal interventionist Biden, Harris has never touted herself as a foreign policy guru. (A Google search for her Turkey policy instead throws up a viral yet distressingly bland Thanksgiving recipe.) Her positions are likely to be determined by preexisting conventional wisdom in Washington, with input from key advisor Philip Gordon, who has generally urged a pragmatic policy of keeping Turkey and other authoritarian allies in the fold while avoiding a combative push for regime change in Iran, Syria, or other hostile states.

As such, there’s little reason to expect a Harris presidency that would substantially alter the course of the United States’ business-as-usual support for Israel, or continued appeasement of Turkey’s own policies of ethnic cleansing, in the name of preserving US regional interests.

As Can suggests, Turkey views Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza and subsequent regional confrontation as an opportunity. While President Erdoğan has vocally condemned the war and been driven to impose economic sanctions following intense economic pressure, Turkey continues to profit by helping Israel meet half of its oil needs and hopes to be at the front of the queue for reconstruction and security contracts amid the rubble of Gaza.

“Turkey styles itself as a harbinger of peace,” says DEM Party spokesperson Öztürk. “But when we look at Turkey’s policies in Rojava, Iraqi Kurdistan, and the internal oppression in Turkey, it’s clear this is far from the truth. Turkey uses ‘peace’ as a tool to achieve its political goals.”

Turkey has long sought to play both sides of the fence, fostering sometimes hostile yet always effective diplomatic relationships with both Washington and Moscow, enabling it to extract concessions from both power blocs. As Crisis Group’s Mandıracı explains, “Turkey has profiled itself more and more as an activist middle power: a NATO member with channels to Russia . . . muscular in defending its interests in its neighborhood, and one of the world’s leading suppliers of armed drones.”

In particular, Turkey styles itself the only force capable of opposing Iran throughout Syria and Iraq. After the announcement of a new trade route mooted as linking West and East through Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Israel while bypassing both the Houthi-blockaded Red Sea and Turkey itself, President Erdoğan angrily vowed to establish an alternative “Development Road,” a $17 billion megaproject that would enable Turkey to maintain its regional dominance and extend its military occupation deeper into Iraqi Kurdistan, all justified to the United States as countering Iranian influence.

Counterweights

Even from Washington’s perspective, a continued reliance on authoritarian states as a supposed counterweight to hostile powers is strategically dubious. “Turkey is unlikely to abandon its strategic balancing between major powers, challenging the argument that Turkey should be reintegrated into NATO’s fold,” says Can.

Nonetheless, we can expect either a Trump or a Harris administration to continue relying on nominally pro-Western states to do their dirty work for them, in both cases also with an eye toward countering Chinese influence in the Middle East. Turkey and Israel will naturally seize the opportunity to pursue their own repressive domestic agendas and prosecute genocidal cross-border violence while enjoying the protections afforded to NATO-aligned, pro-Western “democracies.”

For Kurdish politicians Muslim and Öztürk, only the Kurds’ political program for interethnic tolerance and self-determination can bring an end to regional conflict. “Until stability is achieved in Syria, the current conflicts and tensions in the region will increase,” Öztürk says. To this end, an ongoing and productive series of meetings on European soil has brought together the Syrian Democratic Forces’ civilian representatives with figures from the broader Syrian opposition, including former members of the Turkish-backed opposition bloc, historically diametrically opposed to the Kurdish-led project. Ordinary Kurds, Arabs, and other Syrians will continue to seek ways to cooperate while avoiding the pernicious influence of the region’s guarantor powers.

But even as US citizens vote with one eye on the Middle East’s spiraling proxy wars, the Turkish bombs continue to fall.