The Worst Has Yet to Come
Recently, I proposed a few points about the conjuncture in Britain. None of these were offered in the spirit of hard and fast conclusions, but the aim was to begin to explain the stability and longevity of the coalition government in the face of quite serious social resistance despite its obvious weaknesses. One factor that certainly needs to be added to this list is the delayed, protracted nature of the crisis facing the British working class.
It is often said that this government forgot the lesson that the Thatcherites learned: the need to salami slice one’s opponents, taking on weaker quarries first and only moving on to larger prey after a few demonstrative kills. This government seems to be taking on everyone at once. Its attacks on the public sector have at times seemed to be reckless, its negotiating stances absurdly hubristic, the sweep of its offensive indiscriminate. Yet the two parties of government still have a plurality between them; they aren’t attacking everyone at once, they are attacking certain definite social constituencies, which are traditionally core Labour constituencies. Of course, in the context of the wider capitalist offensive, this means that the vast majority of the working class, and a significant section of the middle class, suffers. But they are doing so in a staged, multilayered fashion, and that has made a difference.
On the one hand, the effects of recession have been severe, the poor suffering most, incomes falling consistently while profits rise. The recession caught the British working class while its state of organization was still poor, and the wave of popular mobilization over the Iraq war was receding. It threw the organizations of the working class, above all the trade unions, into stunned disarray. The employers, being better positioned, got their act together quicker and used the opportunity to wage a successful series of class struggles aimed at cutting pay and conditions.