Greek Life Endures by Offering a Simulacrum of Solidarity

While unions, churches, and leagues are losing members, fraternities and sororities are drowning in new recruits. Their staying power comes from bundling belonging with elite advantage.

University of Southern California sorority students socialize at the Kappa Kappa Gamma House in Los Angeles, California.

Fraternities and sororities are best understood as subscription services for access and advantage, a hyperreal allegory for the promises and problems of American capitalism writ large. (J. Sciulli / WireImage via Getty Images)


Four thousand two hundred and twenty-nine dollars. That was the cost of joining the University of Alabama’s Delta Delta Delta Panhellenic sorority, affectionately known as “Tridelt” to its members, for the 2025 fall semester. The spring semester will run you another $4,005, and if you’d like to live in the 44,294-square-foot sorority house that sleeps seventy-eight, add another $2,886 in the fall and $2,490 in the spring.

This is, as Alabama sororities go, on the affordable side. The most expensive sorority, Zeta Tau Alpha (or simply “Zeta” for those in the know), estimates that a full school year of dues and in-house living totals $19,898, or nearly double the average in-state tuition at an American public university. The cost includes room and board, which is fitting, because Greek life tends to be all-consuming. You will learn to eat, sleep, and breathe it.

I was a ’Bama Tridelt from 2013 to 2017, a few years before the “Bama Rush” phenomenon barnstormed TikTok like a wealthy, white, womanly NFL draft of indistinguishable twangy freshmen. In my day, the dues were closer to $6,000 per year if you lived out of the house. I remember this clearly because, after learning the cost, my parents told me in no uncertain terms that the only reason I could join a sorority was that my scholarship paid for tuition.

I suspect they regretted this almost immediately when I called them, eighteen years old and very drunk, on a bus to our “pledge retreat” — at the four-star-resort-cum-convention-center in Birmingham where we were whisked hours after receiving our “bids,” or invitations to join — crying about how I felt homesick. But they must have estimated, despite not participating in Greek life themselves, that the economic opportunity it would afford me would be worth the money and trouble. That the $6,000 per year was in some sense an investment in my future. They were right.

As the nation reels from yet another fraternity rape story, this time out of Cornell, some interlocutors have wondered whether banning Greek life outright might solve the problem, eliminating the most fetid hotbeds of sexual assault on college campuses.

The debate raises plenty of worthwhile questions about institutions’ role in shaping microcultures, the legality and efficacy of outright abolition, and whether fraternities should be understood as a symptom of misogyny and sexual violence or the virus itself. But I have a simpler question: Why, in a culture defined by atomization and largely devoid of any semblance of associational life, has Greek life — at times deadly and destructive — endured? Every year the ranks of those belonging to churches, clubs, leagues, and unions shrink, and yet, as evidenced by the fervor of RushTok, the number of new recruits to Greek life continues to rise.

According to a now-archived web page from, ironically, the Dean’s Office at Cornell University, only 2 percent of the US population is or was involved in Greek life. But, the page notes, “80% of the top executives of Fortune 500 companies,” “76% of current United States Senators and Congressmen,” “40 of 47 Supreme Court Justices,” and “all but two” presidents were fraternity members. (The page claims the information comes from an undated and unlinked New York Times article that I was unable to locate. If you poke around enough university agitprop for Greek life, though, you’ll find these phantom stats repeated.) The Cornell missive approvingly dubs this “the power of the 2 percent,” commending fraternities for their “leadership, independence, scholastic achievement and service to their various campuses and communities.”

As a former-participant-turned-skeptic, I think fraternities and sororities are better understood as subscription services for access and advantage, a hyperreal allegory for the promises and problems of American capitalism writ large. They are rare, membership-based organizations that bolster, rather than threaten, the power structures that dominate American life, which explains much of their staying power.

Elite Reproduction

Within just a few weeks of joining my sorority, an older member approached me in the campus Starbucks — “the largest Starbucks by square feet in the world,” the student tour guide had boasted on my campus visit, to my awestruck approval. No doubt the older member had noticed me sitting in the pumpkin-spice latte holding pen fondling my newly treasured Tridelt sweatshirt. She heard I was a public relations major, she said, and wanted to help integrate me in the enormous communications school.

It is hard to overstate the impact this woman had on my college experience and later employment prospects. At the time she was the “agency director” of the campus’s premier communications extracurricular, a student-run PR firm that glistened on résumés. Her approval fast-tracked my acceptance into the program, I’m sure, which accepted only a few dozen students. By senior year, I was the agency director and had — I can only assume now — three solid job offers because of it.

This type of networking is a major function of sororities and fraternities, but that wasn’t why I joined. At eighteen, I joined for all the most humiliating and human reasons — my concerns were shallow, selfish, superficial. I was not thinking about my labor market prospects or elite reproduction. I was thinking about the fact that I wanted to be at once special and assimilated. I wanted acceptance from and association with people who I sensed — in some proto-class-conscious way, nascently alert to its hierarchy but not yet disgusted by it — were better than me, a kid from a no-name town in Kentucky known only for its sprawling Amazon regional fulfillment center. And I wanted to get drunk with boys!

But my experience — being plucked out by a high-achieving and generous older member then ushered along the path to accolades and social capital — is indicative of the particular privilege inherent to the Greek system, which can transform the metaphoric big city into a close-knit small town. The mechanism is far less organized than outsiders may assume. There’s no formal process by which alumni committees funnel applications through the side door of Fortune 500 companies. The power of membership is softer, more discreet — less outright patronage than fast-tracked human resources. For those with hiring power, it’s a sanctioned way of assuring “cultural fit,” identifying applicants who’ve been exposed to the same milieux, traditions, and, it should be said, socioeconomic background as yourself.

It’s telling, then, that one of America’s last enduring civic institutions in an era otherwise characterized by alienation is a social club predicated on reproducing class and racial hierarchy, culled from an already-elite subgroup of the population with the time and money to spend on a college education.

Greek Mythology

But some scholarship on the topic suggests the correlation between participation and career advancement is spurious; that kids with the sort of wealth and access that can lead to illustrious job prospects also tend to be the kids who end up in a sorority or fraternity. It was a reduction in grade point average that was associated with membership, the researchers found, and they were unable to identify any causal “Greek salary premium.” My experience demonstrates how it can grease the wheels of campus involvement, but the benefits are far more tenuous at a population level. And the oft-repeated-by-universities statistics about the success of members (e.g., “all but two presidents”)? Also vastly overstated. The real figures, across every vaunted category listed above, are closer to one in four, not three in four. Still disproportionate representation, to be sure, but far from the majority.

These realities — scant evidence that membership itself actually improves career prospects; a battery of self-aggrandizing, invented statistics that make fraternities look like an impenetrable fast track to a congressional seat or executive boardroom — are all part of the carefully constructed myth. The relationship between Greek life and American privilege is obvious and undeniable, yes, but overstating its benefits, power, and impunity risks further boosting the self-mythologizing. That they’re above both the law and grubby proletarian economic concerns is a powerful component of the legend that persists, in large part, because they have been permitted to. Time after time, the system’s worst offenses are deemed acceptable-if-unfortunate downsides for all that perceived membership upside.

So much about the realities of Greek life and its influence was fuzzy even from the inside, mixing the real with the unreal as mythology often does. Before rush week even began, I heard rumors that Phi Mu’s initiation involved nakedly sitting atop a running washing machine and having whatever jiggled circled with a Sharpie. Tridelt’s supposedly involved swallowing a live goldfish. Those were both false. Other rumors swirled about a shadowy cabal-like meta-fraternity called The Machine that drove political outcomes in both student government and Alabama state politics. This was true: Senator Katie Britt, famed owner of an enormous diamond cross necklace and an unsettlingly bare kitchen, was the Machine-backed student body president at the University of Alabama in 2003.

It was and is an insular world of bizarre rituals and rigid intragroup hierarchies, and it surprises me in retrospect how seamlessly I became fluent in its language and assented to its terms and conditions; how quickly a sort of Capitalist Realism–style foreclosure of alternatives made it seem like the only viable option.

This disorienting blend of fact and fiction seems most relevant to me now: that Greek life brings advantages but fewer than you might assume; that it is uniquely harmful, and yet is, in many ways, no different from every other elite institution with too much money. After all, a poisonous cocktail of nepotism, grotesque wealth, and unpunished sexual violence aptly summarizes the president of the United States, a man who has turned all of Washington into the fraternity he never had.

I had been permitted to enter this world, I can see now, but only conditionally. That acute sense of conditionality thrummed beneath my time there — my membership conditional on my parents’ continued willingness and ability to pay and my acceptance conditional on my continued ability to conform to social norms that were harder to define, most of all a slippery but narrow vision of modern Southern womanhood.

But what I remember most about that time, humming beneath the raucous roar of tailgates and lifted Chevy Tahoes, was the loneliness. It was usually muffled by the bluster and grandiosity my participation seemed to afford me, but sometimes, on the rogue Sunday night, it crept in.

In other words, the broader cultural alienation existed within this structure, too, a simulacrum of solidarity that sent me searching in adulthood for the real thing. In this way it would come to resemble my experience navigating the economy writ large, the creeping, inescapable knowledge that the advantages I was being sold were more often than not predicated on many more people’s exclusion from them.

This unshakable discomfort is what led me to embrace a socialist politics, a vision for the world that offered a sturdier and more scalable means of belonging and flourishing conditional only on something none of us can afford to lose but that the status quo so creatively degrades: our humanity.