Is Trump Winning?

On the one hand, Trump has “succeeded” with his tariffs. They’ve become the new normal and countries are lining up to strike deals, if they haven’t already. For the most part, the Republican base has “adjusted” its long-held beliefs, ditching the banker elite–inspired commitment to globalization, open trade between countries, and limitless flows of global finance. In its place, they’ve adopted a kind of protectionist nationalism that channels, if imperfectly, the mercantilist thinking of dead centuries past. They see, or at least pretend to see, a boundless American future rooted in domestic industrial renaissance and foreign acquiescence bordering on tribute.

In a demented ironic twist, Trump has begun to establish an ersatz era of trade policy reminiscent of what many on the Left have been calling for since free trade crept into the imaginations of technocrats and liberals — and, later, conservatives. Except the Trump system is a fun-house-mirror construction, stripped of labor and environmental protections. Indeed, it is actively committed to dismantling those protections.

In a sense, Trump is the gravedigger of neoliberalism — and perhaps the one that neoliberals deserve. Critics have long pointed out that the inherent contradictions of the neoliberal order made it vulnerable to disintegration. American “economic leadership” was always a double-edged sword — capable at any moment of being turned against its “partners” around the world, even as communities at home were torn apart by deindustrialization.

And when that sword turned inward and outward alike, what then? States scrambled to protect their own interests as best they could while the pillars of international liberalism fell one by one. Workers at home have been left to adjust — what other choice do they have? Abroad, the much vaunted “rules-based international order” proved subject to the whims of a hegemon soaked in its own toxic partisanship, susceptible to being ruled by an impulsive narcissist seemingly plucked straight from the decline-and-fall phase of imperial Rome.

Did Trump Kill the European Dream?

Where there is power, there is counterpower — force produces a reaction. In the short run, countries are scrambling and squabbling in the face of tariffs. But over the long term, they are looking around and weighing their options.

Canada, for instance — geographically, culturally, and economically bound to the United States to a significant degree — is now looking abroad: to the European Union for trade and defense opportunities and to Mercosur countries for a deeper commercial relationship. China is making it clear in certain instances — like with Canada — that it’s open to deals. It is all too happy to balance the global distribution of power or to step into certain gaps left by the United States.

Trump’s remaking of the world order may or may not outlast him. But even if it doesn’t fully endure, it has already reshaped perceptions. For many countries, a new wariness of the United States will linger for decades to come. They’d be foolish to feel otherwise.

The United States, however, still has plenty of leverage. Writing in Compact, Philip Cunliffe argues that Trump has “killed the European dream” by securing a favorable deal with the EU — extracting tariff concessions (with a 15 percent baseline) and a commitment to purchase $750 million in energy from the United States.

“Trump’s tariffs,” writes Cunliffe, “have not resulted in the economic cataclysm that many economists predicted. Nor have they isolated the United States while empowering Europe, as some hoped. On the contrary, they now threaten to undermine the fundamental justification for the European Union.”

In that sense, the American gambit has worked. At least for now. And not just with the EU. Cunliffe also notes that the United States has managed to strong-arm NATO member states to buy American weapons. Many of those states are also committing to spend more on defense as a percent of GDP — a target that’s gone from 2 percent to 5 percent. The United States has long complained that certain allies — Canada, for instance — weren’t paying their “fair share.”

Add to that a series of bilateral trade deals struck under Trump, and it’s possible the administration will get away with its scheme after all. Maybe — for now. But it’s unlikely to last.

Troubles on the Home Front

While counterforces abroad regroup — or at least catch their breath — the Trump administration is testing the limits of popular support for its agenda at home. Inflation is setting in, job growth is slowing, and prices are rising. Eighty percent of Americans worry about the cost of tariffs and 60 percent blame the president. Nearly a third of the country cites inflation as the top issue facing Americans.

Markets are falling and, in response, Trump has shot the messenger — firing the head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and posting on social media that Erika McEntarfer had “RIGGED” the data “to make the Republicans, and ME, look bad.” Americans aren’t buying it — or, at this rate, much else.

The economic pressure isn’t abstract; it touches on living essentials and entertainment favorites. Nintendo announced last week that it was raising the price of some of its coveted Switch consoles and accessories, citing “market conditions.” Adidas is warning of potentially higher prices, too. Meat prices may also increase because of US tariffs on Brazil. The Trump administration had hoped — claimed or perhaps demanded — that companies would not pass along higher costs to consumers. But the data shows they’re doing just that.

The United States may avoid the recession many feared last year. But after years of pandemic-related strain, stubborn inflation, and a worsening affordability crisis, Americans are struggling and, to say the least, fed up as midterm elections approach.

While Trump’s new order is struggling to take shape, some early successes make it look as if predictions of the coming death of American hegemony have been greatly exaggerated. Still, the future of this order — up against decades of neoliberal orthodoxy and entrenched material interests — can’t be taken for granted, particularly as it causes tangible economic harm to Americans who may not tolerate the struggle for long.

But something is happening to the neoliberal order that has dominated since the 1970s. Davos man, bereft of his centrist party vehicles — now on the backfoot almost everywhere — may not yet rise again so easily. Whatever one says about Trump’s tariffs, they at least signal that the neoliberal age may be drawing to a close. But elites will fight back. Emerging disruptions will be compounded by long-term geopolitical shifts and the accelerating climate crisis. This may be a period during which alternative visions for economic relations — both at home and abroad — may have a shot at breaking through years of inertia, hopefully before it’s too late.