A new US administration is always a global-level event. The world anticipated George W. Bush’s arrival at the White House with fears that came to be confirmed, while Barack Obama’s election brought hopes that didn’t pay off. But for perhaps the first time ever, the new boss of the Oval Office is seen with perplexity and confusion. No one quite knows what to expect of Donald Trump’s presidency. That’s rather natural, because he doesn’t seem to know what to expect himself.

This eccentric elderly billionaire comes back to power with a set of populist slogans that sound threatening enough to scare American liberals but give absolutely no clue as to the priorities and strategies of Trump’s foreign policy. Yes, Trump intends to fight an influx of immigrants from Latin America, as well as Chinese and other international competition in the domestic and global markets. He has begun legislating on these fronts and others. But these priorities are not enough to build upon and strengthen the US’s global hegemon and superpower status.

Trump’s election came along with a unique ideological crisis, in which all the usual principles that American politics was based on are put in question. For decades, a bipartisan consensus in Washington regarding basic values and priorities of foreign policy dominated. Arguments did take place, often heated, but they regarded tactical questions rather than strategic ones. Strategic principles that successive administrations followed regarding Europe, the Soviet Union, Russia, Latin America, the Middle East, and elsewhere were perceived as a reflection of national interests. Not only the governing elite, but also most of American society shared this vision.

The Left was the exception. It harshly criticized American involvement in any part of the world. But it criticized US policy from its victims’ point of view, from the outside, and didn’t offer its own alternative vision of national interests, nor a strategy that could be implemented. As a result, the Left’s position only marginalized them more and had zero effect on foreign policy.

The Trump situation is brand new. He publicly questions accepted strategic principles (for instance, North Atlantic solidarity), but doesn’t offer anything coherent in return. Both the bourgeois morality of the government elite and the critical morality of the Left are alien to him. America must be great again, but it’s unclear what this slogan really means: striving for the state’s greatness, or just having a great time.

How will US foreign policy change in practical terms? As strange as it seems, perhaps not much. In a situation when goals, values, and priorities seem unclear, the State Department’s apparatus and the Pentagon, like any bureaucracy, will act by inertia. There might be some curveballs caused by personal interference of the absolutely incompetent president. But it’s more likely that the resulting political course will be steered in a usual fashion.

Does this mean that the uncertainty brought on by Trump will not affect international relations? No. But it will affect not so much the actions of the United States as other actors’ behavior.

In times of uncertainty, some become highly cautious, others try testing boundaries, others again seek to establish their own rules. This is likely to create the conditions for change. The cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, which is unsatisfactory for both parties, is a direct consequence of this new uncertainty. It’s clear that Israel is afraid that the United States would leave the Middle East; for Islamists, that would be a dream scenario. As different as their approaches are, the two sides of the conflict were forced to act the same. Hamas leaders choose not to provoke the new administration; better for them to let the conflict fade from memory for now and keep a low profile. Israel, in turn, realized that if it didn’t arrange this present for Trump’s inauguration, the country might fall out of grace with him.

And here go our two hostile parties, negotiating unwillingly, glancing back not as much at each other as at unpredictable Big Brother in Washington, who would presumably enjoy this kind of arrangement.

It’s far from clear that changes will necessarily be for the better, but the spontaneous process of realigning international relations is imminent. As for the United States, I can’t help but think of a bull in a china shop: even if it stands still, its presence is impossible to ignore.