A Traumatic Rupture in Israeli Society

The events of October 7 constituted a turning point in every Israeli’s personal life, as well as a traumatic rupture in the Israeli collective consciousness. That dark day, immediately mythologized and repeatedly described as the worst event in Jewish history since the Holocaust, has generated a pervasive feeling of insecurity and pessimism, and ultimately a vengeful disregard for Palestinian lives. This societal trauma remains for the most part decontextualized and singularly focused on that day. Nevertheless, the war in Gaza has also taken a significant toll on Israeli society in many other ways that typically remain hidden behind the horrors of October 7 and everything since.

The actual physical space accessible to Israeli civilians has shrunk dramatically since the outbreak of the war. In the very first days of the war, Israeli authorities ordered approximately 300,000 Israeli citizens living within the country’s internationally recognized borders to evacuate their homes. While the evacuation of the southern regions was necessary given the presence of armed Palestinian militias, the evacuation of the northern front with Lebanon was a precaution taken in a moment of panic amid fears of a similar attack.

For ten months, this evacuation seemed like Israel’s worst strategic decision in the war. It enabled continuous, ever-intensifying skirmishes along the border throughout the year, and finally the recent Israeli escalation in Lebanon, including the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and now a ground invasion.

Many in the south have already returned, due to the occupation and destruction of Gaza and the Israeli army’s control over the border. But in the north, along the Lebanon border, the approximately sixty thousand displaced are still away, while their former towns and Kibbutzim are becoming ghost towns only occupied by Israeli soldiers, and their homes and farmlands are being systematically destroyed by Hezbollah direct fire and subsequent wildfires.

The evacuation of entire communities to hotels and hospitality centers created a large contingent of effectively homeless Israelis. Some Kibbutzim were integrated en masse into others in more central regions, but tens of thousands are still roaming the country, relying on family members or colleagues, wondering whether their displacement will be permanent. No one can say if they will ever go back.

The notion that Israel has lost the north is one of the strongest sentiments concerning the war and probably the greatest failure of state confidence following the debacle of October 7. While some voices see this loss of sovereignty as the price of the continuous Gaza offensive, the reality of displacement has mainly been instrumentalized by the government for belligerent propaganda urging the expansion of the northern front, which we’ve now seen unfold over the past few weeks.

Accelerating the Authoritarian Drift

Prior to October 7, Israeli society was already in the middle of a fierce battle over the Netanyahu government’s proposed judicial overhaul, which threatened to weaken the judiciary and grant unprecedented authority to the executive government. This overhaul was part of a wider set of policies aimed at paving the way for the annexation of the West Bank. Mass protests against the overhaul had been ongoing since January, but October 7 rallied all of Jewish Israeli society around the flag and allowed the government, under the cover of war, to pursue its authoritarian agenda through other means.

In the first weeks after October 7, Israel launched a massive wave of investigations, arrests, and indictments against Palestinian citizens accused of “incitement to violence” and “support for terrorism.” Most were arrested for social media posts, including expressions of empathy and pain over the suffering of Gazans. Hundreds of investigations were opened, with the attorney general granting the police sweeping permission to detain suspects. Citizens suffered prolonged detention, where they reported physical violence and degrading treatment. Palestinian journalists working for international media also suffered abuse, arrests, arbitrary restrictions, and, in many cases, legal bans.

Police repression was complemented by widespread harassment, doxing, and violence organized by civilians and right-wing groups — who, by contrast, face virtually no police retaliation. Palestinians were threatened in workplaces, schools, and public places, creating an atmosphere of pervasive intimidation and silencing. Harassment is particularly widespread in universities and institutions of higher education, while authorities usually offer little or no protection.

This crackdown on Palestinians and antiwar activists is part of a broader, extremely dangerous politicization of the police, as Noa Levy and other commentators argue. The far right’s systematic takeover of the police began with the appointment of Kahanist radical Itamar Ben-Gvir as minister of national security.

In December 2022, as part of the preconditions for forming Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, the Knesset passed the “Ben-Gvir Amendment” to the police ordinance, transferring significant powers from the police commissioner to the minister. Shortly afterward, Ben-Gvir began a series of political appointments to senior police positions, dismissing commanders who opposed his agenda and empowering loyalists — especially if they showed an inclination toward violence and a willingness to violently suppress protests. Journalists report that these appointments were made against regulations and without judicial oversight, promoting openly far-right officers with records of brutality and disciplinary issues.

October 7 both accelerated Ben-Gvir’s transformation of the Israeli police into a political weapon and established other paramilitary far-right forces. In the weeks following the Hamas attack, Ben-Gvir oversaw the massive distribution of firearms to civilians, easing licensing restrictions and increasing the number of private gun owners by 64 percent. On top of that, some twelve thousand licenses are reported to have been issued illegally, leading to an investigation into the ministry.

Ben-Gvir also established around nine hundred “Emergency Response Units” composed of civilian volunteers armed with assault rifles. These units, hastily created without proper training, discipline, or oversight, now operate in cities and towns across the country (including East Jerusalem and mixed Jewish-Palestinian cities within the Green Line), and there are serious concerns that they will use unauthorized force and lead to armed conflict between civilians.

Expanding Settler Rule

While Ben-Gvir was focused on setting fires inside Israel, his partner Bezalel Smotrich, the representative of extremist Jewish settlers in the government, has given his constituency free rein within the occupied West Bank.

According to the coalition agreement, in addition to his post as finance minister, Smotrich was put in charge of the Civil Administration and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), the two bodies governing all civil life in Area C in the West Bank. He was also authorized to establish a new civilian body called the “settlement administration,” responsible for all aspects of life in the settlements that were formerly under military jurisdiction. This administrative reshuffling quietly paved the way for the de facto annexation of the settlements.

Since October 7, Smotrich has been making full use of the responsibilities entrusted to him to promote ethnic cleansing and the expansion of settlements in the West Bank. By April, 2024 was already a record year for declaring occupied territory “state lands,” marking them for future settlement-building. It also broke records for approval rates of new building plans and attempts to retroactively legalize illegal outposts and houses, some on privately owned Palestinian land. Twenty-four new outposts have been built since the beginning of the war and dozens of new roads paved.

Settler violence against Palestinians was already at record highs before October 7 and has only worsened since — often committed with the protection, if not active participation, of police and the military. Nearly a thousand violent attacks have been recorded this year, some involving hundreds of rioters, taking the lives of at least thirty-one Palestinians. Activists report that because many settlers were recruited as reservists, it has become impossible to distinguish between settlers and soldiers, and the attackers enjoy almost total impunity. While war raged in Gaza, nineteen herding communities in the Jordan Valley were expelled and dispossessed of their lands. Left-wing activists who seek to defend these communities are also regular targets.

Deepening Dehumanization and Alienation

The expressions of hatred and dehumanization toward Palestinians we are currently witnessing are unprecedented, even in Israel’s long history of bloody wars. With notable exceptions, public responses to the ongoing slaughter, starvation, and terrorizing of two million people in Gaza range from shoulder-shrugging apathy to genocidal bloodlust. As South Africa’s International Court of Justice case against Israel records, Israeli decision-makers from Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant downward have made hundreds of genocidal statements, like Smotrich’s recent statement that it might be “justified and moral” to starve two million people to death.

This profound dehumanization was fueled by the trauma of October 7 but was by no means born on that day. Rather, it is the result of decades of embargo and siege, in which Israel exercised complete control over many aspects of life in Gaza but had almost no contact with its people or government. The Gaza Strip existed as a kind of shadow land in the Israeli consciousness: a place of absolute evil and danger of which most people knew next to nothing and with which there was not and could not be any communication.

This dehumanization is reinforced by the Israeli mainstream media, which voluntarily adopts military talking points. Israeli news outlets have systematically repressed reports about casualties and civilian suffering in Gaza, with most citing no sources other than Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokespeople. Apart from a handful of independent outlets and occasional reports in Haaretz, Israelis are not exposed to the harrowing pictures and reports that the entire world is watching. As Hagar Shezaf recently reported, the IDF denies journalists access to Gaza except when accompanying military units, ensuring that their coverage aligns with Israeli perspectives. The government closure of Al Jazeera’s operations in Israel was also a clear attack on freedom of the press and the Israeli public’s ability to access alternative points of view.

The near-total media blackout of any news concerning Palestinian suffering in Gaza makes Israelis numb not only to the devastation they are inflicting but also to any divergence of opinion within the Palestinian community. The Palestinians and their allies are perceived in ever-wider swaths of Israeli society as a group totally dedicated to the massacre of Jews — in Gaza, the West Bank, and even on American college campuses. This conception serves the ruling narrative that only endless military action can protect Israelis from another October 7.

Building a Jewish Sparta

Throughout the past year, we witnessed the further militarization of an already highly militarized society. Jewish Israelis from all segments of society are actively embracing the vision for Israel promoted by the religious right: that of a Jewish Sparta on the eastern Mediterranean, a nation of warriors under God’s guidance, waging a holy and eternal crusade against the Arabs.

The dominant military narrative around October 7 was that Israel relied too heavily on the notion of “a small and smart army” based on technological savvy, highly effective intelligence, and a strong air force. The collapse of the IDF’s defenses in Gaza generated a consensus among Israeli military experts that the army requires more men and more tanks to defend the borders and manage the occupation. Yet a permanent expansion of the armed forces in a relatively small country like Israel will have wide-ranging societal consequences.

Many assume that this hypermilitarization, including the long-term reoccupation of Gaza and perhaps a “security strip” in Southern Lebanon, will require extending military service for men. Figures mentioned in Israeli media include extending mandatory service from three to four years and stipulating reserve service of up to one hundred days per year. Mandating conscription for the ultra-Orthodox community, already a hotly contested issue, is now becoming an urgent military question.

In other words, Israel is preparing for a state of permanent war.

This vision for the future also has dire economic consequences. Permanent war means a permanent war economy. The increased investment in the army — in weapons systems, training, personnel, and more — will come at the expense of social services. Moreover, the increased burden of military service will directly influence Israel’s productivity due to the loss of labor in the civilian economy, since soldiers do not produce economic value.

Yet the direct costs of war represent only the immediate effect of Israel’s Spartacization. Israel’s campaign of wanton destruction risks making it a pariah on the world stage, notwithstanding the ongoing support of the United States and Germany. The globally integrated Israeli economy, propped up by its high-tech sector, cannot sustain this isolation for long. Israeli economic planning will have to double down on cybersecurity, armaments, and natural gas extraction to maintain at least average Western GDP levels. But even if the war economy manages to hold out, living standards will be incomparable to those Israelis have gotten used to in recent decades.

Faced with this looming situation, many Israelis with the possibility and means — namely, professional expertise and a foreign passport — are in the process of leaving the country. Whether they support the war or not, they don’t want to live in a Jewish Sparta. The trend is most prominent among the sectors of society Israel needs to remain economically afloat — tech workers, academics, and doctors, to name a few. As the literal and figurative fences around Israel get higher, an exodus is already underway.

The Failure of the Opposition

Faced with societal trauma, a hypermilitarized public atmosphere, and an onslaught of antidemocratic and expansionist policies, the opposition to Netanyahu’s government, in parliament and on the streets, has utterly failed to mount an adequate response. While there is much criticism over the government’s failures in running the war, only a small minority objects to the war itself.

Fear and anger toward the government are stronger than ever among large segments of the public, who hold it responsible for failing to prevent the October 7 attack and, more urgently, for abandoning the hostages and Israel’s northern region. In massive public protests throughout the year (and especially following the murder of six hostages in August), protesters held signs calling Netanyahu and his ministers murderers — albeit not for their killing of more than forty-one thousand people in Gaza, but for refusing to sign a cease-fire deal that could have saved the hostages.

The marginalized Israeli radical left, participating in these demonstrations as part of the “anti-occupation” bloc and represented in the Knesset by the Palestinian-Jewish party Hadash, has sought to link the fate of the hostages with that of the people of Gaza, all of whom are suffering in the war. But the bitter truth is that the overwhelming majority largely accepts the narrative that military aggression is the only way to restore security.

Yair Lapid, the leader of the opposition, has changed his tone recently, calling explicitly for an end to the war, but he finds himself in a minority. More hawkish former generals such as Benny Gantz and Yair Golan, as well as right-wing strongman Avigdor Lieberman — all fierce critics of Netanyahu — have been proposing plans for the conquest of Lebanon. Gideon Sa’ar, another right-wing opposition leader, joined Netanyahu’s government recently to support the campaign in Lebanon, greatly raising the chances of it staying in power until 2026.

While the pressure generated by the protest movement was a major reason for the release of 105 hostages in the first deal last November, the protesters face a dead end as long as they fail to address the wider moral and political questions enveloping the war. All sides treat ending the war as a price that must or must not be paid for the hostages’ return, rather than an objective in its own right.

This contradiction was most evident in a recent campaign to return the hostages and then go back to fighting in Gaza. This idea, in equal parts cruel and unrealistic, represents more than anything a desperate attempt to sway the opinion of a war-intoxicated public. It serves the government, however, which can easily accuse the protestors of being irrational and defeatist, allowing Netanyahu to portray himself as a “tough negotiator” vis-a-vis both Hamas and the United States. By failing to challenge the fundamental premise of the government’s actions, the opposition ultimately strengthens it.

Apart from the psychosocial factors outlined above and the effects of pervasive dehumanization, the mainstream opposition’s hesitation to call for a cease-fire stems from the absence of any alternative political vision. Israelis are understandably terrified of returning to the pre–October 7 situation in Gaza. Most of them know that the promise to “eliminate” Hamas is unrealistic and that maintaining military forces in Gaza and Lebanon — not to mention rebuilding settlements — means an endless war of attrition.

Yet none of the major actors have proposed a different solution. Many criticize Netanyahu for allowing Hamas to rule over the enclave and strengthening it rather than the Palestinian Authority, but none of the other Zionist parties have prioritized resolving the conflict either.

The reconciliation declaration signed between Hamas and Fatah in Beijing last July might have presented a chance for an alternative solution had Israel not assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, regarded as a moderate within Hamas, the following week. The prospect of a Palestinian unity government jointly overseeing the reconstruction of Gaza with the support of the international community is far better than any other path put forward by Israel. Real solutions for the situation in Gaza — rebuilding, lifting the siege, and gradually opening its borders through regional agreements — were not on Israel’s agenda before October 7, and they certainly are not now.

Help From Outside

Israelis are thus caught between an overpowering fear of external threats on the one hand and a growing fascist mood domestically on the other. A fatalist belief in military aggression as the only possible solution locks the country in a double bind.

Netanyahu’s fear- and warmongering propaganda thrives in this climate. Israel’s current aggression in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East has generated a significant rebound in support for the prime minister’s government. While the initial military success of these attacks has been celebrated in Israel, they spell many more months of war and risk replicating the atrocities committed in Gaza — all while not offering a clear future for displaced Israelis, who could only return to their homes if a negotiated settlements is reached.

Under these conditions, there is little hope of change coming from within the Israeli political system. While some are still determined to struggle on, the traumatic rupture of October 7 and the subsequent waves of repression dealt deadly blows to the liberal and left camps in the country. Under this reality, only decisive international intervention, starting with a credible weapons embargo, can stop the war on Gaza and Lebanon.

In the long run, international pressure is also key in generating the necessary political change within Israeli society. By showing Israelis that there is an actual cost to their state’s rogue behavior, the world can help rebuild a force in Israeli politics that says no to the extreme right’s vision of Spartacization and promotes a different approach to the country’s relationship with the Palestinians and the region as a whole.