The Working-Class Trump Voters Who Can Still Be Won

Despite what Democrats say, working-class support for Donald Trump is complicated and nuanced. Some could never be won over to a populist economic program. Others, though, are still reachable — and there are just enough of them to win elections.

A supporter waits for Donald Trump to speak at a rally in Conroe, Texas, on January 29, 2022. (Mark Felix / AFP via Getty Images)

How has Donald Trump won the support of so many working-class people? Can Democrats ever win back their support? For the last decade now, American electoral politics has revolved around these questions. Opinions on the answers abound.

Some argue support for Trump derives from workers who have been left behind by a changing economy. Others claim it is mainly the result of working-class Americans feeling fed up with political elites who seem to ignore people like them. Others argue that the problem is far more intractable because Trump has courted the love of many workers by speaking to the hate they feel toward immigrants, minority groups, and “woke” cultural change.

The truth is, all of the above help explain working-class Trumpism to some degree — but not equally, and not for everyone. In order to effectively win some workers back to the progressive side, it is necessary to understand the nuances of support for Trump.

To begin, it is important to grasp the nature of working-class support for Trump. It comes disproportionately from workers who are without a college degree, who have lower incomes, and who work blue-collar jobs. These workers are shifting away from Democrats and toward Donald Trump. In 2012, Barack Obama won 51 percent of noncollege voters. Hillary Clinton won 49 percent in 2016. Joe Biden won 48 percent in 2020. Kamala Harris won just 45 percent in 2024. Examining lower-income voters reveals an even more dramatic decline: Biden won them by 19 points; Harris won them by just 1. (A similar trend shows up among manual laborers from 2012 to 2020, but we are still waiting for analyses of how they voted in 2024.) Why are these workers in particular abandoning Democrats for Trump?

It makes sense to first rule out simple explanations before considering complicated ones. The simplest explanation is that these workers are becoming more conservative. Yet recent research suggests the opposite. A new report from the Center for Working-Class Politics (CWCP) analyzes decades of survey data on 128 policy questions and finds that workers without a four-year college degree and in the bottom two-thirds of the income distribution have actually become more progressive over time, specifically from 1990–2007 to 2008–2022. And not just in one area but across the board — on immigration, racial justice, and even economic issues.

So if these workers are growing more progressive, why are Democrats losing their support?

How Trump Wins Working-Class Voters

There is strong evidence that Trump is exploiting the economic pain these workers have been forced to endure — all while Democrats look the other way. In recent decades, the income of the vast majority of workers has grown more slowly than in the past, while the incomes of those at the very top have exploded. Half of all men in the United States have seen their earnings stagnate, decline, or disappear completely, leaving them increasingly reliant on government welfare. Mainly, this is because they have lost work due to economic recessions, automation, and globalization.

The result is a sense of decline and disillusionment. Into this void stepped Trump, whose attacks on trade, outsourcing, and the political elite struck a chord with voters who felt left behind. In 2016, Trump gained ground in regions hit hard by automation and industrial decline. Economically distressed communities shifted toward Trump again in 2024 with the president winning an outright majority of the vote in low-income, welfare-dependent counties.

This pattern isn’t unique to Trump. Social scientists across many disciplines have found that economic distress often fuels support for political extremism. A study of 140 years of elections across twenty advanced democracies found that far-right support increased by 30 percent in the five years after a financial crisis. In this view, Trump’s rise is part of a broader, global story about the political consequences of economic insecurity.

But economic explanations alone don’t tell the whole story.

Other researchers have shown that economic grievances often translate into political backlash only when combined with feelings of powerlessness. People who feel alienated from politics (believing that no one listens to them or cares what they think) are more likely to embrace antiestablishment candidates. In the United States, that sense of alienation and political discontent is widespread: trust in government has been falling since the 1960s, and today over 80 percent of Americans say elected officials don’t care about “people like them.” Americans don’t just express this discontent on surveys — they express it at the ballot box by voting out the party in power, which they have done at historically unprecedented rates in recent years.

Trump taps into this frustration, not with policy solutions that would actually empower people but with a performance of strength that offers a vicarious participation in power from the sidelines. For many of his supporters, Trump represents a fantasy of reclaiming control in defiance of elites who have usurped power from the people. He offers a story in which that power is restored: he is their champion, so his power is their power.

This helps explain why some working-class voters who are economically insecure and politically alienated reject Democrats even as others do not. But these factors alone do not predict Trump support. What matters is how this discontent is interpreted — the story voters tell themselves about who’s to blame and who can fix it.

That leads to a third line of research on authoritarianism and cultural backlash. Many Trump voters aren’t just vaguely disillusioned with the economy or the political system, they’re overflowing with anger and know exactly who’s to blame for everything that’s wrong with their country. When Trump rants about an invasion of violent, criminal migrants threatening to bring the whole country down, he isn’t brainwashing his supporters, he’s saying what they think. In a world that is supposed to be “for them,” it feels like no one respects their values — people seem to care more about minorities than about them.

For these voters, the solution to their problems is clear: the country needs a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything. This mindset is the core force driving Trump’s most loyal supporters. Survey research consistently finds that Trump supporters are more likely to score high on measures of authoritarianism and prejudice against a variety of groups, and that these factors typically outweigh economic concerns. Many voters back Trump not in spite of his cruelty, but because of it.

The Working-Class Trump Voters Who Can Still Be Won Over

So how do we make sense of all this? Does authoritarianism put every Trump voter out of reach? Or are there some Trump voters — those who are economically frustrated, hungry for political change, but not consumed by prejudice and resentment — who could be persuaded by a progressive message that speaks directly to their working-class concerns?

One of the most promising answers comes from an analysis by pollster Emily Ekins, who found that Trump voters in 2016 could be sorted into five distinct groups. Some were traditional conservatives and free-market libertarians. But others, whom she called “American Preservationists,” “Anti-Elites,” and “the Disengaged,” were less typical and more disaffected. These groups weren’t loyal Republicans — they had voted for Democrats in the past. What united them was a shared sense of frustration with the system.

But there were also key differences. The “American Preservationists” were defined by high levels of prejudice and a strong attachment to white identity. They were the most economically distressed, least educated, and most culturally reactionary part of Trump’s coalition. Bread-and-butter economic appeals are unlikely to win them over — not because they’re doing well economically but because they’ve embraced a worldview where the road to prosperity runs through fighting their enemies. Their support for progressive economic policy is conditional: government should help deserving people like them but punish people they see as underserving.

The “Anti-Elites,” by contrast, were much more moderate on cultural issues, and their support for progressive economics seems genuine. They believe that the rich use their money to game the political system against working people like them, they support higher taxes on the wealthy, and they are open to redistribution. These voters represent a real opportunity for progressive candidates.

The new CWCP report reinforces and updates this point through an analysis of 2020 Trump voters. It finds that 8 to 10 percent of working-class Trump voters (roughly 2 to 2.5 percent of the national electorate) hold moderate-to-progressive social views while supporting progressive economic policies like raising the minimum wage, taxing the rich, expanding Social Security, and investing in public schools. That 2 to 2.5 percent might sound small, but it exceeds the margin by which Kamala Harris lost both the national popular vote and several key swing states in 2024.

These voters — economically and politically discontent but not driven by authoritarianism — are potentially persuadable. But reaching them requires a clear, consistent, and genuine message about how progressives will fight for them and alongside them to improve their lives. This means not being afraid to engage in direct confrontations with the rich and powerful against austerity and authoritarianism. It means emphasizing job security, wages, health care, housing, and education in language that makes it clear whose side you’re on. It also means choosing messengers who can credibly make that case: candidates who come from working-class backgrounds or have shown a real commitment to economic justice.

Progressives don’t have to convert the entire Trump base. They just have to reach the ones who are open to a different path — who are angry at the system but not consumed by grievance and hate. This will not be easy, but the evidence suggests it is possible for those with the credibility and the courage to try.