The Far Right Lacks a Solid Class Project

Trump’s first term was an embarrassment for the far right and a victory for the center. He couldn’t even finish building the wall. Not just “the liberal establishment,” but the Republican Party prevented him from realizing his broader infrastructure push. The wall is simply not good for business: it is not only costly but could bring about a climate unfavorable to capital accumulation.

Will the same scenario be repeated in a second Trump term?

In the buildup to this election, Trump spoke of adding a “socialist ban” to his “Muslim ban,” commented that he would be a dictator (at least in clearing opponents from office) “on day one,” and indicated that he will deport millions of people. The courts blocked many aspects of his Muslim ban during his first term. The FBI slowed him down too, including through battling neo-Nazi groups in his first year: Trump had made a nod to armed right-wing gangs by telling them to “stand back and stand by.” But Trump soon replaced many judges. And the Supreme Court is now under solid conservative control. Some journalists have argued that the FBI has been subdued and cannot react the way it did in early 2017. These factors might change the dynamics. This is what most mainstream attention has focused on, and this is partly at the root of the talk of “fascism.”

But much hasn’t changed. Hence my first thesis: Trump’s economic policy positions and his relations to the working class have not shifted dramatically. The nature of his working-class support is crucial: Trump might be more popular among workers, but this popularity will be fickle so long as it isn’t supported by durable policies as well as organization and mobilization on the ground. Whether Trumpism’s relations with the business class have changed, or could change, is more complex.

Let’s recall two important developments at the end of Trump’s first term: the Midwest swung back to the Democrats and building trade unions withdrew support due to lack of solid job creation in construction and related industries. The so-far granular changes in Trumpism are not sufficient to prevent a similar reckoning in 2028.

Trump appeals to the working class still mostly through cultural, security, and border issues. Despite his claims to the contrary, he has turned the Republicans into the party of angry white males (and secondarily, a growing share of minorities) who happen to be workers, not “the party of workers.” Trump’s leadership of “the uneducated” against “the educated” is well-established in survey data. But while there’s an overlap between the working class and people without college degrees, the two should not be conflated.

Trump has certainly improved his standing among the working class, including union households. Yet, even the pro-business Kamala Harris led Trump by a 10 percent margin among union households (6 points down from Joe Biden’s lead in 2020). True, unionized households are a minority of the working population, but they provide a crucial indicator since they can be expected to vote more along the lines of class issues, compared to nonunionized workers.

Furthermore, even among the broader working class, Trump’s lead is not insurmountably high. If there is considerable dealignment, this means a split, not a realignment in which “the Republicans have become the party of the working class.” Many workers will most probably swing between parties in the coming elections.

J. D. Vance did not change the nature of Trump’s appeal to workers so far. If he voiced relatively more pro-labor positions before Trump picked him as running mate, such as standing for higher wages and against corporate mergers, he is hardly calling the shots. The anti-corporate parts of the Teamster leader Sean O’Brien’s speech at the Republican National Convention were not met with enthusiasm, with the crowd visibly excited to see the rare showcasing of a major union leader at this steadfastly pro-business venue. O’Brien’s pro-union and anti-corporate speech was a genuine attempt to take a populist message to the right-wing party, as well as a move to shore up O’Brien’s support among his own membership, which supports Trump in large numbers. Nevertheless, given the absence of any anti-corporate Republican framing in the months that followed, it was probably a fluke, rather than a harbinger of institutional change.

Trump himself still banks on higher tariffs and arm-twisting to bring jobs back to really turn the Republican Party into the home of blue-collar workers. However, in the absence of serious industrial policy, tariffs and personal interventions will not bring jobs back in a sustainable manner. With more tax cuts, and tariffs unsupported by industrial policy, the second Trump term is likely to be even more disastrous for durable employment generation.

Project 2025 and the GOP’s current policy platform (announced in mid-July) provide only mumbo jumbo on these issues. They do not integrate any of Vance’s relatively more pro-labor positions. Most of the mainstream press declared that the GOP abandoned its traditional stances by announcing this platform in mid-July and became the Party of Trump. Yet, this is not an accurate description. Other than the issue of taxes and deregulation, there is no consistent framework in the July platform. And on those issues, the platform is “traditional GOP,” i.e., pro–big business and “free market.”

On that note, recall that this exact issue — taxes — led Steve Bannon to be ousted from the White House in summer 2017. When Bannon attempted to tax the rich to fund Trump’s infrastructure push, and Republican neoliberals started a campaign to ridicule and undermine him, there was no organized movement or intelligentsia that could stand up for Bannon. He had to leave the White House soon after his tax-the-rich campaign. Upon his exit, Bannon was crystal clear regarding how infrastructure and construction spending differentiated him from the GOP: “The Republican establishment . . . [are] not populists. . . . [They] had . . . no interest [in] infrastructure. . . . [W]here is the funding for the border wall, one of [Trump’s 2015–16 presidential bid’s] central tenets?” After Bannon’s departure, Trump did not develop any serious “national economy” positions. Trumpism created no “nationalist economics” back then. It is unlikely to do so now.

So, the question remains: If the GOP is still the party of big business, can Trumpism effectively align the GOP establishment and the working-class parts of his base?

Such realignment will run into its first big barrier when it comes to deportations. The Republican establishment might go with Trump’s “populism” in the beginning, but businesses could be hurt if the numbers of deported people climb up to the millions. Who will perform the dirty jobs if millions are deported? It could be argued that a partial realization of this plan will have a strong disciplining effect on migrant labor, making for a meeker and more pliant workforce more vulnerable to blackmail. However, there might be adverse, unintended consequences for the capitalist class. Even if US-born workers choose to replace immigrants in some venues, the ensuing labor scarcity would push wages up. This could thus outweigh the expected benefits. Given these business interests, beyond a certain point the Republican establishment and the Democrats could even coalesce and intervene to slow down the deportations.

Journals such as American Affairs and think tanks such as American Compass (and newsletters connected to them, e.g., Understanding America) have been trying to push Trump toward a more consistent “national economy” line. Such attempts have so far failed. These small circles of far-right intellectuals and cadres are trying to put a positive spin on things: “Unlike in 2016, we are ready to rule,” they appear to say. But Trump is not really buying into their line, and it is doubtful that he will give them any prominent positions to dictate policy.

Trump is more likely to put the likes of Elon Musk and other billionaires in charge of the economy, not far-right visionaries. Musk and his ilk are unlikely to create meaningful alternative policies that can secure the long-term support of workers — as contemporary far-right parties in Turkey and Hungary partly did, for instance.  Trump’s evolving cabinet picks are telling. Although they are seriously upsetting for the establishment, these picks are loyalists to the person of Trump, not to a far-right or populist ideological cause.

The only serious exception to the cronyism that has so far shaped the cabinet is Trump’s labor secretary pick, Lori Chavez-DeRemer, one of few House Republicans to have supported the PRO Act. With key conservatives such as Grover Norquist already mobilizing against her, it is not clear whether Chavez-DeRemer will be confirmed or, if she is, how much difference she could make.

Trump’s main orientations to the business class are roughly the same as in 2016: cronyism, lack of vision, and favoritism. Trump is no savior of the working class, but he is at best an unlikely and upsetting hero for the capitalist class. He panders to their short-term, economic-corporate, and personal interests more than their long-term and political-ideological interests as a group.

So, social and economic dynamics that could keep the Midwest, the Rust Belt, and the broader “angry male” working population loyal to Trump without alienating businesses are weak.

Fascists Aren’t Ready for Regime-Changing Mass Violence

Now, I come to my second thesis: due to Trump’s almost-inevitable failure to create durable enthusiasm on the economic front, there is simply no guarantee of a far-right victory in 2028. The exception would be some sort of violent intervention: perhaps in the shape of a January 6–type uprising or — given that this has been tried with less-than-optimal success — a more subtle but also more organized campaign of violence on election day or other similar interference.

It might appear that Project 2025 — a systematic plan to infiltrate and overhaul institutions — could give Trump the clout to render all subsequent elections meaningless. Will electoral engineering and institutional manipulation keep the far right in power even in the absence of class-based enthusiasm or decisive mass violence? Experts have pointed to Hungary’s Viktor Orbán as the exemplar of this strategy. However, for want of mass organizations and a sturdy class project, institutional infiltration and manipulation might not work as strongly. In fact, Orbán’s strategy has granted him fourteen years in power arguably because it was based on mass organization: a similar strategy in Poland secured far-right government only for eight years (2015–23) because it lacked such organized grounding. It is also significant that what remains of Hungarian civil society is more Orbán-aligned — and devolved institutions weaker — than in the American case.

So, the real question is: Is the far right ready for decisive violence? Polls have been indicating increasing attitudinal readiness on the part of Republicans regarding a “second civil war.” We also know that they have enough guns. Yet their organizations remain dispersed and thin. Despite growing dynamism documented by several journalists and academics, nothing like the Ku Klux Klan is on the horizon. There is no unified and savvy leadership that could turn an uprising into a successful coup.

Here, then, is my third thesis: we don’t have enough reason to think that the next January 6 would be more coordinated and effective (although we cannot entirely rule this possibility out).

So, I’ll stick to the argument I developed in early 2021, my fourth thesis here: the real danger is in the cavalier approach of the institutions to the far right, rather than the organization, resources, or social bases of the Right.

If institutions wanted to deal with the possibility of a game-changing insurrection in 2028, they could do so overnight. But the security and intelligence agencies hide behind “freedom of speech” and other excuses to shut their ears to warnings from journalists and experts (“embedded” ones among them) that the far right is getting ready for a civil war. The FBI and the courts do not care about the “freedom of speech” when it comes to the Left. They crack down on leftists whenever there is the slightest doubt of “danger,” which is very broadly defined. Yet, they will let violent far-right groups have an increasingly serious impact on politics and society.

But There Is a Fascist Threat

To pull my four theses together: the American far right doesn’t have what it takes, either in terms of programmatic vision, bases in social groups and classes, or level of organization and resources, to impose its rule long-term. But the decay in institutions can still pave the way to a far-right takeover.

Moreover, none of this should justify a complacent attitude with respect to the fascist threat. Paramilitary groups can still take advantage of the pending state terror to sow chaos and further organize. Mass deportations, raids, and state repression of especially anti-Israel protests will increasingly provide such opportunities for far-right organization.

The events at the University of California Los Angeles, in which campus authorities and the police facilitated far-right activists’ attacks against students, may portend what is to come. Imagine such implicit cooperation between authorities and violent far-rightists during a sweeping federal campaign to deport millions. The death toll of state terror could disproportionately rise if abetted by paramilitary violence, even in the absence of a fascist regime. My fifth thesis follows: neofascist mobilization and social harm will grow, without this meaning an immediate transition to a fascist regime.

Despite the clarity of this danger, one more difficulty confronts the Left. As the Harris electoral campaign has shown, anti-fascism is not a great sell on its own. The Left’s priority needs to be the construction of a solid base through workplace, tenant, and other mass organization. But each of these mass organizing activities needs to have an anti-fascist dimension. Only an organized working class, in a labor-led coalition with diverse social movements, can defeat fascism.