Coalition of Losers

In the end, Macron had no choice but to ally with what he once called the “old world.” Barnier got his start in conservative politics in the 1970s before winning a seat in parliament in the 1980s and holding several ministerial briefs under right-wing governments, before more recently serving as the European Union’s chief Brexit negotiator.

The Barnier government is likely the weakest in the history of France’s Fifth Republic. Together, the parties that formed the previous Macronist government, plus their newfound allies from Les Républicains, hold not far over two hundred seats — hardly more than the 193 legislators behind the NFP. Even if they can count on the circumstantial support of other independent centrist formations, in an assembly that counts a record eleven official caucuses, they’re far short of the 289 votes needed for an absolute majority.

Formed to block the Left from power and get a budget approved that upholds Macron’s agenda, the Barnier government could easily fall to a censure vote from the combined opposition forces. Its fate most likely rests in the hands of Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National, which counts 142 seats alongside its far-right allies, a breakaway faction from the Républicains headed by the party’s former leader Éric Ciotti. In a September 21 post on Twitter/X, Le Pen criticized Barnier’s coalition with the Macronists as “far from the desire for change expressed this past June,” referring to the EU elections and the first round of the parliamentary elections when her party emerged in first place.

Though the overall balance of power in the National Assembly is heavily in the Right’s favor, the disappointment is tangible for supporters of the NFP, which has demanded the right to govern since it won the largest share of seats in this summer’s elections. Coordinator of the NFP-aligned France Insoumise, Manuel Bompard, lambasted Barnier’s cabinet as uniting “everyone who lost the last elections,” denouncing the “greatest swindle of the Fifth Republic.”

The NFP is now gearing up for a confrontation with the sitting government and the president. The alliance’s combined secretaries on the National Assembly executive bureau — where the bloc holds an absolute majority — have brought to the parliamentary agenda a motion to impeach Macron. The measure has little chances of approval, with the Parti Socialiste — also part of the NFP — expected to reject it. But the bloc can be expected to vote in favor of censure votes targeting Barnier. Those motions also face little likelihood of success without a change of tack from the Le Pen’s Rassemblement National, which is adopting a wait-and-see approach to Barnier. This past Saturday, left-wing protesters took to the street in Paris against the Barnier government. A larger, union-led rally is scheduled for early October.

Cat-and-Mouse Game

Since 2017, and especially since losing an absolute majority in the National Assembly in 2022, Macron has been in a cat-and-mouse game with the Républicains. That enmity between the Macronists and the old conservative establishment was always more of a question of political ambitions and competing party apparatuses — Macron has absorbed a crop of Républicains stalwarts over the years — than serious policy differences.

For now, at least, Barnier’s government brings that charade to an end. As the two most powerful parties in the governing coalition, Macron’s party, Renaissance, and the Républicains carved out the choicest cabinet seats. Bruno Retailleau — former leader of the Républicains group in the Senate, where the party is in control — won the most sought-after spot: interior minister, a portfolio that ranges from policing and internal security to immigration. The other main prizes for the Républicains are higher education and agriculture.

As the biggest force in the coalition, Macron’s allies hold the largest cabinet contingent, including the national education, defense, and economy ministries. Rachida Dati, once a rising figure in the Républicains who jumped ship for Macron in January 2024, was reappointed as culture minister. The only new figure from the soft left of the political spectrum is the justice minister, Didier Migaud, a member of the Parti Socialiste until 2010 who has since led the national state audit court and a transparency watchdog.

The Barnier government is far from a full cohabition — the French term for a government in political opposition to the presidency — although Macron will lose some control over the direction of domestic policy. On international affairs Macron still holds sway, however, getting Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu reappointed. In a low-level spat with Barnier last week, Macron had his old confidant and outgoing foreign minister, Stéphane Séjourné, selected to replace Thierry Breton as the EU’s industrial policy commissioner. Séjourné’s replacement at the foreign ministry is Jean-Noël Barrot of the centrist MoDem, a party allied with Macron since 2017.

Perhaps what’s most telling about this government is who’s not in it: the most politically ambitious heavyweights of both the Macronists and the Républicains. Laurent Wauquiez, a known Républicains presidential hopeful, declined the economy and finance brief and will instead lead the right-wing party’s caucus in the National Assembly. The largely unknown thirty-three-year-old Renaissance MP Antoine Armand will take his place, replacing as economy minister the Macronist (and former Républicains figure) Bruno Le Maire, who had held the post since 2017.

Gabriel Attal, an old Macron protégé and the prime minister upended by this summer’s dissolution of parliament, will remain in the National Assembly as an MP. Gérald Darmanin, who jumped ship from the Républicains and had served in many cabinet positions under Macron from 2017, most recently as interior minister, has also been sidelined. He was known to be courting a position, ideally as foreign minister, possibly to buff up foreign policy credentials before a presidential bid. The Rassemblement National’s party president, Jordan Bardella, had drawn a red line around Darmanin’s return. He claimed that Macron’s past governments have been too liberal on policing and immigration — but mainly sought to flex the far right’s muscle over the government selection process.

Troubled Agenda

Beyond passing a budget, it’s unclear how much this government will be able to get done. The ruling parties have all sworn to cut spending — and prevent tax increases — and in the 2025 finance law will be looking to make steep cuts. But beyond that, the political calculations become more difficult.

Eager to keep a distinct “Macronist” political identity intact in the coming years, the president’s group in the National Assembly is headed by former premier Attal. In early tensions, Macron’s allies were up in arms last week over claims by Barnier that he would consider measures for “more fiscal justice,” including possible tax increases, and have warned against possible backsliding on reproductive and LGBTQ rights. The Républicains, meanwhile, will also be suspicious of signs that Barnier has too heavily diluted himself in with what remains a majority-Macronist government.

These disputes, again, are mostly about political jockeying before eventual elections. There are indeed points of convergence, even beyond the budget: for instance, a reform to weaken France’s public audiovisual sector, notably the web of state-owned radio and television stations, was on the docket before this summer’s snap election was called and is the object of a broad consensus from the Macronists to the Rassemblement National.

Another place where the Macronists and the Républicains (and Le Pen’s Rassemblement National) have converged in the past is immigration, with the three forces voting for a stiff immigration law last winter. The appointment of arch-conservative Républicains senator Retailleau to the interior ministry is a sign that the Barnier government could be willing to push further in that direction and point to some piece of consequential legislation beyond budgeting. At the very least, Retailleau’s appointment is recognition of the fact that Barnier’s short-term survival depends on the indulgence of the far right.

Long a critic of Macron’s alleged “laxity” on security, immigration, and secularism, Retailleau pledged at the interior ministry transfer of power to “restore order.” He announced on September 24 that he would seek criminal pursuits against France Insoumise MP Raphaël Arnault, a prominent anti-fascist activist elected to parliament this summer. Last weekend, Arnault had referred to the death of two Kanak protesters in New Caledonia as “assassinations” by French police clamping down on unrest in this overseas territory, prompting Rassemblement National figures to demand punishment against the left-winger.

In any case, this government — and likely this parliament — has a time stamp on its head. Le Pen has come out in favor of a new dissolution of parliament and elections next summer (by the constitution, they cannot be held before next June). Until then, the Rassemblement National says it will judge Barnier on a case-by-case basis, even though its votes combined with the NFP would in fact be enough to sink the new government. In late October, the Rassemblement National is planning to use its day in control of the National Assembly agenda — an annual right of opposition parties — to bring up the repeal of Macron’s 2023 increase in the retirement age, a measure also demanded by the Left.

After a first cabinet session on September 23, Barnier will make his opening address to the National Assembly on October 1, laying out his government’s priorities. But with such strong opposition forces circling, he and his cabinet would be wise to not get too comfortable in their new positions.