As tensions rose along the Ukrainian border last February, Keir Starmer traveled to NATO’s headquarters in Brussels, where he affirmed his “unshakable” commitment to the US-dominated military alliance. The trip signaled the extent of Labour’s foreign policy realignment since the Corbyn years. Following his election as leader in April 2020, Starmer touted his “pro-American” credentials, applauded the AUKUS trilateral security partnership, and strained every sinew to arrange an Oval Office photo op. The dominant mood within the party is now one of nostalgia for the unipolar era, when Britain served as chief enforcer for the US hegemon.

To revive that fading memory, Starmer envisions an imminent return to Great Power conflict, with the UK displaying maximal hostility toward America’s strategic rivals. After the Russian invasion on February 24, when Boris Johnson began to pour arms into Ukraine and roll out economic countermeasures, Starmer urged him to go further still, demanding “more sanctions,” “more military support,” “more to reassure and reinforce NATO allies in eastern Europe,” as well as a “post-9/11”-style surge in weapons spending.

These proposals demonstrated Starmer’s ingrained Atlanticist reflexes. Yet in recent weeks, his interest in the shifting geopolitical landscape has been eclipsed by more parochial questions. Given the leader’s hyperfactional mentality, Labour policymaking is often a cypher for internecine struggles. Positions are taken with a view to marginalizing internal opponents rather than solving social problems or courting swing voters. In this vein, Starmer’s response to the Ukraine crisis has exploited the prospect of a new cold war to inflame the forever war within his party.