The European debt crisis that began a decade ago has offered stark insights into not only the European Union itself but also the mechanisms of neoliberal crisis management. Greece was but the most extreme example of a eurozone state unable to refinance government debt and subjected to external “bailouts” designed only to protect the interests of its creditors. The austerity imposed by the European institutions led in 2015 to the election of a radical-left government that promised a change of course, only for it to rapidly fold to immense institutional and financial pressure.

If Syriza ultimately found its hands tied, what other mechanisms could it have brought into play? Historically speaking, governments in a similar situation have been able to take recourse to default, accepting short-term pain in exchange for being able to offload the debt burden which had been crippling their populations and economies. Yet as Jerome Roos explains in his recent book Why Not Default? The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt, such a recourse to default has in fact become increasingly difficult, as finance has expanded its power across our societies.

In this interview with George Souvlis, Jerome reflects on the Greek crisis but also other past examples in Mexico and Argentina. He explains how the dogmas surrounding debt have hardened in recent decades, the class war inherent in the “structural adjustment” plans promoted by bodies like the IMF, and the reasons why elites are increasingly unbothered about trampling on the democratic process.