Sovereignty and raison d’etat emerged after the Hundred Years War (1337–1453), the Thirty Years War (1455–1487), and a host of other wars in between. Sick of the bloodshed, wary of religious absolutism, the secular sovereign was seen as, above all, seeking stability. This meant countering the hegemonic aspirations of any state by decentralizing international power, forging favorable alliances (even with rivals), and remaining watchful of new states entering (and possibly changing) the existing constellation of political forces. The concept developed in concert with a new appreciation of the “balance of power,” the principles underpinning international law, and the extension of formal reciprocity to other sovereign states in choosing their government and religion.

In this system, policies that call for unqualified isolationism — which could result in an erosion of leverage — are as dangerous as those justifying impulsive intervention in the affairs of other states. There is a sense in which the two play off one another. Feelings that the state is alone, disrespected, and under siege heightens the appeal of paranoia and xenophobia, unpredictable policy choices, and the likelihood of war. Distinctions between “friend” and “enemy” blur and change so rapidly that purely instrumental considerations come into play. Any state can appear as an “enemy” or “friend” at any time not merely in principle but in fact. Strategy dissolves into tactics; the consequence is an inability to formulate any coherent or consistent policy. This is precisely the situation in which the United States now finds itself: sovereignty has been stripped of its connection with the balance of power, reciprocal recognition of other states, respect for international law, and — perhaps above all — stability.