The Smears Don’t Work Anymore

Ever since Israel’s armed forces began pulverizing the Gaza Strip as revenge for the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, activists looking to organize protests against the war and Germany’s material support for it have been tarred with false accusations of antisemitism. Practically any implication that October 7 was not, in fact, an utterly unprovoked and barbaric terrorist attack — but perhaps the ultimate consequence of an ongoing process of illegal occupation, oppression, and displacement on the part of successive Israeli governments — was practically verboten in mainstream discourse. Even prominent Jewish voices who sought to make such a case, like German American author Deborah Feldman, faced antisemitism accusations.

Meanwhile, the buzzword “imported antisemitism” — implying that Muslim immigrants were responsible for antisemitic attitudes in Germany — became a common talking point across most of the political landscape, as the anti-Muslim racism long proffered by the far right now converged with the political imperative to stand by Israel. In more sophisticated circles, seemingly sensible, liberal commentators like Süddeutsche Zeitung editor Ronen Steinke, though cautioning that Benjamin Netanyahu’s forces might be overdoing it with the carpet bombing of the Gaza Strip, did their utmost to defang any deeper exploration of the colonial origins of the conflict, confidently asserting that Israel could not be a settler-colony given that Jews had lived in the region for thousands of years.

A certain hesitancy to criticize Israel after October 7 was to be expected in Germany, the country whose historic crimes provided the impetus for Israel’s founding to begin with. Yet this climate of intense restraint lasted well into the second year of the war, after it had long become clear to practically all serious international observers and institutions that what the Israel Defense Forces was perpetuating in Gaza amounted to systematic ethnic cleansing and at least an attempt at genocide.

German media has remained overwhelmingly biased toward Israeli claims throughout the conflict, as researcher Fabian Goldmann recently documented for Jacobin. Even large parts of the Left — including both Die Linke and other extraparliamentary formations — largely accepted the official narrative and emphasized their solidarity with Israel even months into the indiscriminate destruction of Palestinian life in Gaza and accelerating ethnic cleansing in the West Bank.

Against this backdrop, the Palestine solidarity movement struggled to break out of its isolation, and for months, its mobilizations were largely restricted to the Palestinian and Muslim communities, along with small groups of non-German (often, Israeli) leftists. The brutal police violence against the movement, especially in Berlin, which was only hesitantly condemned by Die Linke, helped to further stigmatize the mobilizations. It sent a clear message to mainstream society: these were not legitimate protests but illegal hate speech.

Last Saturday’s demonstration made clear that the tide is turning. There had been an avalanche of negative reporting in the buildup to the protest, including several mainstream-media stories in which anonymous Die Linke functionaries made specious claims of rampant antisemitism among the organizing coalition and predicted disaster. Yet nothing of the sort occurred. The participation of tens of thousands of everyday Germans and the presence of numerous Die Linke MPs as parliamentary observers also restrained the police.

Because they failed to get the images of clashes and Hamas flags they hoped for, the mainstream German press is instead trying to cover its ass, acknowledging that the war has “divided Germany” or complaining that antisemitism is on the rise because Israel “failed to precisely explain” why its flagrant crimes against humanity in Gaza are unfortunate but necessary. They still defend Israel’s crimes, but the one-sidedness of the last two years has hit a limit, and some adjustment is in order.

The demonstration’s organizers mostly agree that a seismic shift is occurring. Tsafrir Cohen, director of the NGO Medico International, described the protest as a “bridge” between the marginalized Palestine movement and the broader German public, whose opposition to Israel’s actions in Gaza “could not find an appropriate expression, because the commitment to Germany’s own history of violence as a prerequisite for an open, anti-nationalist and thus immigration-friendly Germany has degenerated into anti-migrant rhetoric in elite discourse.” But this protest could be a “tipping point” for ending German complicity.

Medico does not exactly represent Germany’s bourgeois center, but rather its left-leaning, green section. Still, Cohen is correct: the lack of public solidarity with Gaza is, above all, an expression of how far to the Right official opinion has drifted in the last years. If the movement succeeds in integrating protests against the genocide into a broader mobilization against the Right, it could not only ratchet up the pressure on the center but also chip away at far-right influence.

Die Linke and the Palestine Movement Stand to Gain

Though the shift in public opinion is significant, and last Saturday’s demonstration signaled (some) Germans’ growing willingness to speak up against Israeli war crimes, it will still take time to convince the broad middle of society that solidarity with Palestine is not antisemitic, and that attending a demonstration will not risk their job.

Even if the pro-Israel establishment is now on the defensive, it will take time — and lots of patient coalition-building — to turn this crack in the proverbial dam into a deluge. The shift within Die Linke, however, both shows that it’s possible and poses an important tool with which to leverage further shifts.

Many rank-and-file Die Linke members, along with a minority of particularly courageous parliamentarians, were deeply involved with Palestine solidarity all along. Yet it’s no exaggeration to say that the party leadership strove to marginalize the issue as long as it could, even up to the demonstration itself. The term “genocide” was strenuously avoided. While members who “questioned Israel’s right to exist” faced expulsion on several occasions, a vocal minority of functionaries, such as regional heavyweight Bodo Ramelow, publicly accused the movement of spreading Hamas propaganda, without facing any consequences.

Not so last Saturday. It would appear that, overwhelmed by the sheer size of the demonstration and impressed by the cool reception they received from many protesters, party leaders decided spontaneously to use the word “genocide” for the first time and apologize for their previous recalcitrance. But regardless of why the shift happened, it will be next to impossible to walk back, and the movement now has to consider how to respond to Die Linke’s apparent overture. If the movement is interested in expanding and building a majoritarian coalition against the genocide, we can only hope that it answers positively.

Germany’s Palestine solidarity movement has been trapped in a vicious cycle since October 2023, whereby — demonized and ostracized by mainstream society — it responds to that demonization with further radicalization, its verbal militancy effectively correlating with its irrelevance on the national stage. This dynamic was well-illustrated at the “United4Gaza” demonstration in late June, which, although also rallying tens of thousands of protesters, was visibly dominated by the ultraleft fringe and tended to favor radical posturing over popular demands.

Though holding up a sign that says “Fuck Germany” might feel justified given the country’s deafening silence, it certainly won’t help to rally more Germans to the cause. In many ways, this sort of performative radicalism even helps Israel apologists maintain the upper hand, as they can more easily write off the movement as extremist.

Public and consistent support from Die Linke will give the Palestine movement — and more importantly, the people in Gaza — a loud voice in the Bundestag for the first time. Actions like last week’s display of a Palestine flag by four Die Linke MPs, though itself little more than a stunt, point to much bigger potential. The party could, as formerly during the war in Afghanistan, organize larger, coordinated protest actions within the halls of parliament, while at the same time introducing motions condemning Israeli conduct and calling on the German government to do more to push for a ceasefire.

Last year, attempts by Die Linke MPs to introduce a motion recognizing the State of Palestine foundered on the opposition of several pro-Israel colleagues. Given the balance of forces on the streets and in the party today, that kind of opposition is hard to imagine. As Nicole Gohlke, one of the first Die Linke MPs to speak out loudly against the war, told Jacobin, the party had “finally connected with the public mood” and could “not allow itself to go back to being driven by right-wing media and a small minority of members.” Presumably, her sentiment is shared by many of her Bundestag colleagues, even if they are less vocal — for now.

Consistent pressure by Die Linke will also be vital in pushing other political parties to express opposition to the war in Gaza. Both the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens were conspicuously absent from Saturday’s demonstration. Though the SPD, as the junior partner in the governing coalition, can hardly be expected to break ranks with federal chancellor Friedrich Merz, the Greens have already shown a bit of movement.

The shift in tone among middle-of-the-road climate activists like Luisa Neubauer over the last few months — expressing sadness at the slaughter in Gaza and even edging toward walking back her criticism of Greta Thunberg on a recent podcast — reflects a deeper rethink within Germany’s center left. As tempting as it may be to write them off as opportunists, building a winning coalition for Palestine requires doing the opposite.

In the end, a more aggressive stance on Gaza by Die Linke would benefit both the movement and the party. By bolstering its profile as the only pro-Palestinian party in parliament, Die Linke can continue to distinguish itself from the other opposition parties and, in the future, plausibly argue that its very public pressure is what has pushed the German government to walk back its most hawkish positions. And unlike social policy, on which Die Linke is already putting up strong opposition, an end to military cooperation with Israel also would not cost the state any money — indeed, quite the opposite.

For the movement, having an ally in parliament vastly increases its own leverage within the German public and its ability to pressure official politics. Just this week, a parliamentary inquiry by Die Linke MP Lea Reiser revealed that Germany had approved €2.5 million of additional weapons shipments to Israel since the alleged weapons export ban took effect.

At the same time, the newfound relationship between the party and movement could encourage a process of clarification within Die Linke itself. A number of functionaries from the party’s rightmost fringe already left in protest last year following an initial declaration of solidarity with Gaza — presumably, at least a few more are considering doing the same after last weekend. After all, most of their politics would be equally at home with the Social Democrats or Greens.

The last two years have been devastating and alienating for Palestinians living in Germany and their allies. That devastation and alienation has not ended, but since last weekend, for the first time, a plausible way forward appears within reach. And Die Linke has an important role to play in getting there.