In my contribution, I want to revisit the main conclusions of my writings on 1917, especially as they relate to the thorny, still deeply politicized question of how the Bolsheviks won out in the struggle for power in 1917 Petrograd. However, let me start with a few words about the views of earlier historians on this issue.

To Soviet historians, the October 1917 revolution was the legitimate expression of the will of the revolutionary Petrograd masses — a popular armed uprising in support of Bolshevik power led by a highly disciplined vanguard party, brilliantly directed by V. I. Lenin. Western historians, on the other hand, have tended to view the Bolsheviks’ success as the consequence of the Provisional Government’s softness toward the radical left; a historical accident or, most frequently, the result of a well-executed military coup, lacking significant popular support, carried out by a small, united, highly authoritarian and conspiratorial organization controlled by Lenin and subsidized by enemy Germany. To historians holding the latter view — which now includes many historians in Russia today — the structure and practices of the Bolshevik party in 1917 were the inevitable progenitor of Soviet authoritarianism.

The conclusions of my research work on 1917 departed in significant ways from these common interpretations. To illustrate this point, let me take note of a few important, still often overlooked moments during the crucial summer and fall of 1917 which seemed me to be of special importance in understanding the character and course of the “October Revolution” in Petrograd. I will then summarize how “Red October” looks to me today.