1 in 1,000

The catastrophe was the result of a fatal combination of an extreme weather event, reckless urban development, and political ineptitude that could lead to criminal charges. DANAs (isolated high-level depressions, a meteorological technical term that has entered common usage in Spain) are part of the climate in eastern Spain — but their intensity has increased with the climate crisis. The one last October 29 was so intense it was statistically a 1-in-1,000-year event.

The hardest-hit area was Horta Sud, a largely working-class area on the outskirts of Valencia with a very high population density, much of it built on floodplains. The area is crisscrossed by numerous barrancos — dry riverbeds for most of the year that turned into immense torrents that day, covering towns with up to three meters of water and mud, and sweeping away everything in their path, including over a hundred thousand cars reduced to scrap metal. The effects were more akin to a tsunami than a river overflowing.

Yet also decisive was the ineptitude of the regional government, which is responsible for emergency services. In the affected towns, alongside candles memorializing the dead, one can still see banners with the text “20:11. Neither forgotten nor forgiven.” This refers to the time, 8:11 p.m., when the regional government sent a warning to mobile phones telling people to take shelter, by which point dozens had already drowned. Since no one had warned them, people thought it would be a minor flood like others common in the area and carried on with their lives as normal. Many people died trapped in their garages, where they had gone to move their cars to keep them from getting wet.

Although the affected area is just a few miles from Valencia — which suffered no damage — tens of thousands of people were completely cut off, without power or running water, many without phone service, and unable to get food or medicine. Emergency services took several days to reach some areas due to the destruction of many roads and communication routes being blocked by mud, but also due to the regional government’s lack of preparedness. Mazón’s government also resisted asking for the necessary help from Pedro Sánchez’s national government, led by the center-left Socialists (PSOE). With state aid lacking, thousands of volunteers went on foot to the affected towns, bringing people basic supplies and helping them start cleanup efforts. A year later, the work is still ongoing.

Political Impacts

The popularity of President Mazón, soon plummeted. More than 70 percent of the region’s population wanted his resignation, according to polls, and many held him directly responsible for the deaths. Since the day of the floods, there have been twelve demonstrations in Valencia demanding that he quit, one of them the largest protest since the 2003 Iraq War. At the official commemoration held for the victims this October 29, a year on from the tragedy, several relatives of the deceased shouted “murderer” at him. On November 3, he finally left his position. Support for his PP has dropped considerably, though polls still count it as the most-supported party in the region, at just over 30 percent.

The two main opposition parties in Valencia are the PSOE and Compromís, a left-wing regionalist party close to Yolanda Díaz’s Sumar. Both have seen a slight increase in voter support over the past year, with the PSOE close to the PP and Compromís at around 15 percent. However, public discontent also extends to Sánchez and his party. Many have criticized the prime minister for not immediately deciding — upon seeing the regional government’s failings — to use his constitutional powers to directly take over management of the emergency. A common interpretation is that Sánchez — known as a calculating politician — was more worried about avoiding political fallout than helping the people of Valencia.

The central government’s argument was that taking control of the emergency would have been technically risky, as the Valencian emergency services had better knowledge of the terrain. Both elements were likely present in Sánchez’s mind. Compromís, for its part, is a parliamentary ally of the PSOE in Spain’s national Congress and governed the Valencian region for eight years with the Socialists, so it is not seen as entirely separate from Sánchez either. If this left-wing, environmentalist party may be expected to have much to say about the causes and handling of this disaster, it has lacked an aggressive strategy to capitalize politically.

Both parties support an ambitious environmental agenda — although the PSOE’s stance is full of contradictions, such as proposals to expand ports and airports —and they criticize the predatory urban development pushed by the current Valencian government, which has proven to be at odds with the need to adapt to increasingly extreme rainfall. In fact, two weeks after the DANA weather event, the parliamentary majority formed by the PP and Vox in Valencia approved a legislative reform to allow the construction of hotels just 200 meters from the coast (the previous limit was 500 meters), once again prioritizing the interests of the real estate and tourism sectors over the protection of the land and its people. However, a year after the tragedy, the political effect of these stances on the ecological crisis has proven very weak.

The main beneficiary of the shock has been Vox, which has surpassed 16 percent in voter intention in the latest polls in the Valencia region. Its support for predatory urban development and its opposition to climate policies have not reduced its electoral support. This apparent contradiction is explained by several factors. First, Vox is now, across Spain, the main alternative for conservative voters disillusioned with the PP. Therefore, many people who voted for Mazón but are outraged by his handling of the emergency are turning to the far-right party, which has already become normalized in the Spanish political landscape. Vox governed with Mazón for a year — and in fact contributed to weakening the regional emergency system and climate policies. However, Vox was fortunate that the DANA hit some months after it left the government, sparing it this embarrassing association even though it actually maintained its parliamentary support for Mazón.

The second element explaining why Vox has harnessed part of the discontent lies in the chaotic days following the floods. Outrage with the “political class” (in general) became common sense in the affected areas due to the feeling of abandonment. Over the following months, conflicts between the regional and national governments over their respective responsibilities in disaster management was added to the mix. The slogan “Only the People Save the People” became popular during those traumatic days of October and November, drawing a dividing line between the volunteers who rushed to help with their own hands and government authorities.

The wave of volunteers, who came from all over Spain and even other countries, was a genuine moment of popular mutual aid that demonstrated, once again, that in disasters, solidarity spontaneously prevails over selfishness. However, far-right activists also came to the area, some of whom organized racist distribution of aid, and influencers spread disinformation about the causes of the tragedy. Their goal was to downplay the influence of global warming on the DANA and to blame Sánchez, the number-one enemy of the Spanish far right — with lies such as the claim that his government had caused the floods by destroying dams.

In the last twelve months, public investment (both national and regional) in cleaning up and rebuilding the affected area has been immense, and abundant financial aid has been granted. However, the trauma of the institutional abandonment in the first days, the slowness in granting aid, and the frustration over the catastrophic effects of the floods have continued to fuel distrust of the political system and the governing parties — at a time when Vox is, across Spain, the political force most capable of presenting itself as anti-system. The participation of most left-wing parties in Sánchez’s government prevents them from playing this role.

The Unexpected Impacts of a Climate Disaster

It is naive to think that a climate-related disaster will necessarily reduce support for climate-skeptic political forces. The vast majority of the Spanish population is aware of the effects of the climate crisis and demands decisive action to address it, but in a tragedy of this magnitude, this factor is outweighed by others with greater political power. The Valencia case suggests that the only apt response from institutional politics in the face of a disaster of these dimensions is to make resources available to the affected people in the shortest time possible, without worrying excessively about formal divisions of jurisdiction, and to communicate this unconditional commitment to the population. As the pandemic demonstrated, much of the legitimacy of democratic states today resides in their ability to protect the population from crises that will become increasingly severe and frequent.

A similar point can be made for social movements and left-wing parties not in government. Valencia’s popular movements sent many volunteers and played a key role in coordinating aid, and some political organizations, like the Catalan pro-independence left, also sent many activists. However, most of the Spanish left showed excessive confidence in the institutional response, while far-right youth organizations quickly sent activists and trucks full of aid, gaining visibility and using it to misinform the population with self-serving falsehoods.

The political effects of a climate disaster are never predetermined. Rather than rely on climate deniers being discredited by such disasters, left-wing parties have to step up to the plate and show that they can protect people from the effects of this mounting crisis.