Emmanuel Macron Doubles Down on Austerity

France’s new prime minister has resisted calls to suspend Emmanuel Macron’s 2023 pension reform. While left-wing opposition parties want to undo Macron’s agenda, the president is defending his attacks on welfare as a prized legacy.

Ever since his first election, Emmanuel Macron promised to shake up the codes of French politics. Yet with debt soaring, parliament gridlocked, and social conflict rising, he is nothing more than a lame-duck president. (Ludovic Marin / AFP via Getty Images)

France’s new prime minister Sébastien Lecornu has rejected the suggestion that the opposition Parti Socialiste might weigh in on his 2026 budget plans. Shooting down each of the center-left party’s demands, Lecornu spurned talk of a suspension of President Emmanuel Macron’s 2023 retirement age hike. He dismissed calls for a targeted levy on the country’s largest fortunes, or even for the reinstatement of a smaller wealth tax on private assets, scrapped at the beginning of Macron’s presidency.

In short, Macron’s close confidant wants to double down on a program of fiscal austerity, which will hit working- and middle-class French people the hardest. The president’s allies point to the country’s swollen budget deficit — expected to hit 5.4 percent of GDP in 2025, the current highest in the eurozone — to argue for a package of spending and welfare cuts.

Yet Lecornu is far from having the parliamentary majority that he’d need to force through such an unpopular and unbalanced economic program. One month after the deeply divided parliament ousted the previous premier François Bayrou, the Macronite center is again digging in behind its red lines.

This should come as little surprise. Macron has governed from the right since his first election in 2017 and has no intention of changing course now (his second term officially finishes in spring 2027). The president’s hand-picked prime minister is expected to again meet in the coming days with the far-right and center-left oppositions who hold the keys to his survival. But his hands are tied. Speculation is already mounting about another government collapse, with people again hitting the streets on October 2 in union-led marches and strikes.

A fresh defeat would only exacerbate the crisis of legitimacy facing Macron, who is reaping the bitter fruits of his decision to call snap elections in summer 2024. Most polling now has the president in the high teens in approval ratings — a record low for Macron in his now eight years in office.

Yet such questions of popularity ultimately won’t determine whether Macron’s tenure has been a success. Since 2017, his chief mission has been to facilitate a transfer of social and economic power toward corporations and the wealthy, whether through tax cuts and attacks on organized labor, or via the erosion of social-democratic welfare rights. Now that his back is against the wall, the priority is to hold on to those victories in the war of position that France’s shattered party system has become.

Elections? Which Elections?

If the government again collapsed, Macron’s most likely maneuver would be to order the dissolution of the National Assembly, thus prompting an election, sixteen months after he last called a snap contest in June 2024. Behind the scenes, France’s political forces are already preparing campaign plans and candidate lists. This makes the doggedness of Macron’s camp in the ongoing budget talks even more beguiling. His supporters likely stand to suffer the most from a fresh election.

The president’s best hope is that holding another election might paper over his role in the current parliamentary logjam. “The June 2024 dissolution did not make sense to a lot of people,” says constitutional law scholar Dominique Rousseau. “Today, if there’s a dissolution, it would at least have some justification: it would be about the budget.”

But even in a new campaign focused on budgeting and austerity, there’s reason to doubt that a clear majority would emerge. The lower house could well remain mired in the three-way split baked in by last summer’s elections. A poll conducted following Bayrou’s ouster in early September suggested as much, pointing to the far right winning roughly a third of the electorate. They’re followed by various configurations of a rebooted left-wing alliance, with Macron’s camp and his right-wing Républicains allies trailing behind.

The all-too-possible scenario of inconclusive parliamentary elections has fed suggestions that the only way out of the impasse is for Macron to resign, accelerating presidential elections currently scheduled for 2027. Some polls suggest that half of the public wish that Macron would abandon the presidency, a fraction that rises to nearly two-thirds in some studies.

The left-wing party France Insoumise has been pushing the idea since last fall, when Macron refused to appoint a prime minister from the Left after the Nouveau Front Populaire alliance eked out a first-place finish in snap elections. “The choice that the French people need to make now is if they want to force Macron’s resignation,” France Insoumise MP Danièle Obono told Jacobin, as the party lends its support to ongoing anti-austerity protests.

France Insoumise’s counterparts in the Nouveau Front Populaire view this demand with suspicion, fearing that a presidential election, polarizing the political cycle around big-ticket personalities such as Jean-Luc Mélenchon or Marine Le Pen, is above all designed to restore France Insoumise’s hegemony over the Left. “I’m not sure that it’s the desirable solution that some make it out to be,” Socialist deputy Arthur Delaporte told Jacobin, pointing to the far right’s strong polling position.

Throw In the Towel?

It is almost inconceivable that Macron would heed those calls. Yet behind the demand that Macron abandon the presidency, there is more than just the arm wrestling on the French left.

One argument for a fresh presidential election is that it’s the only way to deliver the requisite jolt needed for a stable governing majority. The French Fifth Republic’s political system is ill designed to deal with the situation in which it now finds itself: with an ungovernable parliament, caught in a nearly even three-way split between far-right, centrist and left-wing blocs. With so little authority at the top, there’s not enough incentive for the parties down the pyramid of institutional power to work together.

That devastated political landscape may be the result of Macron’s governing strategy, but Rousseau is not convinced. “Nothing in the constitution obliges Macron to resign in light of his sinking approval ratings,” the Sorbonne professor told Jacobin. Past presidents from François Mitterrand to Jacques Chirac have been dealt major defeats or found themselves in the doldrums of unpopularity, only to cling to power.  In 1997, Chirac dissolved the National Assembly in the hope of winning a mandate for austerity cuts. Instead, the Left won a majority, forcing the president into a “cohabitation” with Socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin.

In any case, it is by now doubtful that a fresh presidential election is bound to yield the eventual winner a majority in parliament, too.

If the last twelve months are any indication, Macron is more than willing to accommodate himself with a hamstrung lower house, leaning on a domesticated minority coalition to hold off challenges to his policy record. This spring, the paralysis did not prevent agreement by large majorities of legislators, from far right to center left, for stringent tough-on-crime legislation. In a pinch, the president’s allies can barter away concessions to the far right on immigration.

There is also talk of institutional reform in the form of introducing proportional representation in the lower house — long a demand from Le Pen and her allies. Despised at home, Macron can try to find some solace in the limelight of international galas and diplomacy, leaving parliament to lumber from budget showdown to budget showdown.

But the days of all-conquering, triumphant Macronism are surely over. For the president, who poses as the “guardian” of institutional continuity, blocking any retreat on his agenda is reason enough to hold on to control. Last Friday, Lecornu seemed to acknowledge just that when he took a suspension of pension reform off the table in budget talks, saying it would “be a good subject for the presidential elections.” Whenever they come, at least the lines are drawn.