Union Complacency

This troubling pattern of decline has not led to any sense of urgency among New York labor leaders. Perhaps the relative strength of unions in New York compared to the rest of the country and the ritualistic proclamations of the virtues of unionism from leading politicians have fostered complacency. But organized labor’s passivity in the face of eroding strength has left millions of local workers without the benefits of collective action and contributed to making New York one of the most unequal cities in the nation. And as union membership becomes ever more the exception rather than the rule, unionized workers become more vulnerable to employer pushback and changes in the political climate.

Very few New York unions do much organizing, and many do none at all. Even the most energetic unions have signed up a surprisingly modest number of workers. The United Auto Workers (UAW), which has been at the forefront of organizing higher education and cultural workers, added only 1,571 members in New York City between January 2023 and June 2024. The Service Employees International Union (SEIU), which includes giant units in health care and building services that are very active in organizing, added 847 members, plus another 287 members at Starbucks (affiliated through Workers United). And these unions are the most successful in new organizing! Many union leaders concentrate exclusively on representing the workers they already have, considering it not their problem to organize new workplaces in their own sectors or others.

If organized labor maintains this passive stance, it will all but shrivel away. In the past, there were moments when the entire New York labor movement took it upon itself to organize workers across the economy. In the 1950s and ’60s, the drive by Local 1199, which had been a small pharmacy union, to organize hospital workers succeeded only because other unions gave it money, lent it organizers, and mobilized their political clout on its behalf. For its part, the New York City Central Labor Council launched a low-wage worker organizing drive that, among other things, succeeded in unionizing taxi drivers, before the industry switched to a leasing model that undermined the union gains.

By contrast, over the past few years, when Amazon and Starbucks workers clashed with their employers, most unions were nowhere in sight. Yet New York unions could easily have mounted large picket lines and demonstrations outside of Starbucks stores and Amazon offices throughout the city in a show of solidarity or aided the organizing effort in other ways.

The State of the Public Sector

There has been a lively debate of late among union activists and labor scholars about how best to organize workers, but New York City rarely figures in their discussions, presumably because of the assumption that organized labor in New York is doing much better than it is elsewhere. Multiunion, coordinated organizing drives in the United States have a spotty record of success and failure. But mobilizing the whole New York labor movement at least holds the promise of breaking out of the current situation, in which flashes of energy and some organizing successes have been too episodic and small-scale to yield significant numerical gains.

A new approach would require broader thinking, including having the well-funded, public sector unions commit resources to help organizing in the private sector. Doing so is in their own interest. If New York ends up with a crusading anti-union governor or mayor — someone like Scott Walker, who decimated public sector unions in Wisconsin — with less than 14 percent of the private sector organized, government workers will have few allies and little support outside their own ranks. The possibility that Elise Stefanik may be the next governor means such a scenario is not far-fetched.

Even without an anti-union crusade, public sector unions have problems they need to address.  Under a 1976 state law, municipal unions could — and did — sign contracts that required workers who did not want to join to pay an “agency fee” to cover the cost of representing them in bargaining, grievances, and other matters, though not political action. (Recognized unions generally are legally required to represent all workers in their jurisdiction in bargaining and grievances, whether or not they are members.) Then, in 2018, in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees [AFSCME], Council 31, the US Supreme Court ruled that such contracts violate First Amendment free speech rights. Since then, public employees have been able to enjoy the benefits of union membership without paying dues or an equivalent fee.

The New York municipal unions launched impressive post-Janus campaigns to convince workers to stay members, but over time the number of free riders has grown. While the few, modest efforts by right-wing groups to convince workers to quit their unions have not been terribly effective, a more concerted, well-funded drive might prove more destructive. So the pressure is greater than ever on unions to win significant contractual gains as proof that unionism is worth the cost. (When I was teaching at the City University of New York, I paid a hair over 1 percent of my salary as dues to my union, the Professional Staff Congress — well worth it, but not an insignificant amount.)

But New York municipal unions have routinely failed to win much at the bargaining table. Of late, many contracts have not even matched the rate of inflation, and some workers have been burdened by increased copays for medical care. Unionism seems mainly a defensive mechanism against takeaways. The idea that it might be an avenue to an ever-better life is increasingly forgotten.

Structural Constraints

The meager results at the bargaining table reflect structural disadvantages that New York government workers face. Best known is the prohibition on striking, in place in one form or another since 1947. Afraid of the consequences of breaking the law, labor’s most powerful weapon is not even considered by most public sector unions.

Equally restraining is the system of pattern bargaining, in place for city unions since the mid-1970s fiscal crisis. To keep unions from building on each other’s gains, the city generally picks one union to bargain with first in each contract round and then forces all the other unions to agree to similar terms. On top of that, many individual nonuniformed unions do not get to bargain about basic working hours, working conditions, sick leave, or vacation. Instead, a “citywide contract” covering those areas, bargained by the largest city union, District Council 37 (AFSCME), applies to most mayoral agency employees, whether or not they belong to that union.

Finally, health insurance for city workers is likewise not bargained by individual unions but by the Municipal Labor Committee (MLC), which is dominated by DC 37 and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT). In recent years, those unions got the MLC to pledge hundreds of millions of dollars of reductions in health care costs for city workers in the belief that somehow those dollars would end up in workers’ pockets through wage increases. Among other things, the MLC agreements have led to the effort by the city to force retirees out of traditional Medicare into Medicare Advantage, like it or not.

The arcane bargaining system for New York City employees — with some workers covered by three separate agreements — brings the worst of all worlds to those it encompasses. On the one hand, the fragmentation of bargaining, on top of the fragmenting of the workforce into scores of different union locals, weakens the power of the massive workforce. On the other hand, the forced linkages of unions, through pattern bargaining, the citywide contract, and the MLC, serve not to strengthen them but to restrain their freedom of action.

These structural challenges are daunting, but it is nonetheless notable how reluctant labor leaders are to address them, seemingly content to do their best within their confines. Yet there are lots of things they might do to change the landscape on which they operate. Take the ban on walkouts. Occasionally, labor-backed bills to amend the Taylor Law, which includes the strike prohibition, are introduced in Albany, but labor leaders never mount a full-scale press behind them — almost as if they are frightened by the possibility they might have to lead out their members.

Of course, lots of labor action historically has been illegal, including the many strikes in the 1960s that helped establish the power of New York public sector unions. Striking against the law is certainly risky, but in 1980 and 2005, the subway and bus workers did it and lived to see another day. This past winter, upstate prison guards went on strike for three weeks in defiance of not only the state government but also their own union leaders. Repeatedly, the state was forced to make concessions to try to get them back on the job, while acting as if the Taylor Law simply did not exist. Ultimately, only the bitter-end holdouts lost their jobs, and it looks like many of them will eventually get them back. It turns out that if labor applies enough pressure, the law turns flexible.

Unions don’t even talk about the other structural impediments they face. The citywide contract and the MLC are treated like immutable natural facts. But these over-a-half-century-old arrangements were put in place in particular circumstances for particular reasons. Nothing would stop the city from changing them if unions joined together to apply enough pressure. Even more remarkable is the durability of pattern bargaining, which has no statutory basis (something that shocks even most rank-and-file activists, who assume it is encoded in law). Pattern bargaining survives only because the unions tolerate it.

Some structural arrangements could be turned on their head to become advantages. Imagine if all the major municipal unions banded together and demanded to bargain a pattern together. Add to that an implicit or explicit threat of job action if the city refused to allow such an approach, and we can glimpse what the labor movement might be able to do.

Getting the Dog to Bark

Why are the public sector unions so passive? Some of it is a risk-averse mentality that has pervaded the movement since the 1970s fiscal crisis. Some of it is that current arrangements bolster the relative power of the largest unions, especially the UFT and DC 37, which their leaders no doubt cherish. And to be fair, some leaders may have a gut understanding of how powerful capital can be if it faces a real challenge and decides to put some spine in the local political leaders it helps place into office.

Private sector unionists have reasons for passivity too. Since the 1980s, when the political climate turned more conservative and a series of large strikes were defeated by emboldened companies, labor has been on the defensive. When in 1995, John Sweeney won election as American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) president on an insurgent slate committed to ramping up organizing, hopes ran high. But in spite of many initiatives by the federation and some of its affiliates, like SEIU, when Sweeney stepped down in 2009, the percentage of the workforce that belonged to a union was lower than when he was elected. For many union leaders, the lesson was: don’t invest in a losing cause.

How do we get the dog to bark? One thing about established labor leaders, conservative or progressive, is that they usually have a pretty good feel for what their membership is thinking. When the retiree chapter of the UFT voted out allies of union president Michael Mulgrew, a key backer of the city effort to force retirees into Medicare Advantage, within days the union reversed its position. It will take pressure from below for New York unions, in both the private and public sector, to realize the alarm bells are ringing and that it is time to move, now.

There are plenty of young activists in the New York labor movement. Some are focused on kicking out the old crowd or on reforms specific to their occupations and their unions. But like top officials, they need to think broadly and realize that if things keep going like they are, even the most democratic and militant union will fail because of its isolation. Reformers and activists, with or without the participation of union officials, need to build collaborative structures that cut across union lines to share information about issues their members face and to act solidaristically on behalf of each other’s fights with employers.

Retired city workers have already done this with the NYC Organization of Public Service Retirees, which has led the fight to block Medicare Advantage. There are some efforts by groups like the New York City chapter of Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) to do the same for active employees. The DSA Labor Working Group brings together workers across sectoral and organizational lines. The Rank and File Project and others have encouraged young activists to take jobs where they can help bolster unions. The Emergency Workplace Organizing Committee (EWOC) has created a new model for supporting workers who want to unionize (though so far, in terms of recognized bargaining units, the payoff has been limited).

Acting boldly, barking loudly, might not work. But we know for sure that not doing so will lead to labor’s demise, slowly or quickly. Why not take a chance?