There May Be No Choice but to Nationalize Oil and Gas — and Renewables, Too
The global oversupply of oil and gas before the pandemic, plus the massive slump in demand as a result of lockdown, has put the profitability of the sector in extreme crisis. The case for nationalizing energy production has never been stronger.

A wind turbine spins as steam rises from the cooling towers of a coal-fired power plant near Peitz, Germany. (Sean Gallup / Getty Images)
Once on the margin of the margins, calls for the nationalization of US fossil fuel interests are growing. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the basic argument was this: nationalization could expedite the phasing out of fossil fuels in order to reach climate targets while ensuring a “just transition” for workers in coal, oil, and gas. Nationalization would also remove the toxic political influence of “Big Oil” and other large fossil fuel corporations. The legal architecture for nationalization exists — principally via “eminent domain” — and should be used.
But the case for nationalization has gotten stronger in recent months. The share values of large fossil fuel companies have tanked, so this is a good time for the federal government to buy. In April 2020, one source estimated that a 100 percent government buyout of the entire sector would cost $700 billion, and a 51 percent stake in each of the major companies would, of course, be considerably less. However, in May 2020 stock prices rose by a third or so based on expectations of a fairly rapid restoration of demand.
But fears of a fresh wave of COVID-19 outbreaks sent shares tumbling downward in June. Nationalizing oil and gas would be a radical step, but this alone would not be enough to deliver a comprehensive energy transition that can meet climate goals as well as the social objectives of the Green New Deal. Such a massive task will require full public ownership of refineries, investor-owned utilities (IOUs), and nuclear and renewable energy interests.