<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/"><title type="text">Jacobin</title><id>https://jacobin.com</id><updated>2026-10-13T20:54:25.828946Z</updated><link href="https://jacobin.com"/><logo>https://jacobin.com/static/img/logo/logo-type.png</logo><subtitle type="text">Jacobin is a leading voice of the American left, offering socialist perspectives on politics, economics, and culture.</subtitle><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/neukolln-berlin-die-linke-palestine</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/neukolln-berlin-die-linke-palestine"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/426811458509.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/426811458509.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/426811458509.jpg"/><title type="text">Neukölln, the Berlin District Where the Left Broke Through</title><updated>2026-10-13T20:26:05.288949Z</updated><author><name>Frederik Blauwhof</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><category label="Party Politics" term="Party Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Amid resounding recent victories for the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), on September 20 Germany’s socialist party Die Linke bucked the trend with a spectacular victory in Berlin. It dominated the campaign with its program of ending cuts, capping rents, and socializing housing companies, leaving other parties to respond to the popular demand that Berliners had confirmed in a <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/08/socialized-housing-berlin-elections-die-linke">2021 referendum</a>. The monster victory for the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt further galvanized Berlin’s diverse urban working class to express opposition to the fascists.</p><p>Die Linke’s doubling of its vote in Berlin, winning 25.7 percent support, was no blip. The February 2025 federal election, when Die Linke enjoyed a comeback after years of stagnation, crisis, and splits, already saw a turn to the left in urban centers, among young people, women, migrants, and the Muslim community. At that point already, Die Linke won 20 percent of the vote, with striking gains in inner-city areas of Mitte, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, and Neukölln. In the September 20 Berlin state election, it did even better.</p><p>This victory didn’t just come from the party’s media profile or even its policy agenda. Its result follows a groundswell of coordinated campaigning by local Die Linke branches, whose <a href="https://dielinke.berlin/presse/detail/news/eine-woche-nach-sachsen-anhalt-350-neueintritte-berliner-linke-hat-jetzt-ueber-19000-mitglieder/">membership</a> in the German capital has grown from 7,200 members in 2023 to over 19,000 this September. During this campaign, members and sympathizers were visible across the city, on stalls, rallies, and street events, and knocking on doors.</p><p>Importantly, local activists have been rooted in various struggles and, in mobilizing a vote for Die Linke, could build on already-existing relationships and address local grievances. Across swathes of the inner city, the party has worked to gain trust among parts of the working class that tended toward political cynicism and that had long voted for the Social Democrats (SPD) or Greens without expecting much, or even anything.</p><p>Take the Rollbergviertel in Neukölln, for example, one of the poorest areas of Berlin. Here apartment blocks belong to public housing corporation Stadt und Land, which has raised service costs and left the buildings to dilapidate and rot while cutting janitors and ignoring complaints. Local Die Linke candidate Philipp Dehne organized a rally in the block with volunteers at the neighborhood canteen Kiezanker, gathered photos of problems, and raised tenants’ demands with Stadt und Land management.</p><p>Activists knocking on doors could build on this record, while proposing political solutions like a rent cap and the socialization of private housing corporations. They could also address fears of the AfD by referring to successful actions like the one on September 2, when AfD officials planned to take allies from Austria’s far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) on a tour of the multicultural adjoining main street, the Karl-Marx-Straße. Left-wing groups and Die Linke activists got wind of the plans and followed them in the street chanting “All of Berlin hates the AfD!” <a href="https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/wahlkampf-laute-proteste-gegen-rundgang-der-afd-in-neukoelln-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-260902-930-621701">forcing them</a> to leave under police escort. The 25 to 30 percentage point gains in blocks like the Rollbergviertel, where Die Linke <a href="https://interaktiv.tagesspiegel.de/lab/berlin-wahl-2026-wahlkarte-kieze-wahlkreise-abgeordnetenhauswahl/">reached shares</a> up to 55 percent, cannot be explained without reference to such sustained efforts.</p><p>However, the increasing strength of Die Linke Neukölln and the party’s left wing is also the reason that attacks are now being concentrated on this Berlin district. Their resolve under intense pressure should be an inspiration for the entire party not to give in but to fight for the real change Berliners voted for.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Turnaround</h2></header><div><p>Die Linke’s activity in Neukölln offers a window into the turnaround in the party’s fortunes.</p><p>Die Linke was founded in 2007, when the eastern-centered Party of Democratic Socialism merged with a left-wing split from the SPD called the Labor and Social Justice – the Electoral Alternative (WASG). At the time, the Neukölln branch of Die Linke numbered around two hundred members. Operating in a district of what was once West Berlin, the Neukölln branch had little weight in the Berlin party compared to the large ex-PDS branches in the former East Germany, where membership numbered in the thousands and Die Linke could count on a huge share of the vote.</p><p>It’s important to realize that Die Linke has been in the Berlin government before, albeit as a junior partner. The eastern branches made up the constituencies of the politicians who formed the SPD-PDS/Die Linke governments in Berlin from 2001–11 after the post-reunification fiscal crisis and the Berlin banking scandal of 2001. These governments took measures like the firesale of 70,000 council homes of the public housing corporation GSW and slashing the pay of Berlin public sector workers. Such moves haunt the Berlin party still. The ensuing disillusionment led to the net loss of more than three thousand members between 2001 and 2011 and halved the 22.6 percent vote share the PDS had reached in Berlin, even though it made gains elsewhere in Germany.</p><p>The Neukölln district party made a point of being critical of the neoliberalism and austerity in which the party had engaged in government. Here the founding of Die Linke in Neukölln involved dozens of revolutionary socialist activists — mainly from Marx21, a reformation of Linksruck — joined a few years later by the Sozialistische Alternative (SAV). The anti-Stalinist Marxist groups in the Berlin WASG brought with them their experience from social struggles against the neoliberal reforms of Gerhard Schröder’s SPD-led government, the anti-Nazi street blockades of the 1990s, and the student strikes against tuition fees, leading the branch into the social movements.</p><p>The district party set up four local branches (<cite>Basisorganisationen</cite>, BOs) which all elected branch organizers. The BOs started organizing regular paper and flyer stalls and regular meetings for prepared discussions on current events, strategy, and theory.</p><p>Members would and still do prepare their own input or would arrange for an external speaker from a local campaign, strike, or movement. During discussions, a moderator ensures time limits, encourages women and inter-, transgender, and nonbinary people to speak, and can award priority on the speakers list.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>“Basisorganisationen” as Drivers of Socialist Activism</h2></header><div><p>The BOs also plan a wide array of activism. Members coordinate their presence at demonstrations and visits to picket lines, but also educationals, reading groups, and conferences. Throughout the 2010s, they also devoted time to signature drives for referendum campaigns like Deutsche Wohnen &amp;amp; Co Enteignen (resulting in the 2021 popular vote to nationalize the big landlords) or 100% Tempelhofer Feld, alongside Palestine, Greece, and refugee solidarity work. Die Linke gained members by being supportive and effective: politicizing the issues but being careful not to co-opt existing campaigns.</p><p>In cooperation with the Neukölln board, BOs also mobilize for major direct actions in Germany like blockades of AfD party conferences; climate actions at lignite mines; protests against antiabortionist marches by fundamentalist Christians; and demonstrations against NATO or G7 summits.</p><p>At the same time, Marx21 comrades less involved in the branch played a leading role in the Ver.di union’s drive at the Vivantes Klinikum Neukölln, culminating in the massive hospital strike of 2021. Other practical-minded Die Linke members focused on organizing tenants in the south of the neighborhood around their issues.</p><p>Die Linke in Neukölln became a training ground for all-around socialist activism attuned to Marxist theory and regular practical discussions. This alternative model was notably attractive to an anti-capitalist milieu in Berlin that had recently learned to be wary of political parties. Importantly, the branch calls frequent meetings of the district assembly (MVV) every three months or so, where all members can attend and discuss the way forward, while electing a board and delegates to Berlin and national party conferences. In the spirit of full democracy, ample time is devoted to discussions, proposing amendments, and putting motions to a vote.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Steady Growth</h2></header><div><p>The overall result was a steady growth of the Neukölln branch, from 230 members in 2008 to 600 in 2020, with the percentage of women also rising from 26 to 38 percent. The party’s vote here also rose, from 5.6 percent in the 2009 Berlin elections to 14.3 percent in 2021, surpassing Die Linke’s Berlin average for the first time. These federal elections saw much higher results in Neukölln, up from 13.9 percent in 2009 to 18.2 percent in 2017, a clear indication of discontent of Die Linke voters with the Berlin government. The gains were concentrated in the urban, multicultural north with lesser success in the more conservative suburbs in the south.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>The Crisis in Die Linke Nationally</h2></header><div><p>The late 2010s to early 2020s saw a long crisis in Die Linke, with a conservative, sovereigntist faction around leading member Sahra Wagenknecht eventually splitting away. Die Linke’s federal vote share sunk to 4.9 percent in the 2021 federal elections — almost enough to knock it out of parliament — and it suffered heavy losses also in Neukölln (down to 11.9 percent) and Berlin in general (11.4 percent). Die Linke’s membership shrunk by 20 percent federally and by 10 percent in Berlin between 2017 and 2023.</p><p>Revolutionary organizations in the branch also experienced ruptures. The Sozialistische Organisation Solidarität (Sol) split from SAV in 2019. A significant number of central, founding members of the Neukölln branch first left the Marx21 network to found Sozialismus von Unten (SVU) and then left Die Linke in the course of 2024, leading up to the <a href="https://www.die-linke-neukoelln.de/politik/nachrichten/detailansicht/news/statement-der-linken-neukoelln-zur-entscheidung-der-bundesschiedskommission-im-fall-ramsis-kilani/">expulsion</a> of the Palestinian-German SVU member Ramsis Kilani despite the protest of Die Linke Neukölln.</p><p>Still, the branch maintained its membership and level of activity. The fact that Wagenknecht split away also opened the door for anti-racists, LGBTQ activists, ecologically minded people, and people worried about Wagenknecht’s Russia-friendly stance. The anti-capitalist foundations of the Neukölln branch, too, helped members focus on the long-term strategic goal of building the branch and the movements rather than despair at the lack of immediate electoral success.</p></div></section><section id="sec-5"><header><h2>Palestine Solidarity</h2></header><div><p>After the October 7 attacks and Israel’s turn to all-out genocide, Palestine solidarity became central, also for the many new members in Die Linke Neukölln. The district is home to the biggest Palestinian diaspora in Europe and many others from the entire Middle East and North Africa, as well as mostly young Israeli and non-Israeli Jews. As riot cops raided Neukölln’s Arab shopping streets and went after the Palestine solidarity movement with full force, the government announced blanket bans on demonstrations. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/germany/report-germany/">Amnesty</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/germany">Human Rights Watch</a> issued worried reports about worsening democratic rights in Germany.</p><p>Palestinian school children were humiliated for wearing keffiyehs or the Palestinian flag. One seventeen-year-old reported at a local Die Linke meeting that her teacher ripped her red-green-black wrist bracelet off and threw it away in front of the entire class, claiming, “Palestinians don’t exist.” School protests <a href="https://www.nd-aktuell.de/artikel/1176928.demoverbote-nahost-konflikt-demo-gegen-gewalt-an-neukoellner-schule-verboten.html">were banned</a>, like at the Ernst-Abbe-Gymnasium on the Sonnenallee. The Berlin government sanctioned schools to ban signs of Palestinian identity and funded the classroom distribution of the revisionist pamphlet <cite><a href="https://masiyot.de/projekte/mythosisrael1948/">Mythos#Israel1948</a></cite> by the Zionist group Masiyot.</p><p>Die Linke Neukölln already had good relations with the Palestinian community, having — unlike much of the German left — long proven its solidarity. The Neukölln council fraction, headed since 2021 by Palestinian-German civil rights lawyer Ahmed Abed, successfully pressured the mayor to retract the <cite>Mythos#Israel1948</cite> pamphlet from schools.</p><p>Since 2024, the Neukölln branch has also continued to intervene in Die Linke nationally to start a campaign to stop weapons exports to Israel and to call out the genocide. In defiance of ever more vicious smear campaigns in the national press and politicians from all other parties, Vedi Emde (now a Die Linke member of the Berlin parliament) organized what turned out to be huge <a href="https://www.zeit.de/news/2025-08/06/linke-neukoelln-plant-fest-trotz-hamas-naher-teilnehmer">public meetings</a> on Gaza and Berlin’s <a href="https://www.nd-aktuell.de/artikel/1193646.gaza-krieg-linke-neukoelln-solidaritaet-laesst-sich-nicht-spalten.html">biggest</a> Palestine solidarity demonstration, with <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/von-alexanderplatz-bis-grosser-stern-20000-demonstranten-bei-all-eyes-on-gaza--polizei-lost-islamistischen-aufzug-in-kreuzberg-auf-14402021.html">70,000 people</a>, on September 27, 2025.</p></div></section><section id="sec-6"><header><h2>Comeback</h2></header><div><p>At the same time, the national party abruptly found its way back from the abyss. In summer 2024, Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU) broke a <a href="https://www.rbb24.de/politik/beitrag/2025/02/demonstrationen-berlin-brandenburg-rechtsruck-brandmauer.html">previous taboo</a> by seeking majorities together with the AfD to combat migrants and asylum seekers, prompting a huge wave of protests. Die Linke was now able to catch a wave of progressive, anti-fascist indignation, prompting a wave of young, often female and increasingly also migrant members showing up to meetings.</p><p>Olaf Scholz’s SPD-led coalition government fell in November 2024, leading to snap elections Die Linke was hardly prepared for, in Neukölln or anywhere else. But Die Linke Neukölln saw a chance to put the party’s first ever directly elected candidate in the Bundestag (parliament) in the former West Germany, Ferat Koçak, through a massive door-knocking campaign. The ad hoc campaign group mobilized over two thousand party members and sympathizers, reaching 139,000 doors, and was a wild success with 25.2 percent of the party vote and 30 percent for the individual candidate. By the end of February 2025, Neukölln branch had doubled its membership to over two thousand, winning a thousand mostly young, mostly female, and ever more diverse members over the course of months.</p><p>After the election, the Neukölln board and local district-level groups were overwhelmed by the growth in new membership and invested huge efforts into contacting them all, organizing welcome and orientation meetings, and resorting the existing structures. They involved new members in preparing meetings and actions, mapped the issues and forms of activity that members were most interested in, and got people started in their group.</p><p>This year, the branch has grown further to 2,600 members and ten self-organizing BOs. The district party has grown younger as well, with half of the increasingly multiethnic membership under thirty-five and achieved gender parity in 2025. The election campaign was better prepared and managed to integrate the door-knocking campaign with flyer stalls, rallies, and street events. Actions were organized by each local candidate’s volunteer teams and local BO structures and supported by two full-time staffers hired for campaign logistics and coordination.</p><p>The result was an unprecedented 33 percent of the vote, verging on an absolute majority in the northern half of Neukölln. That is a powerful confirmation of a desire for a real change and a break with the politics of austerity for the sake of militarism, and of official appeasement of the fascists. It is also a vote of trust in an organization that is widely known by now as a mass socialist activist party not afraid to stick to its principles despite sustained smear campaigns.</p></div></section><section id="sec-7"><header><h2>After the Election</h2></header><div><p>This September’s election victory in Berlin caught the ruling classes and the media off guard, prompting them to go on the warpath against Die Linke in a way that dwarfs the outrage over the AfD landslides just two weeks prior. Die Linke Neukölln has been a primary target, with Green national coleader Franziska Brantner saying on election night that her party wouldn’t govern with “antisemites from Neukölln.” The fabricated accusations of Jew hate, mixed up with wild conspiracy theories about Neukölln Bundestag member Ferat Koçak’s unfortunate minor contacts with a Lebanese crime boss, further increased pressure on the branch and hurt Ferat’s standing.</p><p>More attacks of this kind can be expected in the attempt to derail Die Linke and put it on the defensive during coalition negotiations. At the last district assembly this past Tuesday, Die Linke Neukölln made clear that it will not be intimidated and will not give in to the attacks. The membership unanimously passed a motion defending all members caught in the crosshairs, including the newly elected Berlin parliament member Vedi Emde, Neukölln Councilor-elect Basem Said, and the national speaker of the Die Linke Palestine working group, Hannah Bruns, against whom expulsion procedures are underway.</p><p>However, this past Friday, the Berlin-wide Die Linke leadership chose to cave in to the slanders against the Neukölln branch by approving a joint declaration with the SPD and Greens affirming Israel’s “right to exist” and the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism while banning the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement. The text blandly conflates Israel, Zionism, and Jewish life in Berlin. The parties also agreed to ramp up secret-service surveillance and policing to “recognize and combat antisemitic threats early” while not sparing one word for the violence, virulent racism, and outright pariah status that Palestinians experience in Berlin, nor indeed the countless Jews fed up with being used as a prop for a genocidal apartheid state.</p><p>This declaration is an act of self-humiliation. There was no objective reason for it, other than to use the situation to discipline the left flank of Die Linke and facilitate a neutered coalition government. The now publicly confirmed threats to exclude Emde, who gained 46.2 percent of the candidate vote alongside 50.2 percent for the party-list vote in her district, prove the point. The leadership is trying to appease the SPD and Greens by forcing us in Neukölln to humiliate ourselves and destroy our solidarity with the Palestinian community. They would rather decimate the party and its roots in communities and movements than risk an escalation of the fight by defending our massively successful branch.</p><p>Rather than be a Bally Bagayoko — the France Insoumise mayor of Saint-Denis, who used his own body to protect protesting high schoolers from the police — party leaders are throwing the pesky kids under the bus. Oppositional motions on the Berlin board of Die Linke were rejected by a majority this past Friday. But this isn’t what the Neukölln branch, the left wing of the party more widely, or countless new, mostly young members signed up for. We campaigned for real change, to challenge the ruling classes, and for the right to protest. The fight for the soul of the party is on. And with the threat of fascism looming large, we cannot mess this up.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/neukolln-berlin-die-linke-palestine?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-13T20:12:09.908Z</published><summary type="text">Neukölln is a working-class, multicultural district of Berlin that embodies the turnaround in the German left’s fortunes. This has also made it the target of efforts to demonize socialist party Die Linke and disqualify its Muslim voters.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/debs-biography-socialism-class-race</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/debs-biography-socialism-class-race"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/287993770216.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/287993770216.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/287993770216.jpg"/><title type="text">A Portrait of Eugene Debs for Today’s Left</title><updated>2026-10-13T16:25:34.913975Z</updated><author><name>Matthew E. Stanley</name></author><category label="History" term="History"/><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>You can tell the capitalist system is in trouble when Americans start talking about Eugene Debs. Although the popular image of the great labor and socialist leader has ebbed and flowed since his death a century ago this month, our New Gilded Age has placed him back in the spotlight. Progressive politicians and labor activists, including United Auto Workers President Shawn Fain and union organizer Jaz Brisack, quote his speeches with regularity. Last year, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez traveled to Debs’s home in Terre Haute, Indiana, to introduce Bernie Sanders, who has long cited the Hoosier firebrand as a political hero. And when Zohran Mamdani kicked off his mayorship of the nation’s largest city, he did so by <a href="https://jacobin.com/2025/11/zohran-mamdani-election-victory-speech">quoting Debs</a>.</p><p>Such tributes signify a wider movement. The worldview that Debs championed is more popular now than at any other point since his death, with polls suggesting that Americans, especially young people and people of color, <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/714653/socialism-positive-rating-tops-first-time.aspx">view socialism</a> more positively than they ever have. The Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), the institutional descendant of Debs’s Socialist Party of America, recently surpassed 120,000 members to become the largest socialist organization in US history, and more than 250 members currently serve in elected positions across forty states.</p><p>In that respect, Shawn Gude’s <cite>American Socialist: The Life and Legacy of Eugene V. Debs</cite> could hardly be more timely. This charmingly penned and prodigiously researched <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/American-Socialist/Shawn-Gude/9781668056738">study</a> both refreshes familiar stories and prods readers to reconsider common assumptions. For instance, Gude devotes more pages than previous biographers to black socialism and Debs’s racial thinking, revealing less a stodgy, dogmatic relic of the (very) Old Left than a flawed yet often versatile rebel who actively and continuously widened his personal understanding of solidarity. In doing so, <cite>American Socialist</cite> complicates the erroneous notion of Debs as a rigid and unchanging determinist whose outlook failed to reckon with the complexities of race and class.</p><p>Gude’s goal in <cite>American Socialist</cite> is not to supplant previous — and still eminently useful — biographies by Ray Ginger, Bernard Brommel, and Nick Salvatore, but to “bring Debs’s story to a new generation and a wider audience.” Gude has indeed crafted a popular biography for our times — a compelling portrait of “one of America’s great critics of plutocracy: a man who clambered into capitalism’s boiler room, gazed at its machinery, and announced it was despotic to the core.”</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>From Respectability to Radicalism</h2></header><div><p>Eugene Debs wasn’t born a radical. He arrived at socialism through sobering experience — with corporate power, capitalist courts, and the daily injustices of living and laboring in Gilded Age America. Born in 1855 to Alsatian immigrants in Terre Haute, he joined the railroad at age fourteen as the nation hurtled toward buccaneer capitalism. Thrown out of work during the economic depression of 1873, Debs soon became an organizer in the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, using his rising position to oppose strikes, echo the “law and order” rhetoric of his bosses, and espouse the Brotherhood’s conservative craft union credo of “benevolence, sobriety, industry.” He went so far as to deliver a speech defaming the Great Railroad Strike for its “anarchy and revolution.”</p><p>At decade’s end, Debs made his first foray into electoral politics, first as a Democratic city clerk, then a state representative. He proved a moderate labor reformer, respectable and accommodating to business. Notably, he broke with his party in an unsuccessful effort to eliminate racial distinctions from state law but remained decidedly antiradical (even sponsoring a pro-militia bill). Imbued with a Great Man view of history and belief in the power of individual fortitude, he then rose quickly within his whites-only union. Unlike many trades leaders, Debs didn’t openly scapegoat black workers. But nor did he use his position to challenge the color line. Rather, he avoided the subject of race entirely out of either indifference or worry that it would repel white workers. Young Debs’s activism was defined by what Gude calls “parlor room reason,” not organized insurgency.</p><p>But class struggle and the violent obstinance of capital soon wrenched Debs out of complacency. Unrewarded by loyalty to the employer class, Debs led his first strike in 1888 against the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad. He emerged a changed man, embracing broad federation over craft exclusivism and later eschewing the two-party system. Through a new consciousness that drew from the abolitionists and the Knights of Labor, he became active in the Populist movement and was further stirred by anti-worker violence at Homestead and elsewhere. By the time he founded the American Railway Union (ARU) in 1893 and orchestrated the Pullman Strike the following year, Debs was convinced of the permanent structural conflict between owners and workers.</p><p>The story of Debs’s first incarceration and radicalization is familiar to readers on the Left, but Gude delivers it with both rigor and style. Like so many revolutionaries, Debs underwent his greatest transformation while in prison. Abandoned by Samuel Gompers and his American Federation of Labor (AFL) craft unions, Debs devoured books by Edward Bellamy and Laurence Gronlund. He read Karl Kautsky and Karl Marx, too. As Gude puts it, the Pullman Strike constituted an almost spiritual awakening, “a baptism . . . out of which a new Debs was born. He was now, and would forever be, a radical working-class agitator.”</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>The Debs Formula</h2></header><div><p>Debs soon declared himself a socialist, one committed to unions and not utopian schemes. Believing that a workers’ republic would soon dawn (after all, how could the sharp contradictions and profound inequalities of industrial America persist?), Debs embraced the “political socialism” of organizing a working-class party to contest elections, popularize socialist ideas, and act as the political arm of the labor movement. He learned a new language of Marxism, then distilled it for Oklahoma farmers, New York garment women, Montana copper miners, and Louisiana sharecroppers. Fueled by a mix of radical Christianity and American history, he charged through nonstop cross-country tours spanning five presidential campaigns. As he advocated a big tent that was both ballot- and strike-conscious, the question of how to win immediate reforms with the ultimate goal of winning socialism defined Debs’s crusade for the next quarter century.</p><p>Debs’s party made socialism a force in American politics for the first time in US history, but political mobilization and governance proved grueling. Intraparty rifts emerged along class, strategic, and regional lines. Debs felt that conservatives, led by Victor Berger, “diluted the revolutionary aims” with their fixation on electability. But unlike his future Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) compatriot Bill Haywood, he couldn’t imagine a democratic revolution occurring in the United States without attaining power through the ballot box. At times, it appeared that the popular Debs was the only personality holding it all together.</p><p>As an independent party (and not the electoral arm of unions, like the British Labour Party), the Socialist Party (SP) likewise ran afoul of Gompers, who eagerly supported the two capitalist parties. Debs walked what Gude describes as the tightrope of “how to press mainstream organized labor away from exclusionary positions without isolating the Socialist Party.” At times, Debs seemed to believe that, if he only attacked AFL bureaucrats strenuously enough, their rank and file would bolt toward socialist reform.</p><p>The SP also struggled at times to forge a coherent vision. According to Gude, Debs “never laid out precisely what a democratic socialist economy would look like.” While railroads, steel mills, coal mines, and other large industries would be publicly owned and subject to democratic oversight, Debs never outlined the precise role of workers, cooperatives, small firms, or markets within his envisioned socialist state. Like many fellow socialists, Debs thought it premature or potentially divisive to formulate a specific blueprint for life after capitalism.</p><p>Although its electoral achievements were remarkable, the party stalled. Debs received nearly a million votes while running from prison in 1920, but that was proportionally fewer than his 1912 tally. Gude details how many working-class voters couldn’t bring themselves to back Debs for a host of reasons, from party loyalty and patronage to simple political viability. “Debs was still a long shot, even if they believed in his ideals,” he reminds, “and, of course, plenty didn’t.” For all of Debs’s energy and magnetism, after two decades the SP seemed pressed hard against an electoral ceiling.</p><p>Why? Much of the answer lay in the party’s basic lack of resources and machinery. Violent state repression during World War I exacerbated those disadvantages, leading many socialists to shun electoral democracy in favor of revolutionary action. But the answer also lay in the herculean — and still unsettled — task of how to unite the world’s most diverse working class.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Something to Offer?</h2></header><div><p>Like socialists today, Debs encountered the problem of how to organize workers who were deeply atomized by race, gender, age, ethnicity, language, region, religion, and national origin. The SP’s default position was to maintain that capitalism exploited all workers equally, advocate for “race-neutral” goals, and insist that racism would resolve itself naturally through material struggle. A capacious movement naturally required making space for all kinds of disciples, but socialists adhered to an unofficial white standard, viewing active anti-racism as undesirable either in principle or because it would supposedly fracture their fragile movement.</p><p>Scholars and activists have spent a century critiquing what Philip S. Foner termed this “Debsian view” of racial evasion. That critique originated with black leftists at the time, who underscored the SP’s shortcomings on the race question (convinced of the party’s unseriousness on race, Hubert Harrison resigned his membership in 1914). During the sectarian battles of the 1920s and ’30s, Communist Party theoreticians weaponized Debs’s (often decontextualized) statements to discredit the SP by exposing its complicity with white supremacy. The result was, at times, a caricature of the Socialists’ alleged racial indifference.</p><figure><img alt="Debs and other ARU leaders in prison in Woodstock, Illinois, in 1895. (Railway Times)" height="610" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/547192902046.png" width="480"/><figcaption>Debs and other ARU leaders in prison in Woodstock, Illinois, in 1895. (Railway Times)</figcaption></figure><p>Historians since have offered greater nuance. Lamenting the SP’s failure “to adopt a specialized program for the Negro people,” Ray Ginger saw the party as immobilized by “Berger’s prejudice,” on the one hand, and “Debs’s oversimplified analysis” on the other. Later critics, especially in the New Left, cited Debs’s more feeble or decontextualized statements (“We have <a href="https://jacobin.com/2015/08/debs-socialism-race-du-bois-socialist-party-black-liberation">nothing special</a> to offer the Negro, and we cannot make separate appeals to all the races”) as proof of his inadequacy or indifference, but others recognized Debs as moving personally toward anti-racist practice. Nick Salvatore traced how Debs’s racial mindset “changed over the course of his career” from a “one-dimensional” outlook toward, by the end of his life, “a fundamental critique of white American culture itself.”</p><p>Gude’s account enriches this discussion tremendously by balancing the deficiencies of both Debs and the SP more broadly against myriad external limitations and near-impossible party dynamics. Utilizing new sources and subtle insights into black socialism, <cite>American Socialist</cite> complicates Ginger’s racist vs. apathetic binary and vitalizes Salvatore’s conclusions. It does so by situating Debs’s transforming views alongside African American politics and SP imperatives.</p><p>There was little in Debs’s upbringing — one of racial segregation in southern Indiana — to suggest that he would become a racial equalitarian, much less an opponent of racial injustice. That metamorphosis came slowly and through material struggle. As early as the 1890s, Debs leveraged his position as president of the American Railway Union to challenge the union’s whites-only code, perhaps out of personal conviction, but clearly as a matter of union interest. When some delegates defended racial restriction because black workers had been used as strikebreakers (and avowed that Debs himself would be hanged for such an offense in the South), Debs cited that as the best reason to welcome them into the union. His speeches in defense of black membership sometimes reflected popular prejudices (he did not “advocate association with the negro,” for example), and his inclusionary position went down in narrow defeat, but progressive black newspapers praised his efforts.</p><p>Although Debs as an early socialist trafficked in lazy generalizations and pushed an overly narrow “class-first” logic, such as in his 1903 assertion, “There is no ‘Negro problem’ apart from the general labor problem,” Gude leaves little doubt that the Hoosier firebrand was “a radical on race for his day.” Racial conservatives within the SP certainly “had no difficulty seeing the radicalism of Debs’s overall positions,” the author contends, which sometimes alienated him from other white socialists. And when turn-of-the-century black publications criticized Debs, they did so “invariably from the Right, with an attitude of Booker T. Washington–style accommodationism.”</p><p>There was more to come. Chronic race riots, especially in his native Indiana, inspired Debs to write more prodigiously on the “race question.” He assailed state SP platforms that included Jim Crow clauses, publicly attacked popular racist literature, and famously refused to speak at venues that excluded African Americans. As his worldview solidified, what Gude calls the “bigoted tics that had previously seeped into his speeches” became less common; he grew more vocal, and his race thinking became more sophisticated.</p><p>Debs also learned from the black left. Critically, that engagement coincided with the turn against the self-help and entrepreneurial approach of Booker T. Washington, whom Debs allies such as George Washington Woodbey assailed as “a good servant of capitalism.” Influenced by African American delegates William Costley, a California trade unionist, and two Indiana coal miners, John H. Adams and Edward D. McKay, the 1901 SP founding convention adopted a six-paragraph resolution stating that owners sought to foment “race hatred between the white worker and the black” and “betray the negro in his present helpless struggle against disfranchisement and violence.”</p><p>Pinpointing racism as a national, union-inhibiting dilemma and viewing black support as essential to any workers’ movement worthy of the name, Debs looked South. In a 1903 organizing drive through Dixie, he “hoped to peel off trade union members and former Populists” through class-based interracial appeals that flouted regional norms. Likely inspired by W. E. B. Du Bois’s <cite>The Souls of Black Folk</cite>, published that same year, Debs addressed the problem of white identity.</p><p>Like Du Bois, he recognized the irony by which the region’s poor whites, “themselves the foul product of the capitalist system,” were “held in lowest contempt by the master class, yet esteeming themselves immeasurably above the cleanest, most intelligent and self respecting negro.” Walking back his former “color-blind” approach and earlier claims regarding the identical condition of white and black wage earners, Debs acknowledged that black workers were “doubly enslaved.”</p><p>Debs’s most rapid evolution occurred during the mid- to late 1910s. Influenced by activists of color and pressured by demographic change that saw black workers (and potential voters) begin settling in Northern cities, white socialists as a whole became more attentive to race. It was a matter of both political opportunity and ideological sincerity. Socialists had long dispatched black speakers including Woodbey into black communities while using emancipationist language to liken Debs to John Brown, but they slowly codified that racial progressivism into the party line. By 1918, a new SP platform condemned “hanging and burning; widespread political disfranchisement, and loss of civil rights” in the South and demanded that Dixie comply with the Fourteenth Amendment.</p><p>Debs continued to drive home the old idea of statutory equality (“The Socialist Party knows neither color, creed, sex, nor race”) but now occasionally jumped into the civil rights fray, even when he had seemingly little to gain electorally. He joined a public campaign to save a black Arkansas teenager named Earl Gilchrist from the death penalty in 1911; four years later, he walked a picket line with black Terre Hauteans to protest D. W. Griffith’s white supremacist blockbuster, <cite>The Birth of a Nation</cite>.</p><p>Such efforts drew praise from black leaders including Du Bois and Ida B. Wells, who invited Debs to address her Negro Fellowship League. Meanwhile, Debs befriended black Socialists including Ross D. Brown, Chandler Owen, and A. Philip Randolph, who championed the Hoosier in his radical newspaper, <cite>The Messenger</cite>. Their growing influence became a part of what Gude describes as Debs’s broader “reassessment on race” predicated on “more immediate measures to combat racial oppression.”</p><p>Gude details how Debs’s racial education continued until his death and encompassed the cultural elements of white supremacy. In one of his final columns, Debs covered the Osage Indian murders in Oklahoma, deploring the killings and mocking the idea of the “White Man’s Burden.” He exhausted some of the last political energies of his life collaborating with Randolph, a close comrade and future civil rights elder whose Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, according to Gude, had become a “living embodiment of Eugene Debs’s emancipatory dream.”</p><p>Debs’s racial views were hardly perfect, his language sometimes problematic, particularly as an early socialist. But as various black reformers noted and as Gude rightly maintains, it is undeniably significant that at the pinnacle of Jim Crow — as social scientists concocted new racial taxonomies, Yankee imperialists proclaimed “survival of the fittest,” and prominent race leaders urged social deference — Debs was the only national politician advocating the “obliteration of the color line.”</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>The Limits of Equality</h2></header><div><p>But if Debs evolved toward a deeper understanding of the layered oppressions facing workers of color, why didn’t the Socialist Party adopt an actively anti-racist program? Why didn’t the foremost white economic justice advocates of their day attempt to organize black workers at the point of production, launching organizing drives into the Southern fields to recruit miners and sharecroppers (in the vein of the Communist Party)? Why didn’t the early SP systematically campaign against lynching or racism in housing, education, transportation, or the courts? The answer is manifold, involving a combination of indifference, strategic and ideological missteps, structural constraints, and open hostility.</p><p>First, as Gude illustrates in detailed and dramatic terms, the party was perpetually fractured between racial progressives and racial reactionaries. Debs’s views represented one such camp, but he never possessed a stranglehold over the entire party or its competing factions (in fact, by 1904 Debs was already retreating from party policymaking). To further confuse the issue, racism/anti-racism didn’t always map neatly onto other right/left divides within the party. For example, SP activist William English Walling helped found the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) but ended up supporting US involvement in World War I.</p><p>Moreover, even progressives like Debs largely failed, especially in the party’s first decade, to articulate how SP reforms would undermine racism, perhaps seeing a direct confrontation with Jim Crow as what Gude calls “a diversion from Socialists’ fundamental battle.” Debs’s own statements during this time proved contradictory. He spoke to the compounded oppression of the “doubly enslaved” only to then misguidedly state that “when the working class have triumphed in the class struggle . . . the race problem will disappear.”</p><p>There were also practical intraparty constraints. The Socialists were a small, cash-poor party, and many members saw expensive and potentially dangerous organizing campaigns as infeasible. Debs likewise commanded overwhelmingly white audiences, which made his message of equality noteworthy but also placed functional limits upon it. The party relied on dollars and support from the bona fide white supremacists who were an everyday presence within the party’s big tent (as late as 1912, the peak year of SP dues-paying membership, the convention featured a report that argued racism “is not so much a result of social as of biological evolution”).</p><figure><img alt="Banner for the Socialist Party of America presidential ticket of 1904, showing Eugene V. Debs for president and Ben Hanford for vice president." height="702" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/152806621649.jpg" width="1024"/><figcaption>Banner for the Socialist Party of America’s presidential ticket of 1904: Eugene V. Debs for president and Ben Hanford for vice president. (Bettmann / Getty Images)</figcaption></figure><p>Perhaps most critically, broader social and cultural conditions were distinct — and more challenging to multiracial organizing — during Debs’s peak influence. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, racially progressive Socialists grappling with the “race problem” in a nation barreling away from racial equality were fighting a rising tide. In most ways, according to Gude, “the space to organize had closed as the noose of Jim Crow tightened.” The great tragedy of early socialism is that Debs’s personal anti-racism never translated into a concrete movement to recruit black workers within the SP.</p></div></section><section id="sec-5"><header><h2>A Growing Man</h2></header><div><p>Eugene Debs was, as the abolitionist Horace Greeley once referred to Abe Lincoln, a “growing man.” More than previous biographers, Gude illuminates the ways Debs never stopped learning, sharpening his socialist perspective, or recalibrating and expanding his conception of solidarity. From hard compromises within the ARU to his cofounding of the IWW to pondering the formation of an “American Labor Party,” Debs pursued a never-ending quest of how best to empower workers and win socialism.</p><p><cite>American Socialist</cite> evocatively highlights this ongoing political education. As socialism brought Debs into a global movement, he progressed from a Democrat who supported immigrant exclusion as the solution to labor competition to a staunch internationalist who championed labor organization abroad and insisted that US workers had far more in common with toilers of other countries than with their own elites. Drawing on personal experience, Debs likewise became an ardent critic of the carceral state, deeming prisons a form of “torture” rather than rehabilitation. And although he had always backed women’s suffrage, his gender views and allyships radicalized with time as well. According to Gude, Debs was eternally “finding another injustice to rail against” and “never seemed to see one without immediately dedicating himself to fighting it.”</p><p>Flexible transformation meant that Debs wore a cast of rotating hats, often at the same time: a humanist whose politics were imbued with Christian symbolism; a world citizen who presented socialism as entirely consistent with American political traditions; and a racial equalitarian whose words and policy proposals often fell short of his ideals even as he moved toward anti-racism — a theme that is one of the book’s most compelling features.</p><p>Indeed, Gude’s attention to race vis-à-vis earlier biographers evinces how leftists have long grappled with the precise relation between racism and capitalism, including how to undertake class-struggle anti-racism in moments of comparative decline. As in Debs’s time, US workers today — run ragged by rising costs and crushing workloads, disciplined through scarcity discourses and techno-authoritarian surveillance, and isolated through remote and gig labor — appear, at times, almost hopelessly segmented. Owners use religious, generational, and immigration issues to pit blocs of workers against one another. Politicians and media elites leverage various identities to subvert discussions of inequality, labor rights, and material redistribution. Meanwhile, nonreactionary alternatives, including (an easily commodified) liberal “anti-racism,” aggravate the issue by ignoring class politics, absolving capital, and reducing racism to a problem of individual attitudes or cultural representation. Debs’s life, in Gude’s capable hands, exposes these difficulties of multiracial organizing in conditions of anti-worker propagandization and weak structural power for labor.</p><p>Although he traces Debs’s legacy from the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the Highlander Folk School to Martin Luther King Jr’s opposition to the Vietnam War, Gude suggests that the “Debsian spirit” has never held more purchase than it does in our current New Gilded Age. Importantly, then, this captivating book isn’t <em>for</em> socialists so much as it is for those who, exposed to the injustices of today, relate to Debs’s expanding consciousness and sense of indignation. It’s for any emerging critic of our wildly undemocratic economy — one that is fixed for the ultrarich while the seemingly powerless majority languish in exploitation and unaffordable and unresponsive systems in housing, education, and health care. It’s for all who recognize that capitalism is failing to deliver on its promise of freedom.</p><p>Debs’s politics were, at their brightest, tenacious in undercutting what Gude calls “all forms of unaccountable power — rich over poor, men over women, white over Black, colonizer over colonized — as poisonous to human freedom.” A page-turning delight, <cite>American Socialist</cite> is an engaging and valuable tool for anyone who seeks to win a world where that kind of freedom reigns supreme.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/debs-biography-socialism-class-race?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-13T16:25:34.913975Z</published><summary type="text">Socialism is on the march, and capitalism’s defenders are on the ropes. Shawn Gude’s American Socialist: The Life and Legacy of Eugene V. Debs, a biography of the most prominent socialist agitator in American history, could hardly be more timely.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/russia-putin-elections-war-authoritarianism</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/russia-putin-elections-war-authoritarianism"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/581013046664.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/581013046664.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/581013046664.jpg"/><title type="text">In Russia’s Election, Nothing Happened, but Things Got Worse</title><updated>2026-10-13T15:03:40.546482Z</updated><author><name>Maria Chiara Franceschelli</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><category label="Policing and Repression" term="Policing and Repression"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Between September 18 and 20, Russians voted for a new State Duma, along with several regional parliaments and governors. According to the Central Election Commission, turnout reached 59.8 percent, up eight points since 2021. The result was the one everyone expected.</p><p>Vladimir Putin’s United Russia took almost 58 percent of the party-list vote and 349 of the Duma’s 450 seats, up from 310 in the outgoing chamber. Forty-one of its new MPs are veterans of the invasion of Ukraine. The Communist Party (KPRF) came a distant second with thirty-seven seats, followed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) with twenty-three, New People with nineteen, A Just Russia with seventeen, and Rodina with one. Four independents complete the total.</p><p>Voters received two ballots: one for a nationwide party list (225 seats) and one for a candidate in their local single-member district (the other 225). Yabloko, the only registered party running on an openly antiwar platform, was removed from the party-list ballot after the Supreme Court canceled its federal slate in August following a lawsuit brought by Rodina. Yabloko could thus be voted for only on the district ballot and only where one of its individual candidates had survived registration challenges, i.e., in roughly a hundred districts. Outside those districts, and on the national party list everywhere, Yabloko was not an option.</p><p>Yabloko has never carried much weight in parliament, but this time was the only institutional party openly opposed to the war, with a program calling for an immediate end to the offensive and a return to negotiations. The Kremlin had two options. It could exclude Yabloko, as it has routinely done with inconvenient candidates, or let it run and collect a negligible vote — proof, as it were, that opposition to the war commands little support, while stressing United Russia’s supremacy as well as offering a façade of pluralism. At first, it seemed the authorities had chosen this path: the Central Election Commission registered Yabloko’s list. Then, Rodina filed its complaint, and Yabloko was eventually struck from the ballot.</p><p>Besides the ruling United Russia, all the other nine parties belong to the “systemic opposition”: a well-rooted paradox of Russian politics by which some parties enjoy enough room for maneuver to criticize specific government policies, while ultimately remaining loyal to Putin and not representing a substantial threat to the Kremlin.</p><p>In this scenario, the only notable development was New People (Novye Lyudi), founded in 2020 by entrepreneur Alexey Nechayev. Having no clear ideology, the party’s stances can be linked to a vaguely liberal center right. Over the last year, it has gained popularity thanks to its opposition to the internet shutdowns and restrictions imposed by the Kremlin, has surpassed the KPRF as the second-most-popular party (although polling in authoritarian systems, especially in wartime, must be treated with caution), and won in eighteen out of twenty-seven of the main polling stations abroad. However, this data is not nearly enough to predict any groundbreaking change, also because New People’s vague brand could be easily co-opted by the Kremlin and made another pillar of Putin’s stability.</p><p>Election observers were also absent. There was no mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), since Russia did not send the necessary invitations. Russia’s own independent monitoring groups, meanwhile, have been worn down by years of legal and informal pressure, to the point where they could no longer meaningfully operate.</p><p>Nobody was surprised by United Russia’s landslide, which even exceeded the government pollsters’ own figures by a few points. The real question these elections raise is not about the outcome, which has been known in advance for more than twenty years. Instead, it is about what an election even means in a country moving decisively toward totalitarian rule.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Power Built on a Vacuum</h2></header><div><p>The stability of Putin’s rule has always rested on the systematic depoliticization of Russian society: a lasting detachment of citizens from political life and its rituals.</p><p>This detachment has a history. In the Soviet Union, political life and participation were organized from above, and there was little room for bottom-up engagement. When that scaffolding collapsed, nothing took its place. The economic and political crisis of the 1990s, Boris Yeltsin’s coup against parliament in 1993, and the rapid consolidation of an oligarchic order meant that the transition to a working participatory democracy never happened. Mechanisms of democratic participation from below never took root, either in terms of free and open electoral competition or the everyday infrastructure of collective organizing.</p><p>This does not mean that Russia lacks grassroots organizations, activists, and movements. It has them, and they have paid dearly for their existence under mounting repression. It means that this kind of social dynamic never became the norm. Putin’s system found fertile ground in that vacuum, building an authoritarian order that starts from economic elites and extends through the military and security apparatus down to the courts and local administration. Over the last twenty years, the structural gap in resources between the state and those who tried, or wished, to build a genuinely participatory democracy could never be bridged.</p><p>Depoliticization, then, works on two levels. It operates through formal channels of participation such as elections, but also at a cognitive level. An important manifestation of structural depoliticization, as researchers at the Public Sociology Laboratory have shown in a series of studies, is the alienation of Russian citizens from the very act of articulating their own political positions.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>From Demobilization to Mobilization</h2></header><div><p>Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, however, something within the regime has been shifting, not as a change of direction but as an exponential increase. Putin’s system was authoritarian; it is increasingly taking on the features of a totalitarian order, closing down remaining spaces for expression, participation, and dissent.</p><p>In this sense, depoliticization is now paired with mobilization encouraged from above. For most of Putin’s rule, the goal was to keep people away from politics, including the polling booth. A low, predictable turnout suited a system that asked nothing of its citizens but acquiescence. Now Russia is shifting toward potential disorder, with Ukraine reacting to the invasion and drones bombing infrastructure and houses in western Russia, shortages at gas stations, a looming economic crisis, internet restrictions, rising death tolls at the front lines, and the prospect of a new military mobilization. In this context, consensus and unity are more needed than passivity. Voting is actively encouraged — with employees in factories and firms being formally obliged to vote and even taken to the polling booths — not for the sake of democracy but to mobilize the population in support of the further concentration of power and the consolidation of the political system itself. Local administrations, state agencies, and state-linked institutions are all put to work bringing people to the ballot box.</p><p>The role of elections has thus been inverted. They are no longer a moment of (managed) democratic participation that the Kremlin prefers citizens to sit out but a mechanism for mobilizing consent to the centralization of power. Although internet voting and the involvement of the occupied territories of Crimea, Sevastopol, and parts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson surely play a role, the rise in turnout, from 51.7 to 59.8 percent, should be read also in this light.</p><p>In that sense, these elections tell us little that is new in electoral terms. And yet, at a delicate moment, marked by growing economic difficulties driven by the war and Ukrainian missile strikes and by a risk of social unrest, Putin’s answer is once again repression but this time accompanied by a demand for active participation and performative consent, in the manner of the totalitarian regimes of the 1930s.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>The Russian Feud</h2></header><div><p>This discursive effort is accompanied by classic techniques from the Putinist repertoire. The first is the figure of the necessary leader. Putin presents himself as the only one who can defend the country from external attack: in this case, “the West’s war on Russia.” Many Russians now perceive this confrontation as <a href="https://publicsociologylab.com/en/projects/war-perception.html">inevitable</a>, almost messianic, something from which only a great leader can save them.</p><p>The second is passing the buck to the regions. The costs of the war, as so often, are made to fall on regional administrations. The management of the fuel crisis, for instance, has been offloaded onto governors. This is not new: the Kremlin did the same during the pandemic, shifting the responsibility for COVID-19-related restrictive measures onto regional governors. This mechanism protects the image of the center, which must continue to be seen as the guarantor of stability, and spares it direct responsibility for unpopular measures.</p><p>This is part of what makes the system so resilient. Putin personally still hovers above the fray. His authority is real, but the responsibility for what the state actually does, its merits and its shortcomings, is spread widely across institutions and levels of government. Combined with the heavy security theater on display, especially in Moscow, this diffusion of responsibility helps explain why the system appears so immovable.</p><p>The regions have also borne the human cost of the war most unevenly, and military recruitment has doubled as an instrument for managing (to put it mildly) those with the least political and economic power or those the authorities find most <a href="https://www.ponarseurasia.org/military-mobilization-in-russias-regions-from-protests-to-submission/">inconvenient</a>.</p><p>There is also a more mundane, logistical side to these elections. Elections and the reshuffling of posts that follows allow careers and responsibilities within the state and legislative apparatus to be redistributed without anyone having to be fired. The war itself “works” in this sense as a continuous transfer of public money to military elites and as an occasion to redraw relations among institutions. The forty-one veterans now sitting in the Duma for United Russia are one visible sign of this.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>Wartime Support</h2></header><div><p>What do we really know about popular support for Putin and the war? <a href="https://publicsociologylab.com/en/projects/war-perception.html">Ethnographic work</a> carried out inside Russia suggests that most people do not hold a clear, consistent political opinion about the war, which is one reason why conventional opinion polling tells us so little. People move back and forth between supporting and criticizing it, depending on personal and situational factors rather than any coherent ideology.</p><p>Opinions on Russia’s war can be influenced by personal ties with relatives and friends from and in Ukraine, the mobilization of a family member to the front and the tragic implications that this often carries, personal economic impact, fear of drone attacks, and other factors that strongly affect one’s personal life. In fact, it is also important to remember that Putin has always strived to keep his war far from Russia’s civilian population and instead to push a romanticized, heroic, and epic image of the “special military operation” and its “patriots.” Over the last months, this has become increasingly difficult to sustain.</p><p>However, thanks also to a far-reaching propaganda effort, many see the war less as a political event they could influence than as something more like a natural disaster arriving from the outside. Without a settled view of the war or a broader political outlook to anchor it, people tend to slide into a kind of relativism.</p><p>Opinion about the war, in other words, is scattered and situational rather than systematic. This is partly a product of depoliticization. It is also because people do not reason the way sociologists do in their work: they do not necessarily organize their views into positions that can be neatly measured and aggregated.</p><p>For years, much of the debate on Russia turned on a recurrent question: Was support for Putin genuine or merely passive? It was a reasonable thing to ask, and it once seemed to hold the key to the regime’s future. Today it has become a matter mostly for specialists. The Putin system has sealed itself off and narrowed the space for participation so far that the quality of consent, whether sincere or alienated, no longer has much bearing on the course of events. What shapes the situation now is simpler and starker: there is no longer any opening through which that consent, or its absence, could make itself felt.</p><p>This also goes for parliamentary debate, such as KPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov’s postelectoral criticism of the Kremlin’s war efforts in Ukraine and his forecast of a gloomy defeat if Putin maintains his line. However, the KPRF has historically supported the annexation of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as the invasion of Ukraine. The KPRF’s 2026 election program never names Ukraine, yet it takes the war for granted: it speaks of securing victory at the front, uses standard Kremlin language about “neofascists” and “Banderites” in Kyiv, and promises more for the army and veterans. It offers no position on the war’s aims, an end to it, or peace talks. It sounds more like performative criticism of domestic policies amid a situation — the war — that is already taken for granted.</p></div></section><section id="sec-5"><header><h2>Very Few Options</h2></header><div><p>These elections were a problem for the Russian opposition, too. The opposition in exile is increasingly disconnected from dissent inside the country, which is small and mutilated, and the networks of organization and collective action that once existed have been cut and harshly repressed. So, what options did people have if they did not want to support United Russia or wanted to vote against the war? With Yabloko gone, four remained, and none of them offered much.</p><p>The first was a boycott. Staying home would lower official turnout but not change the result: Russia abolished the minimum turnout requirement for Duma elections back in 2007. Nor does a boycott send a clear message, since there is no way to tell someone abstaining in protest apart from someone who simply stayed home.</p><p>The second was tactical voting, in the tradition of Alexei Navalny’s “Smart Voting” now upheld by his widow and heir of his movement, Yulia Navalnaya. Its impact on the party lists is minimal, but it can matter somewhat more in single-member districts, which elect half the Duma. There are no runoffs: whoever gets the most votes wins the seat. The logic is to back the strongest challenger to the Putinist candidate rather than splitting protest votes among several names, whether by reading the polls or following the recommendations published by Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK). The challenger in question is almost always a candidate of the tolerated “systemic” opposition. The tactic had its biggest successes in the 2019 Moscow City Duma election, where the supported candidates took twenty of forty-five seats, and in the 2020 local elections in Tomsk and Novosibirsk. By the 2021 Duma vote, the blocking of FBK’s app and website and the rollout of electronic voting had strongly blunted its impact.</p><p>The third was to take one’s ballot home. Duma election law does not forbid it, and while it changes nothing about the distribution of seats, it can expose fraud. Precinct commissions must record the number of ballots issued but not returned in their final protocols. If a voter took a ballot home and the relevant line in the protocol reads zero, the commission most likely filled the gap with an extra vote for someone.</p><p>The fourth was to spoil the ballot. This too leaves the result untouched, but a mass protest is easier to see this way than through abstention. It is also risky. In previous elections, some voters were arrested after writing antiwar or anti-Putin messages on theirs (although theoretically, votes are anonymous). A ballot left blank, however, is easy to fill in during a fraudulent count.</p><p>None of these strategies amounts to a real opening for opposition, not even a symbolic one, or the kind of small-scale guerrilla activism that dissidents relied on in the first years of the war. The choices were few, and each of them could at best leave a trace in a precinct protocol.</p><p>This is what distinguishes the 2026 elections from those that came before. For two decades, Russian elections were managed events that the regime preferred citizens to watch from a distance. Now they have become a mere rally reminiscent of a totalitarian regime, in which the opposition cannot even score symbolic wins.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/russia-putin-elections-war-authoritarianism?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-13T14:53:53.427Z</published><summary type="text">The stability of Vladimir Putin’s rule has long relied on encouraging citizens to ignore politics. But last month’s wartime elections instead saw a different approach, staging popular support for a further centralization of power.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/debs-1908-presidential-campaign-socialism</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/debs-1908-presidential-campaign-socialism"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/260390218197.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/260390218197.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/260390218197.jpg"/><title type="text">All Aboard Eugene Debs’s Red Special</title><updated>2026-10-13T14:20:23.504208Z</updated><author><name>Shawn Gude</name></author><category label="History" term="History"/><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>The specially chartered locomotive pulled out of Chicago on a late August day in 1908, heading west, a sleeper car, dining car, and baggage car loaded with socialist pamphlets in tow. Red flags poked out, bunting and streamers festooning the sides.</p><p>The passengers were in high spirits. Socialist Party presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs joked that he and his balding brother, Theo, were the resident “long hairs”: “We have three long hairs between us.” Neighbor Stephen Marion Reynolds, whose new biography of Debs was serving as campaign literature, pinned a red flag to his pajamas and explained, “Something might happen in the night, and they would find me dead or unconscious. How would they know I wasn’t a Republican?” As the train raced across the fields of Iowa — flat, flat, flat — a newspaper reporter asked Debs what he’d enjoyed most on the trip so far. “Oh, associating with this brace of despots, I suppose,” Gene quipped.</p><p>Debs’s speaking trip was a cavalcade of railroad depots and opera halls, scheduled speeches and impromptu whistle-stops. His September 2 itinerary read like this:</p><blockquote><p>Des Moines, Iowa: Depart at 6 a.m.</p><p>Creston, 9:40–10:10</p><p>Corning, 10:50 to 11:20</p><p>Clarinda, 12:20 to 1 p.m.</p><p>Burlington Junction, Missouri, 1:45 to 2:15 p.m.</p><p>Kansas City, MO: 3:30 p.m. (speech that evening)</p></blockquote><p>He spoke at each stop, plus at least six other unscheduled ones.</p><p>Sometimes he mounted a platform outside the Red Special — as Debs’s campaign train was known — speaking as Theo and others distributed campaign literature in the crowd. Other times, he simply rained down words from the caboose. He attracted converts, critics, and the merely curious. At the Corning, Iowa, stop, a woman, sneering, asked a man clad in overalls whether he’d accepted a socialist book. The man — half-sheepish, half-unapologetic — showed he had.</p><p>Briefly, Debs considered cutting south to speak in the minefields of Birmingham, Alabama, where members of the United Mine Workers were engaged in a daring interracial strike. He ultimately judged the detour cost-prohibitive given the cramped budget. The Red Special continued speeding west. (The landmark strike was soon crushed by the government, wiping out the local union and, with it, the rare organization able to challenge Jim Crow.)</p><p>It was Debs’s third presidential bid in a row. His Socialists would again try to beat the vast structural odds by reaching the toiling masses rally by rally, pamphlet by pamphlet. By sheer exertion. By relying on the “Jimmie and Jennie Higginses,” as the selfless rank-and-file members of the Socialist Party were known. People like Sarah Cluff of Provo, Utah, and E. Z. Ernst of Olathe, Kansas.</p><figure><img alt="Eugene Debs during one of his presidential campaigns." height="488" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/486772252397.png" width="927"/><figcaption>Eugene Debs, on the presidential stump: “We know that economic conditions determine man’s conduct toward man, and that so long as he must fight him for a job or a fortune, he cannot love his neighbor.”</figcaption></figure><p>Cluff was in her early fifties, an English immigrant who had toiled at a lace factory as a young girl and raised three children in poverty. Opinionated and resolute (she’d successfully divorce her husband a few years later on grounds of cruelty), Cluff was part of the volunteer army that sold <cite>Appeal to Reason</cite>, the massive socialist paper out of small-town Kansas that was proving a linchpin of Debs’s campaign.</p><p>As a younger woman, Cluff had been mystified about “why it was so hard to get enough to subsist on.” Then she’d studied socialism. It was “the only light,” she told the <cite>Appeal</cite>, “that can dispel the darkness for working people.”</p><p>Ernst, also in his fifties, was a farmer and artisan in northeast Kansas who’d once led a sixty-acre socialist commune. An 1896 illustration in the paper Ernst edited at the time showed him with short hair and a long tangle of muttonchops and a beard, as if while clearing farmland the underbrush had leapt onto his face and taken up residence. By the 1908 election, he’d been a radical agitator for decades, passing out literature, selling subscriptions, and knitting together town and countryside, so crucial to Socialist success in the rural Midwest.</p><p>Sarah Cluff and E. Z. Ernst weren’t outliers. Socialist Party membership had doubled since the last presidential election to 40,000, and a staggering four thousand volunteer speakers were available to work the soapbox. In Milwaukee, party members would venture out every Sunday morning, arms chock-full of literature and buttons, brains swimming with answers to questions they’d receive at the doorstep.</p><p>They could take heart that the headline-grabbing Red Special was barreling across the country at that very moment.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><hr/></header><div><p>The Red Special experienced some hiccups once it reached the Pacific Coast. The campaign was already running low on money, threatening an embarrassingly early end to the trip. Debs turned to average party members, whose nickels and dimes filled up the campaign coffers. The show would go on.</p><p>Supporters contributed more than just money. They would pile onto the iron caravan at each stop, their enthusiasm infectious, sometimes bearing gifts. One day in Oregon, Theo described the bounty to his daughter: “The baggage car is half full of the finest fruit I have ever seen. At every station our supply is increased: pears, plums, seedless raisin grapes, and such bunches, strawberries, watermelons, and today a comrade handed in a magnificent string of fresh mountain trout.” They wolfed it down for dinner that evening, joined by Socialist rank-and-filers, who could pay two cents a mile (and fifty cents a meal) to ride for several stops.</p><figure><img alt="bain/00885u.tif" height="1200" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/951695089417-large.jpeg" width="865"/><figcaption>Eugene Debs, photographed circa 1912. (Bain News Service / Library of Congress)</figcaption></figure><p>Along the road, Debs saw the unmistakable sign of recession: workers on the “tramp.” One day, shortly after leaving San Bernardino, California, the train stopped when a tramp was found on board attempting to snag a ride. Normally, the man would have been tossed off the train. But this was the Red Special. He was instead ushered up “to ride with a presidential candidate on the plush,” Debs recounted with a laugh.</p><p>“Of all the workers who are tramping,” Debs told a reporter, “we have not seen one of the type usually used for caricatures in the comic sections of the Sunday newspaper editions. All we have encountered since leaving Chicago on this campaign train have been fine young fellows, the same kind that have helped make this country what it is today, but have been thrown out of work by the trend of the times.”</p><p>And what use was an economic system that regularly made millions beg for a job?</p><p>As Debs crucified capitalism, its leading champions mounted a defense. Earlier that summer, President Theodore Roosevelt had used a memorial ceremony near his twenty-three-room summer home in Long Island to charge Debs and his compatriots with promoting “equality of reward” rather than “equality of opportunity.” Socialists would sweep away a system that valued “energy, foresight, intelligence, thrift, courage” in favor of one that allowed the undeserving to “rob his neighbor of what that neighbor has earned.” (The dedication ceremony was for a monument to an early English settler named John Underhill, the famed leader of a colonial militia that massacred American Indians.)</p><p>Debs couldn’t conceal his scorn, unloading on this “well-groomed president of the ruling parasites” in an <cite>Appeal</cite> article. What “equal opportunity” was there for the unemployed workers teeming the breadlines? What “equal opportunity” was there for the child laborers “fed alive to Mammon”? It was capitalism, not socialism, Debs growled, that had a skewed system of rewards — bequeathing “colossal private fortunes” for owning rather than toiling.</p><p>Debs was more gracious with Lincoln Steffens, the Progressive journalist, who interviewed Debs in Milwaukee shortly after Roosevelt’s address. Sympathetic but skeptical, Steffens pushed Debs on the nuts and bolts of his socialist vision. Debs explained that in the “cooperative commonwealth,” as he called it, everyone able to work would have a job. No one would be terrorized by the “fear of starvation.” Workers would be “paid according to their social use” rather than the profit-minded calculations of the free market. “Skill and ability would count” in determining remuneration, but workers performing undesirable jobs (say, sanitation) would also get better pay or shorter hours. Labor-saving technology would be used to reduce drudgery. Pay wouldn’t be equal, but nobody would pile up money like a Rockefeller (or a Roosevelt).</p><p>Wasn’t Debs worried, Steffens asked, that people would lack an incentive to work? He wasn’t. Human beings had an innate need to be active, he explained, and they were motivated by a range of concerns other than making the most money possible. And “a society that produced for use and not for profits would have plenty of work to have done.” Plus, with much shorter hours, all workers would have ample leisure time, when they could “enjoy healthily all the good things of the earth.”</p><p>What about individuality? Wouldn’t socialism “level men down”? Here, Milwaukee Socialist Victor Berger, who joined Debs for the interview, jumped in with characteristic gusto: “The capitalist system — doesn’t it level most men down now? Yes, it takes all the individuality, all the courage, self-respect, liberty, and beauty out of the great mass of men to produce a few” economic titans. Debs agreed.</p><figure><img alt="Theodore and Eugene Debs during the 1908 presidential campaign." height="563" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/675718737687.png" width="903"/><figcaption>Theodore and Eugene Debs during the 1908 presidential campaign.</figcaption></figure><p>He slapped down the stereotype that socialists fomented class hatred (“There are classes now and we say so. Why not? It’s true”) and that they wanted to seize personal property. “Socialism does not abolish private property,” he explained, as he’d surely explained so many times before, “except in the means of production. We want all men to have all they produce, all; we are for [personal] property; it is Capitalism that is against it.”</p><p>Nor was Debs worried about running a socialist economy. He cited capitalism’s recurring depressions and panics as “proof that capitalists cannot handle industry, business, nor even money.” He noted one of the contradictions at the heart of capitalism, what economists call the “overproduction problem”: employers want to keep labor costs as low as possible, but this means that workers don’t make enough money to buy the goods they produce. And so, Debs explained, “The surplus grows, a load on the market, till the crash comes, production halts, men are discharged, prices fall, and — there’s your panic.”</p><p>Debs thought the solution was simple: socialize the economy, remove the profit incentive, distribute the economic pie more equally, all fixed. Even in the Steffens interview, he never laid out precisely what a democratic socialist economy would look like. Yes, the railroads and steel mills and banks and other large industries would be publicly owned, managed in some capacity by a democratically accountable government. But what role would their workers play in directing these enterprises? How would socialists ensure that an expansive state didn’t become another haughty boss? And what of smaller firms? Would they be run as worker cooperatives? What role might markets play?</p><p>Like many socialists of the era, Debs seemed to think it was preemptive, even undemocratic, to sketch out a postcapitalist blueprint. That was for the people themselves to decide (and the socialist intellectuals to agonize over).</p><p>He certainly underestimated the difficulty of managing a modern economy. And yet this fuzziness about the nitty-gritty turned off fewer people than we might imagine. Catholic priests fulminating against “ungodly” socialism and major-party newspapers smearing “violent” socialists probably dissuaded more workers from voting for Debs than the charge that he lacked a fully fleshed-out alternative.</p><p>Many Americans had lived through a Civil War that had extinguished an entire economic system in the South. Many remembered a time before industrial capitalism. The Socialists’ claim that they would harness the economic trends and technologies of the day and simply transfer them to democratic, public hands seemed less far-fetched to early twentieth-century ears than twenty-first-century ones.</p><p>Or as Debs ended the interview, soaring back into the heavens:</p><blockquote><p>We know that economic conditions determine man’s conduct toward man, and that so long as he must fight him for a job or a fortune, he cannot love his neighbor. Christianity is impossible under capitalism. . . .  When things are rearranged so that I can help my fellow man best by helping myself, by developing all my skill and strength and character to the full, why, then, I shall love him more than ever; and if we compete it will be as artists do, and all good men, in skill, productiveness, and good works.</p></blockquote></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><hr/></header><div><p>By the end of September, Debs had traveled nine thousand miles and delivered 187 speeches over twenty-five days in every western state and territory, to an estimated 275,000 people. Exhausting. So exhausting, in fact, that occasionally, when it was an especially small town and Gene’s throat felt especially aflame, Theo would fill in for his brother unannounced, the doppelganger convincing the crowd that this balding man gesticulating wildly before them was the famed Eugene V. Debs.</p><p>And still the East Coast lay ahead.</p><p>There were some highlights out east: Gene’s wife, Kate, joined him for this leg of the journey, and in Trenton, Ohio, a scrum of children dashed through the rain after school to greet the Red Special — “one of the most beautiful compliments paid us on the entire trip,” Debs told the kids, choking up. “This train,” he explained, “represents an effort to make it possible for all children everywhere to have time for play, and time to go to school, and the opportunity to grow up.” The band struck up a tune, and they were off.</p><p>Debs’s train rumbled through nearly every state in the Upper Midwest and Northeast, clattering textile towns and cacophonous manufacturing cities. He marched in front of a parade stretching ten full blocks to Boston’s Faneuil Hall. He sold out New York City’s Hippodrome Theatre, with 7,500 paying admission and 2,500 more turned away. After working himself into a sweat — a photograph from the event shows Debs in a three-piece suit speaking from the wooden floor of the hall, his sea-blue eyes flaring like a tropical storm, his hands in a flurry so fierce the shutter could only register a blur — Debs climbed into an open-roof car and headed down to the Lower East Side.</p><p>By that point in the journey, Debs admitted, “I was little more than a portable corpse.” The newspapers reported that he was so fatigued it “was painful to witness,” and Debs told those assembled at Hamilton Fish Park he wouldn’t be giving a speech because “I am not able to do so.”</p><p>Kate was watching from a box at the Hippodrome — accompanying New York Socialist Morris Hillquit and his wife, Vera — with what must have been a mix of pride and dismay. What would be left of her Gene after the cause had gotten through with him?</p><p>Her husband pushed on. Turning back west, continuing to fill speaking engagements along the way, the Red Special made an impromptu stop at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, the site of John Brown’s doomed antislavery rebellion. Standing at a monument marking the spot where Brown was captured, Debs delivered brief remarks: Brown “dared the whole world and gave up his life for freedom. What more can a man do? . . .  [Ralph Waldo] Emerson has said: ‘The time will come when John Brown will have made the gallows as glorious as Jesus Christ made the cross.’”</p><p>Cheers and tears. William Lowery, a former slave who owned the scuffed-up tin candlestick that lit John Brown’s fort, gifted Debs the timeworn object. Theo found it the “most thrilling and dramatic” moment “of the entire trip.”</p><p>The Socialist Party was making an explicit appeal to black voters that year despite their minor electoral heft. (Ninety percent of African Americans still lived in the Jim Crow South.) A party pamphlet cast Debs, rather hyperbolically, as “the John Brown and William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass and Abraham Lincoln of the new emancipation all rolled into one.” Jobs and political rights for all — Debs’s “new emancipation” would rip out the roots of racial oppression (although the pamphlet omitted mention of any immediate civil rights measures). The party dispatched several black speakers, including the Reverend George Washington Woodbey, who traversed the Upper Midwest and the East Coast, culminating in a two-hour, eve-of-the-election address on a cold night in the increasingly black New York City neighborhood of Harlem.</p><p>Other slices of the working class also received targeted appeals. Denmark’s A. C. Meyer, a Socialist member of parliament, crossed the Atlantic to campaign for Debs, often making his overtures in his native tongue at Scandinavian venues like the soaring five-story brick of Minneapolis’s Dania Hall.</p><figure><img alt="A poster for Debs’s 1912 presidential campaign." height="933" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/641970750141-large.png" width="1200"/><figcaption>A poster for Debs’s 1912 presidential campaign. (Socialist Party of America)</figcaption></figure><p>It had been an inspired campaign. Debs had crisscrossed the nation twice, traveled over 20,000 miles of tracks, forced his raspy voice to deliver addresses sixty-five days straight in “one of the most aggressive speaking campaigns ever undertaken by a presidential candidate,” according to one biographer. He had heard passing train drivers sound their whistles in solidarity, seen buggies queue for miles along the tracks and throngs so eager to hear his words they’d block the rails to make the Red Special stop. At his final campaign address, the Chicago crowd cheered him for twenty-seven minutes straight.</p><p>The results of Debs’s 1908 Red Special campaign were disappointing: a mere 20,000 votes more than in 1904. Good for just 3 percent of the national vote, despite higher shares in strongholds like the Mountain West, the industrial Midwest, and the Great Plains. His Red Special, the campaign’s great expenditure at $35,000, had been funded by 15,000 contributions and $14,000 in ticket sales. J. P. Morgan and Andrew Carnegie alone had donated millions to the GOP.</p><p>But all was not lost. Far from it. By Debs’s next presidential bid four years later, party membership had tripled to roughly 120,000; some 1,200 Socialists held elected office, including eighty mayors in thirty-six states; and strikes were cascading through the country, many led by Socialists.</p><p>Maybe, just maybe, Eugene Debs’s “cooperative commonwealth” was still on the horizon.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/debs-1908-presidential-campaign-socialism?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-13T13:29:15.119Z</published><summary type="text">In 1908, on one of his five presidential runs, legendary socialist organizer Eugene Debs embarked on a whirlwind tour across the country on his own train, the Red Special. His mission: spread the socialist gospel to any American who would hear him out.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/autozone-organizing-drive-election-firings</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/autozone-organizing-drive-election-firings"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/909062448848.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/909062448848.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/909062448848.jpg"/><title type="text">AutoZone Workers Won a Union. Then the Company Fired Them.</title><updated>2026-10-13T20:23:20.686843Z</updated><author><name>Ashley Bishop</name></author><category label="Unions" term="Unions"/><category label="Work" term="Work"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Speaking with members of the newly formed AutoZone Workers Union, you would never guess that one of them had just been fired — and that another would be the next morning. That’s what happened to Nathan DuCongé and then David Valencia after they won their union election. On a Zoom call with <cite>Jacobin</cite>, though, their joy was contagious. DuCongé and his coworkers were all smiles and banter as they talked about their union campaign, how it feels to win, and the unexpected boost they received from filmmaker Boots Riley.</p><p>On Friday, September 25, an AutoZone store in White Plains, New York, became <a href="https://aflcio.org/2026/9/29/service-solidarity-spotlight-autozone-workers-vote-join-uaw-first-nationwide-chain">the first</a> of the company’s nearly seven thousand American retail locations to unionize. DuCongé and his coworkers, now members of United Auto Workers (UAW) Local 259, said they hadn’t been sure which way the vote would go.</p><p>“The deck was really stacked against these workers trying to organize here,” said Brian Murray, an experienced organizer brought on in August by UAW Local 259 Vice President Mike DiGuiseppe. “It was because of their sticking together, the amount of fun they have, and their camaraderie, their solidarity for each other, [that] they were able to overcome a lot of union busting.” He added, “I would have expected [them] to not have succeeded in winning that vote, but they did.”</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>“We Were Already a Union”</h2></header><div><p>DuCongé moved to New York City two years ago and soon started working for AutoZone as a part-time employee. A year later, he became a parts sales manager. He said he decided to start organizing his store after he was removed from the schedule one Saturday in April, and instead went to a joint meeting of the Emergency Workplace Organizing Committee (EWOC) and the New York City Democratic Socialists of America (NYC-DSA). There he was connected with UAW members who encouraged him to unionize.</p><p>By then, DuCongé and Valencia, who was hired several months after him, had already discussed the possibility of a union. Valencia’s turning point came in 2025, when he worked a Fourth of July shift and found out from his paycheck that he wasn’t getting holiday pay. “I went in and I told my manager that day . . . I’m going to make a union.”</p><p>Valencia said he already knew DuCongé’s political orientation when he approached him about unionizing. “We got to talking about it, and it took a long time because we didn’t have the institutional knowledge on where to even begin, until by chance Nate met someone at a DSA meeting. They hooked us up with the UAW, and the rest is history.”</p><p>Given the store’s small size, the workers’ specific grievances, and the tight-knit relationships among several key employees, DuCongé and Valencia felt it would be a good place to test whether AutoZone could be organized.</p><p>“I know this isn’t always the case, but for us, it was already there,” said Valencia. “We were already a union.”</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Do the Job Right</h2></header><div><p>Juan Accostupa, a full-time sales associate who has worked at AutoZone for ten years and trained many of the organizers, described the extra responsibilities workers take on. “We’re not just a retail place. We do a lot of work,” he said. “We unload the trucks, we do installations — batteries, headlights, brake lights, wiper blades, whatever the case might be — and we’re just not getting paid properly.”</p><p>“You’re expected to do a lot for so little,” said DuCongé. “These are the kind of things that mechanics are paid to do, right?”</p><p>Accostupa said he has made minimum wage throughout his tenure at the store. “Some people think this is, like, a revolution thing. It’s not. We’re just asking for what should be done: better pay and better benefits. That’s it.”</p><p>Jess Omelia, a part-time commercial driver who previously worked for a Pepperidge Farm warehouse in Florida with “really great benefits,” said working for minimum wage with little to no benefits was a huge adjustment. “It was a job that I needed at the time, so I took it.”</p><p>Omelia said the lack of holiday pay for part-time employees came as a shock. She recalled being put on the schedule for Mother’s Day even though she was the only one among her coworkers with a toddler. “I was the only one there working on Mother’s Day,” she said. “It was only my store manager there. He had given everyone the day off or people had called out to be with their families.”</p><p>Workers also cited other reasons for unionizing: inconsistent and last-minute scheduling, inadequate equipment, no say in how they handle their routine responsibilities or in disciplinary procedures, and a push to upsell customers known as “WITTDTJR” — short for the AutoZone slogan “What It Takes To Do the Job Right.”</p><p>“We would literally come in and underneath the [sales] numbers every day, there would be a threatening note underneath that you need to get these numbers up,” said Omelia. “You would be punished and your hours would be taken away if you weren’t upselling.”</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>What Makes a Supervisor?</h2></header><div><p>Workers said their card drive proceeded with little incident until July, when corporate got wind of it. After the workers sent their demand letter and submitted their cards in late July, AutoZone promptly rejected them, saying DuCongé’s involvement as a parts sales manager — a position the company says is supervisory — nullified them.</p><p>DuCongé disputes that categorization. Under the National Labor Relations Act, a supervisor must have the authority, using independent judgment, to make or effectively recommend decisions like hiring, firing, disciplining, or promoting other workers — authority DuCongé said he did not have. Rather than fight the issue, which could have delayed an election, the workers resubmitted the cards without him.</p><figure><img alt="David Valencia, Juan Accostupa, and Nathan DuCongé take a photo together." height="710" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/659361569322.png" width="1000"/><figcaption>David Valencia, Juan Accostupa, and Nathan DuCongé, take a photo together. (UAW Local 259 / Facebook [lightly cropped])</figcaption></figure><p>“I just felt like it would be selfish if I tried to fight for my eligibility,” said DuCongé. “I never wanted to stand in the way of these people. They’re my friends, my coworkers. It was a good feeling to be able to just help.” He added, “As a member of DSA as well, I felt that as a responsibility. It was kind of like, hey, look, I’m in this organization, I might as well do something that lives up to the organization and the reason why I’m in it.”</p><p>Workers said that at a prehearing meeting in late August, AutoZone made clear that it intended to challenge the election not before the National Labor Relations Board but in federal court in Tennessee, where the company is based. At the same meeting, the workers and AutoZone signed an agreement that locked in the list of eligible voters to prevent challenges to votes on election day.</p><p>Yet other employees who hold the same position as DuCongé were allowed to vote. Two workers who were transferred to the store in mid-August were also deemed eligible.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>“We Will Accept Your Invitation to Fire You”</h2></header><div><p>In the lead-up to the vote, workers reported being subjected to heavy surveillance, multiple antiunion meetings per week, and threats of disciplinary action against the organizers.</p><p>“We were having three meetings a week. It was constant . . . and they were really just reading off of a script every time,” said Omelia. “It was just all anti-union. They were extremely against it, said that they would do everything in their power to fight it. If we didn’t like the conditions, [they said] that we could quit and go to another store.”</p><p>Valencia said the anti-union messaging relied on half-truths and accusations, including misleading claims about union dues and employees’ ability to communicate with their manager. Organizers, he said, were accused of misleading or threatening workers into voting yes, and were portrayed as using the campaign to land union jobs paid for by workers’ dues.</p><p>Workers said AutoZone brought in managers from locations around the country to surveil the store. “There were up to eight, nine people in the store a day, and even the customers were like, ‘What’s going on?’” said Omelia. “There would be times where they’re literally just standing at the back of the store with their arms crossed, just watching us.”</p><p>DuCongé said that after the workers submitted their demand letter on July 24, an account under the name of AutoZone CEO Philip Daniele showed up among the viewers of one of his Instagram stories.</p><p>In a September 4 recording shared with <cite>Jacobin</cite>, management threatened to fire DuCongé for union activity on the grounds that he was a supervisor: “If you continue to involve [yourself] in unionization activity, we will accept your invitation to fire you.”</p><p>LaborLab, a workers’ rights watchdog group, <a href="https://labornotes.org/blogs/2026/09/autozone-workers-are-trying-form-companys-first-ever-union">estimates</a> that AutoZone spent around $200,000 trying to defeat the union. “They do everything except pay you more,” said Murray.</p></div></section><section id="sec-5"><header><h2>AutoZone in Six</h2></header><div><p>Despite the onslaught of anti-union activity, the workers said the solidarity they felt with one another kept them moving forward. When Omelia’s mother died, her coworkers took up a collection. “I came into work, and they had a little envelope, and they all pitched in to help with my mom’s funeral costs. That’s how close we are.” Accostupa was quick to point out that every manager declined to contribute.</p><p>Support also came from outside the store. DuCongé, a filmmaker himself, had posted on social media about how inspiring he found Boots Riley’s new film, <cite>I Love Boosters</cite>. To his surprise, Riley started reposting updates on their organizing efforts. His first feature, <cite>Sorry to Bother You</cite>, follows a group of telemarketers who organize and go on strike.</p><p>“Boots has been massively influential on my personal life, my filmmaking efforts, but also really, really influential for this campaign,” he told <cite>Jacobin</cite>. “The solidarity is going beyond the movies and TV shows that he makes.” He added, “I just can’t thank him enough, truly, for helping us out.”</p><p>Workers said management kept talking to employees about the election in the twenty-four hours before the vote — and even during it. “On the day of voting, during voting happening, managers were pulling some of those people out of the store, and trying to sway those votes,” said Omelia.</p><p>Barred from voting and, he said, from entering the store, DuCongé stayed nearby. He recounted the moment:</p><blockquote><p>I didn’t know what to do with myself, so I just stand on this hill that’s looking down at the store . . . I felt locked onto the ground, and there’s this groundhog sitting right next to me, just also looking out there too. I’m looking at the groundhog, and then eventually it just looks at me, like, “What are you looking at?” It turns out we’re both just looking down at the store. There’s this beautiful sunset and all these crows and everything, and that’s when Mike [DiGuiseppe] texted us the news, and said, “You won.” I just collapsed.</p></blockquote><p>The final tally was 6–4 in favor of the union. Despite the prehearing agreement, and despite his serving as the union’s election observer, Valencia’s vote was challenged during voting, but, in the end, every eligible vote was counted.</p></div></section><section id="sec-6"><header><h2>After the Win</h2></header><div><p>The day after the vote, AutoZone fired DuCongé. In a recording provided to <cite>Jacobin</cite>, management tells him: “Effective immediately, AutoZone is terminating your employment as a result of the failure to act appropriately as a manager by engaging in and/or facilitating union activity.”</p><p>The following day, a manager was fired for, in DuCongé and Valencia’s words, “not stopping the union.”</p><p>Valencia says he was fired too, on October 3, the morning after the Zoom call. Asked on the call whether he was worried about his job, he had said, “If I get fired, I get fired. They’re going to have to come up with a good reason, because I’m in the bargaining unit. It won’t be so easy.”</p><p>That same day, AutoZone <a href="https://www.nlrb.gov/case/02-RC-392985">filed</a> three objections to the election with the National Labor Relations Board, a move the union sees as a delay tactic. The workers seem undeterred.</p><p>“We fought for this and we did it. It’s funny, I was telling the staff and everybody else, we were like the Knicks. Knicks in six,” said Accostupa. “The thing about it was we won six and four, 6–4. That was the key.”</p><p>Next they intend to help workers at other AutoZone stores organize. “I deliver to other stores, so I see the things that they go through,” said Omelia. “They were watching this election and waiting to see what happened with us to see if they could move forward.”</p><p>Valencia says AutoZone runs on the work of people like him and his coworkers. “People come into AutoZone frantic,” he says. “You help them out, you send them on their way with a smile on their face. It’s a good thing. We’re not saving the world, but one person at a time, we’re making their day better.”</p><p>“The workers on the ground are really providing all the value to the companies that eat up all the value,” Valencia says, “and all the people at the top that take all the profits that we create. And we just want some kind of compensation that looks closer to the value that we provide.”</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/autozone-organizing-drive-election-firings?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-12T13:00:00.5Z</published><summary type="text">In September, workers in White Plains, New York, won the first union at any of AutoZone’s nearly 7,000 US stores, despite an aggressive anti-union campaign. The next day, the company fired a lead organizer. Then another.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/political-cinema-robert-kramer-new-left</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/political-cinema-robert-kramer-new-left"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/567222929936.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/567222929936.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/567222929936.jpg"/><title type="text">Robert Kramer Is the New Left’s Great, Forgotten Filmmaker</title><updated>2026-10-12T12:30:00.133015Z</updated><author><name>Whitney Strub</name></author><category label="Film and TV" term="Film and TV"/><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>When Robert Kramer’s 1968 film <cite>The Edge</cite> reached Los Angeles, its ad in the <cite>Free Press</cite> posed a provocative question: “Should we kill the President?” And while Lyndon Johnson survived that film’s alienated would-be assassin, Kramer’s next film left little question as to where he stood. <cite>Ice</cite>, shot in early 1969 and released in late 1970, imagined an armed leftist insurrection in New York City, taking the jolting documentary-like style of Gillo Pontecorvo’s <cite>Battle of Algiers</cite> (1966) and bringing its war home to the Big Apple. Watching Kramer’s revolutionaries move through Grand Central Terminal, JFK Airport, New York University, and other recognizable sites as they try to create an all-American National Liberation Front is an eerily captivating sight in 2026. It’s impossible not to think of Luigi Mangione, or Elias Rodriguez, or perhaps January 6, or the death of the revolutionary ’60s dream.</p><p>Kramer, who was born in 1939 and died in 1999, was almost indisputably the key filmmaker of the US New Left. He played a central role in shaping Newsreel, the agitprop documentary collective that forged the New Left’s aesthetics, and his political ties included everything from Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) to the Weather Underground to armed communes in Vermont to the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). While his closest contemporary Haskell Wexler was filming the 1968 Democratic National Committee chaos, Kramer was being arrested there for attempting to coat roads in spiked balls to hinder the police, which helped land him on the FBI’s Security Index of dangerous subversives. His resolutely independent films captured the New Left from the inside and offer its most cohesive filmic legacy.</p><p>Yet Kramer remains somewhat obscure. He’s remembered best in France, where the <em>Cahiers du cinéma</em> crowd adopted him early, listing him on the October 1968 cover among the <cite>Quatre Américains</cite> at the forefront of independent US film, alongside John Cassavetes, Andy Warhol, and Shirley Clarke. Kramer moved there at the end of the 1970s, stayed through his death, and has always remained visible in national film culture. Back in his native land, however, he’s a cult director at most, known almost exclusively to the sorts of cinephiles who haunt repertory theaters and the deep-cut wing of Letterboxd.</p><p>It’s tempting to attribute Kramer’s near-invisibility to political repression, of which there was of course plenty. But having spent several years investigating his life and work for my new book, <cite>Films That Explode Like Grenades: Robert Kramer and the Search for a Radical Cinema</cite>, I reached a somewhat more materialist conclusion: Kramer faded from sight in the United States because for several decades almost none of his work was easily available to see.</p><p>The home video market of the 1980s and ’90s bypassed him almost completely, and even now in the age of streaming and torrenting, many of his works remain elusive. But it’s my hope that we’re on the brink of a Kramer renaissance. As the contradictions of American politics continue to heighten, and as its internal tensions intensify, Kramer’s explorations of radicalism have rarely felt more pertinent.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>The Making of a Radical</h2></header><div><p>Robert Kramer grew up on Park Avenue in Midtown Manhattan, the only child of a highly accomplished physician father and an equally respected textile designer and art collector mother, both from families that had fled Eastern Europe in the Jewish diaspora. His father, Milton, was among the first doctors dispatched to Hiroshima after the atomic bomb. He never discussed the horrors he witnessed, and Robert grew up in a cocoon of affluence and alienation.</p><p>He attended Swarthmore, graduating in 1961 just before the New Left arrived en masse there. Consequently, instead of joining its early organizing, he spent his postcollegiate years as an aspiring novelist, laboring on a gargantuan modernist tome that his friends found ponderous. He was accepted into Stanford’s doctoral history program and promptly quit. His major romantic relationship, with ceramics artist Jane Doubilet, often seemed driven by inertia and ennui, and after they married unhappily, they traveled on family money to avoid confronting their mutual dissatisfaction. While they were in South America in 1965, his father died from a cerebral hemorrhage at age fifty-eight.</p><p>Only then did Kramer plunge into both film and the Left, using both as a springboard out of his malaise. His childhood friend Peter Gessner, son of film studies pioneer Robert Gessner, was working in a small production unit headed by blacklisted Hollywood exiles when they received footage smuggled out of Venezuela by revolutionaries with the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). Gessner invited Kramer to collaborate. The resulting half-hour short, <cite>FALN</cite> (1965), was a straightforward, inauspicious debut — except for the arresting fact that it endorsed revolutionary violence against a US-backed puppet state.</p><p>By that point, Kramer had found SDS. The flagship New Left organization was attempting to move beyond its largely white college campus base by organizing in black urban areas and forging what a strategy document called “an interracial movement of the poor” premised on new forms of grassroots solidarity. Lead planners Carl Wittman and Tom Hayden decamped for Newark, New Jersey, and their presence and the proximity to media-capital New York made the city the flash point of the national project.</p><p>Kramer was too much of an individualist to be a strong community organizer, but he was nevertheless a photogenic, charismatic, and commanding speaker. When the documentary <cite>Troublemakers</cite> (1966) chronicled the Newark Community Union Project (NCUP), Hayden appeared as a clear leader, but Kramer brought the on-screen cool in his sporadic appearances, waving a cigarette as he cast doubt on working within existing systems, clearly thinking of the armed FALN as he declared, “My whole life has been spent trying to figure out how stinking the political system is, and I don’t really understand how all of a sudden we’re going to step in and change it.” NCUP primarily focused on block-level organizing, but Kramer appeared as a hip radical ready for revolution. One acquaintance from this era recalled him as “how all of us imagined <em>On the Road</em> to look, always in shades and leather jackets, looking like an angry bohemian.”</p><p>He didn’t last long in Newark and was gone before the city erupted in the infamous June 1967 rebellion. But <cite>Troublemakers</cite> made an impression, catching the New Left at the transitional moment when it was beginning to hypothesize about the limitations of participatory democracy and warm to the idea of more radical intervention, with Kramer as the film’s avatar of this pivot. Stokely Carmichael, then the chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), endorsed the film, and underground film impresario Jonas Mekas called it the “only American film I know that preaches revolution.” While he had been peripheral to NCUP itself, Kramer was suddenly at the center of New Left film culture.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>The Cinema of Accelerationism</h2></header><div><p><cite>Troublemakers</cite>’ directors, Robert Machover and Norman Fruchter, became his crew for a minimalist feature, <cite>In the Country</cite> (1967). The film tells the story of a couple who burns out from left organizing, retreats to a country house, and engages in sustained recriminations as their own romantic relationship disintegrates. Beholden to European art-house style, it was a bold if indulgent directorial debut (also introducing actor William Devane to the screen) which went largely unseen but served as a useful laboratory for <cite>The Edge</cite>.</p><p>Kramer’s second feature, in which a young leftist announces his plan to kill LBJ and his friends mostly shrug, was another dissection of what he saw as the catatonia and paralysis of the Left, intended as an internal autocritique. Presidential assassination provided an alluring hook, but <cite>The Edge</cite> steadfastly refused thrills, instead confronting a movement that Kramer found frozen. While a voracious reader, devouring works by Frantz Fanon, Malcolm X, Régis Debray, and other radical theorists of the day, Kramer was undeniably susceptible to romantic adventurist views and constantly judged the US New Left against the revolutionary anti-colonial movements then sweeping the Global South, finding it insufficiently committed. Nothing short of revolution could end the war in Vietnam or upend the hollow hypocrisies of American daily life. With no real rising action or climax, <cite>The Edge</cite>’s allegorization of Kramer’s dissatisfaction surely frustrated anyone seeking a political thriller, but it was precisely the coiled, unresolved tensions that led to Kramer’s adoption by <cite>Cahiers</cite>. No less than French New Wave pioneer Jacques Rivette listed it as his favorite film of the year.</p><p>For all that buildup, it was Newsreel and <cite>Ice</cite> that catapulted Kramer to the forefront of international radical film. Newsreel, formed in early 1968 by an ad hoc group of leftist and experimental filmmakers, immediately became the de facto documentary wing of the New Left. It produced visceral shorts on the student occupation of Columbia University, antiwar protests, the Black Panther Party, and more. Kramer himself traveled to North Vietnam with an SDS delegation to pick up three released prisoners of war and make a film featuring Ho Chi Minh. When the leader fell ill, Kramer’s team instead shot at village schools and self-defense trainings. When they returned home, US customs confiscated their footage, releasing it only after the Newsreel team challenged them in court. The resulting film, <cite>People’s War</cite> (1969), became an immediate staple of US anti-imperialist cinema, a paean to the perseverance of the Vietnamese people.</p><p>Newsreel’s choppy, grainy-16mm style deliberately contrasted with the sanitized polish of the mass media. Kramer frequently served as an always-quotable spokesman, telling <cite>Film Quarterly</cite> that Newsreel sought to “make films that unnerve, that shake assumptions, that threaten, that do not soft-sell, but hopefully (an impossible ideal) explode like grenades in peoples’ faces, or open minds up like a good can opener.” They didn’t seek dialogue or debate, Kramer explained. “We strive for confrontation,” he said. “We prefer disgust/violent disagreement/painful recognition/jolts — all these to slow liberal head-nodding.”</p><p>That is what he attempted with <cite>Ice</cite>, a film whose lasting impact stems partly from its bewildering contradictions. It is unambiguously a work in support of revolution. Opening with a communiqué from the National Committee of Independent Revolutionary Organizations, it tracks the efforts of “urban white people whose task must be armed struggle” to join a vanguard that includes the Black People’s Army and Mexican Revolutionary Front. Its frenetic handheld camera (manned by Machover from <cite>Troublemakers</cite> and Kramer’s previous two films) brings a restless nervous energy, occasionally released through prison breaks, assassinations, and the storming of an upper-middle-class apartment tower to force its residents at gunpoint to watch Newsreel-like propaganda.</p><p>Yet for all that, Kramer withholds the sort of stirring spectacle central to left cinema since Sergei Eisenstein first toyed with montage; violence in <cite>Ice</cite> (which includes the castration of Kramer’s own translator character) is neither cathartic nor triumphant but rather crude and brutal. If the plot charts rising action, the affect retains the eerie flatness of <cite>The Edge</cite>, with characters committed to insurrection but wholly unable to relate to one another, leaving <cite>Ice</cite>, true to its title, frozen in a revolutionary limbo, trapped between the thrill of insurrection and the existential abyss of capitalist personal alienation. For all the charge-the-barricades bravado of his public statements, Kramer proved more dialectical than didactic behind the camera, refusing the satisfying pleasures of more triumphalist agitprop while forcing the viewer to grapple with the film’s deliberate unresolvedness, which is precisely what gives <cite>Ice</cite> its unsettling staying power.</p><p>This also allowed Kramer to maintain two simultaneous positions: more than any other film, <cite>Ice</cite> indexed the radical currents of 1969 as SDS imploded and mass democratic politics gave way to the vanguardist tactics of the Weather Underground, some of whose explosions echoed scenes from the film (indeed, some cast members joined the group). Yet as much as Kramer himself supported the Weather Underground, including a brief affair with leader Bernardine Dohrn at the height of her fame on the FBI’s Most Wanted list, <cite>Ice</cite> also predicted its failure. For Kramer, this stemmed more from the icy social relations of the Left than the swerve to doomed ultraleftism per se, but it nonetheless renders the film a uniquely haunted and haunting artifact of a moment that was somehow both the height and nadir of the New Left’s revolutionary strain.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>After the Revolutionary Dream</h2></header><div><p><cite>Ice</cite> took over a year to emerge on-screen, mostly due to internal debates over its politics at Newsreel, which ultimately declined to distribute it. Thus a film that predicted the Weather Underground instead appeared to follow it. Even so, when it reached the public in 1970, it caused a stir at Cannes, was widely seen and debated on the US left, and helped spur <cite>Cahiers</cite> into a militant theoretical frenzy that lasted the next half-decade. Robert Kramer had become the face of radical American film.</p><p>It took Kramer a half-decade to complete another film, during which he spent time in Vermont with the Red Clover Collective, an armed commune that failed to inspire an <cite>Ice</cite>-like uprising. After the collapse of SDS and the COINTELPRO-led attack on black radicalism, the early-’70s left spun in numerous directions of varying impact. On one side was the flowering of gay liberation, women’s liberation, the American Indian Movement, black feminism, and other voices that had previously been marginalized even within radical circles; on the other was the excesses and embarrassments of such fringe sectarian organizations as the Symbionese Liberation Army, which soured public opinion on radical politics.</p><p>The Vermont commune scene contained all of these tendencies. Kramer was adjacent to a women-led Free Garage auto repair collective, the “underground railroad” to Canada for draft resisters, and the regional electoral organizing out of which Bernie Sanders’s early political career emerged. His main interest at the time, though, remained revolution, which he and many others still considered imminent. Red Clover stockpiled guns, pamphleteered at local high schools, staged agitprop street theater, and only slowly, painfully began to reckon with the undeniable fact that they had miscalculated.</p><p>This was devastating for Kramer, and <cite>Milestones</cite>, codirected with Newsreel comrade John Douglas, arrived in 1975 as an attempt to make sense of the new context, with a sweeping overview of life after what they saw as “The Movement” (a unity that many of those marginalized groups had long questioned). Following dozens of former New Leftists as they struggle to locate foundations for new forms of resistance, <cite>Milestones</cite>’s three hours constitute one of the most searching examinations of the very conditions of possibility for a US Left seen on-screen in the 1970s. The film, a narrative feature shot in often improvised semidocumentary fashion, breathtakingly captured the natural beauty of America, from New Mexico and Colorado to Vermont, but coupled these observations with ruminations on the nation’s history of racial exploitation and annihilation. The title came from a prison poem by Ho Chi Minh, and as always, Kramer offered fewer answers than open-ended inquiries. But the film’s colorful humanism, somewhat akin to Alain Tanner’s contemporaneous Swiss-French meditation on the reverberations of the 1960s, <cite>Jonah Who Will Be 25 in the Year 2000</cite> (1976), marked a departure for him, surely informed by his codirector Douglas. American audiences mostly ignored <cite>Milestones</cite>, but it was one of the most celebrated films of the 1970s by French critics.</p><p>If Kramer saw the spirit of 1968 slipping away at home, he thought he spied it elsewhere. The Portuguese Carnation Revolution, overthrowing the world’s longest-running fascist regime, began in 1974, and when he took <cite>Milestones</cite> to Cannes the next year, he stopped over and found the atmosphere electrifying. With friend Phil Spinelli, he returned with a camera and almost no budget. Their resulting <cite>Scenes from the Class Struggle in Portugal</cite> goes in search of that initial euphoria — and instead finds the revolution already being supplanted by incipient neoliberalism. Kramer then ventured to Angola, which had recently succeeded in its own anti-colonial struggle against Portugal, hoping to make a film — but he soon contracted malaria and returned home. Back in San Francisco, where he spent most of the ’70s, he lowered his sights, beginning work on a book of photojournalism with a tiny leftist press.</p><p>The late ’70s proved a crushing disappointment for Kramer, personally and politically. The ’60s dream appeared dead, and his work went ignored in the United States, even despite such champions as <cite>New York Times</cite> critic Vincent Canby. He flirted with a Hollywood deal, then with working in a crew capacity for Jean-Luc Godard and Francis Ford Coppola, but nothing coalesced. Instead, he moved to Paris with his partner Erika and their daughter Keja, and began making smaller, art-house-oriented works, plugged into an exile network that included other itinerant filmmakers like Chris Marker and Raúl Ruiz.</p><p>Some of Kramer’s adventures landed, such as the raw, startling <cite>Notre nazi</cite> (1984), an on-set documentary about the making of an experimental film starring a murderous former SS officer. Others didn’t, as when his one mainstream crossover attempt, the postapocalyptic sci-fi flick <cite>Diesel</cite> (1985), deservedly flopped. But the legacies and afterlives of the New Left proved a recurring through line of Kramer’s work. One example was the father/son drama <cite>Doc’s Kingdom</cite> (1987) that united <cite>Ice</cite> star Paul McIsaac with a young Vincent Gallo on the Portuguese coast. Another was <cite>Route One/USA</cite> (1989), a four-hour trip down the eastern seaboard from Maine to Key West on the brink of the 1988 presidential election, which finds a nation haunted by many things, including the merely spectral vestiges of a vibrant, hopeful, popular left.</p><p>By the time a sudden meningitis infection took Kramer’s life just after he turned sixty, he had long since abandoned the incendiary politics of his youth, but he never stopped interrogating their ramifications, or, for that matter, the nature of political cinema. The last feature-length film he completed, <cite>Walk the Walk</cite> (1996), took its title from an old Black Panther slogan: “If you talk the talk, you’d better walk the walk,” as Kramer remembered it. He had his flaws, and in my <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/F/bo267053463.html">book</a> <cite>Films That Explode Like Grenades Robert Kramer and the Search for a Radical Cinema</cite>, I’m unsparing about them. But for whatever critiques we can and should mount — and Kramer, who loved contradictions, very much also embodied them — no other artist holds as strong a claim to being the emblematic filmmaker of the US New Left.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/political-cinema-robert-kramer-new-left?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-12T12:30:00.133015Z</published><summary type="text">Robert Kramer’s films captured the New Left from the inside, from its promising beginning through its painful unraveling. He faded from view mostly because his work was so hard to see. In our new age of political volatility, he deserves a revival.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/books-publishing-reading-mass-market-paperback</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/books-publishing-reading-mass-market-paperback"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/396423859724.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/396423859724.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/396423859724.jpg"/><title type="text">Publishers Killed the Paperback, Then Blamed Readers</title><updated>2026-10-13T20:54:25.828946Z</updated><author><name>Ned Rust</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><category label="Books" term="Books"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>It seems every week a new piece about the decline and fall of the American reading habit goes viral. The idea that we’re entering a literary apocalypse that threatens to destabilize our democracy is perhaps overstated, but nobody is denying the book-reading trend is grim. In the most recent <a href="https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2019/2019179/index.asp">international assessment</a> of adult skills, conducted in 2023, 28 percent of American adults scored at or below the lowest level of literacy — up from 19 percent just six years earlier. By one widely cited estimate, more than half of American adults read below a sixth-grade level.</p><p>It’s interesting to note that these hand-wringing, sky-is-falling pieces unfailingly focus on external issues. Few of us doubt what we feel in our bones to be true — that long-form reading is being harmed by disruptive technologies and other beyond-our-control societal issues (political dysfunction and a decrepit educational system) that apply to the demand side of the equation.</p><p>But what about the supply side? Could it be that corporatized publishing — with all of its consolidations and centralization — may have enshittified the product to the point where it has abetted the decline in consumer demand?</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>The Death of the Mass-Market Paperback</h2></header><div><p>Consider the death of the mass-market paperback last year. When the Big Five publishing houses (Penguin Random House, Macmillan, HarperCollins, Hachette, and Simon &amp;amp; Schuster) took the most affordable book format in America — known for its modest price and compact size — off of life support in 2025, it had long ago failed to live up to the “mass” part of its name. At that point, the books under that banner were recognizable but lacking the vitality and freshness that had first driven them to national attention in the twentieth century.</p><p>Until the 1940s, book retail was dominated by hardcovers — books held between cloth- or paper-covered boards, the pages secured by sewn spines. <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/about/company-articles/celebrating-sir-allen-lanes-life-and-legacy">Penguin</a> in the UK and Pocket Books here in the United States were the first to make successful use of an alternative book format that rivaled — and, for many decades, far outsold — the hardback. This cheaper-to-manufacture book had a soft cover and relied upon a glued (versus stitched) binding. The resulting tome was easier to carry and <em>much</em> easier to afford. The new format was as much commercial opportunism as it was any attempt to democratize reading or to improve the citizenry’s understanding of the world. If you make a dime on each purchase of one hundred thousand paperbacks, that’s more than making a buck each on 2,500 hardcovers, which was the <a href="https://archive.org/details/twobitculturepap00davi">average unit sale</a> back then. Better yet, these books were sold all over middle America — in drugstores, grocery stores, and gas stations — not just in the little metropolitan oases.</p><figure><img alt="A 1939 ad for mass market paperbacks in The New York Times" height="1089" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/611836574905.png" width="834"/><figcaption>A 1939 ad for mass-market paperbacks in <cite>The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><p>In the post–Great Depression years, American bookstores were hardly ubiquitous. Large metro areas with a sufficient intelligentsia density might have a few, but in the 1930s there were only <a href="https://archive.org/details/twobitculturepap00davi">about five hundred</a> dedicated bookshops across all of America. At the same time, basic literacy was nearly universal — by the 1930 census, some 96 percent of Americans over the age of ten could read and write — but the average American only knew books through schools (which used to buy a lot more books than they do now), libraries (which used to contain a lot more books than they do now), and catalogs (which used to sell a lot more books than they do now). Unless you lived in an affluent area with a bookstore or were near a department store or gift shop — which also sometimes had small book sections — you simply did not encounter them as a working adult.</p><p>But when these cheap little books dubbed “mass-market paperbacks” began showing up, they were a hit. America’s Pocket Books launched in 1939 and sold 8.5 million copies within two years. Which is even more remarkable considering they were <a href="https://archive.org/details/twobitculturepap00davi">not yet being sold</a> “north of Boston, west of Chicago, or south of Washington [DC].” The books were <a href="https://archive.org/details/twobitculturepap00davi">averaging</a> close to one hundred thousand units each, with a population a little over a third the size of today’s United States. When the industry discontinued the format in 2024, the highest-selling new mass-market title — a <a href="https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-news/article/97179-book-publishers-plan-for-a-reduced-mass-market-paperback-footprint.html">Danielle Steel</a> book — sold 53,000 units. It’s no wonder the executives decided to scuttle the whole thing and to blame the customer for it.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Did the Public Really Stop Reading?</h2></header><div><p>One of the bigger recent pieces on the supposed new trend in anti-literacy was an <cite>Atlantic</cite> <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/2026/08/reading-crisis-postliterate-age/687618/">piece</a> called “The End of Reading Is Here,” and it was typical in its emphasis on the failures of the society that is degenerating outside the walls of the Big Five. The piece gives us the history of publishing from Mesopotamia to Ptolemy to Johannes Gutenberg and emphasizes the importance that our nation’s founders and civil war heroes placed on long-form print.</p><p>Marshall McLuhan, Neil Postman, Walter J. Ong, and Alexander Luria are name-checked. The tech-happy media and educational industries are decried, and the system that allows kids to spend 4.5 hours a day on social media is called out, but nowhere in the massive piece is any shade thrown at the book publishing industry with whom <i>The</i> <cite>Atlantic</cite>, for 169 years, has been cozy, and to which the article’s Yale-educated writer likely — as with most staff writers — means to sell manuscripts over the course of a career.</p><p>There is plenty of good reason for gloom. We are told that 80 percent of elementary school teachers report that their students have, by kindergarten, received school-issued <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/1/12/upshot/teachers-survey-chromebooks-class.html">personal video devices</a>. But the <cite>Atlantic</cite> piece contains no implication that one possible reason books and long-form reading are falling away, a theoretically contributory factor to the mass market’s extinction and the plummeting demand for books, involves the supply-side of the equation. Any thought that <em>what</em> the publishing industry is printing, or <em>how</em> it has been pricing it, or <em>where</em> it has been placing it, just might have harmed our nation’s reading habit is never mentioned. The writer has good company in blaming the people on the outside. None of the publishing executives and pundits that attended the mass-market paperback’s funeral ceremonies last year did any self-implication either.</p><p>“We follow the consumer,” said Dennis Abboud, CEO of ReaderLink, America’s largest book distributor, upon announcing the death of the mass-market paperback. “It seems the consumer has spoken,” said Steve Zacharius, CEO of one of the biggest publishers in the format. “As a format, I would say it’s pretty much over,” said Ivan Held of Penguin Random House. All this shrugging and hand-washing for the book format that, as one regretful publisher eloquently put it, saved (or at least forestalled the decline of) America. “I believe that mass-market paperbacks democratized America,” said Esther Margolis of Newmarket Press. “For basically the equivalent of a dollar or two, you know, you could be educated. You could pick them up at the school book fair. You could pick them up at a local gas station . . . You didn’t have to be an elitist.”</p><p>But could the mega-consolidated Big Five American publishing industry bear any blame for this state of affairs?</p><p>Consumer scientists have long understood that that popular habits are not just among the hardest things to break but are also very difficult to make. Many companies try to integrate their products into preexisting habits, but it’s rare that a company touches off an entirely new one, much less one at the scale of the mass-market paperback. Those 8.5 million paperbacks sold by Pocket Books from 1939 to 1941 were arguably proof of a bigger, more instantaneous habit birth than that of even the <a href="https://prosperion.us/commentary/the-impact-of-iphone-5/">iPhone</a>, which sold a comparable amount of their own product but to a population that had grown three times larger.</p><p>But America’s decades-long mass-market paperback binge (which in 1979 topped out at <a href="https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-news/article/99293-last-call-for-mass-market-paperbacks.html">387 million</a> annual units sold) suggests that we, as a people, are capable of — and perhaps even prone to — falling into a book-reading habit. So was there anything publishers could have done to prevent the death of the mass-market paperback and the decline of our national reading habit?</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>How Publishers Narrowed the Range of Titles</h2></header><div><p>In 1939, television didn’t exist, movies lasted only a couple hours — versus the days you can occupy through a single book — and even there you were stuck with whatever was playing at the non-multiplex cinema. You also had at best a dozen radio stations to choose from versus the cheap time-killing options we have on this side of the digital revolution.</p><p>The new landscape obviously comprises external demand-affecting features that exist beyond the reach of even the most powerful book industry executive. And judging whether books are more or less attractive seems like a hard one to quantify. Proving that publishers have gotten better or worse at designing attractive book jackets, executing motivating marketing campaigns, and delivering compelling manuscripts would doubtless be largely subjective.</p><p>But one aspect of appeal for which it is much easier to hold the publishers’ feet to the fire is range. There is a bigger story to be told here, but let’s take a snapshot and consider the <a href="https://archive.org/details/twobitculturepap00davi">first ten</a> mass-market paperbacks that Pocket Books published:</p><figure><img alt="An image featuring ten mass market paperbacks from 1939" height="1172" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/630861804558.png" width="1200"/></figure><p>Emily Brontë, <cite>Bambi</cite>, Dorothy Parker, Agatha Christie, Shakespeare, a Victorian bildungsroman and a Pulitzer Prize–winning novel by Thornton Wilder. That’s quite a broad spectrum! Now let’s hold this mini-catalog up against the mass-market <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/books/best-sellers/2025/02/23/mass-market-monthly/">bestsellers list</a> from the very month in 2025 that Dennis Abboud, CEO of ReaderLink — a former managing partner at a private equity firm — announced that the mass-market paperback was to be put out to pasture:</p><figure><img alt="An image featuring the ten best-selling mass market paperbacks of 2026" height="1386" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/060305766249.png" width="1200"/></figure><p>Comparing the first ten paperbacks ever published — which sold millions of copies in a very different world — to the last ten is not entirely unfair. Those were the industry’s ten priority titles of 1939; the latter ones are the ten priority titles of the industry eighty-six years later. In other words, decisions — curations, really — made by the companies. The former are effectively the ten books a person of 1939 was most likely to have encountered while shopping, and the latter are the ten books a person is most likely to have encountered while doing the same in February 2025. In 1939, we have adventure books, plays, poems, a story about a deer, a murder mystery, a prize-winning literary novel, and a movie tie-in — all by a set of authors ranging in age, if they were living at time of publication, from thirty-eight to sixty-nine. In 2025, we have only contemporary commercial fiction options, half of which are series titles (one of which had a whopping thirty-five prior installments) and by eight brand-name authors, average age seventy-four, plus two whose franchise author is a man who would have been eighty-six at the time of publication, at least had he not died in 2004.</p><p>There’s nothing wrong with pursuing safe bets: all these old brand authors and their long-established readerships are obviously dependable, at least from a quarterly earnings standpoint, versus Pocket Books’ unscientific, consumer-data-lacking, instinct-driven — albeit extremely successful — strategy from 1939. But given that variety is an important part of attracting consumers, is it possible our twenty-first century publishers have diminished the wider appeal of their product — for readers and potential readers outside the dependable boomer commercial-fiction core — even just a little bit?</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>Price Gouging Instead of Affordability</h2></header><div><p>As to affordability, ¢25 (the price of each of Pocket Books’ titles) went a lot further in 1939 than it does now but was still a consumer-friendly price point. It was just slightly higher than what our great-great-grandparents would have paid for a gallon of gas and slightly lower than what they’d have paid for a dozen eggs. In 2024, the format’s last year of full national distribution, a new mass-market paperback would set you back three times as much as a dozen eggs or a gallon of gas.</p><p>One might suspect that materials, distribution, or other book-specific costs had risen over the intervening decades. But how then to explain that the mass-market paperback’s older sibling — the hidebound hardcover — hasn’t seen an inflation nearly so dramatic? Today’s hardback novel has a cover price between $28 and $32. That’s 40 percent cheaper than it would have been back in the 1940s, and this is before a typical national retailer discount of more than 20 percent (and often up to 50 percent) for best-selling titles. In 1939, you could buy ten mass-market paperbacks for the cost of a single new hardback. In 2024, you could barely buy two. Which means that under the leadership of the Big Five and their equally hegemonic national retail partners, the flagship product favored by elite-facing bookstores in wealthy enclaves got cheaper, and the format with the proven mass potential got many times more expensive.</p><p>Finally, let’s consider availability. Even before the mass-market paperback was discontinued, books were being carried in fewer and fewer places. Supermarkets, drugstores, truck stops, newsstands, and department stores,had all gotten out of the business. And the bookselling stalwarts of recent decades have been faltering too. In 2024, Costco, which used to sell <a href="https://janefriedman.com/costco-pulls-back-on-stocking-books/">millions</a> of units a year, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2024/12/01/costco-book-sales/76689057007/">stopped</a> carrying books in most of its stores. The big national book retailer Borders, with an assist from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/jul/01/borders-agrees-sell-itself-najafi">private equity</a>, went out of business in 2011. Barnes &amp;amp; Noble has been roughly holding steady, but it has just around six hundred outlets in at best 19 percent of our nation’s counties.</p><figure><img alt="A spinner rack in a Canadian drugstore, July 2026 " height="857" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/212930752273.jpg" width="643"/><figcaption>A spinner rack in a Canadian drugstore, July 2026 (Courtesy Ned Rust)</figcaption></figure><p>The trends the publishers and the media cite to justify this availability crisis are real. But were they unavoidable? And are they excusable? And are they perhaps also driven by problems the two other As — appeal and affordability — over which the industry has even more direct control? Could and should the US publishing industry in fact be visibly exploring solutions or putting up a public fight to maintain a more significant non-digital distribution of its titles? Could and should the industry notice that the mass-market paperback is still for sale in Canada — where, in that same 2023 assessment, just 18 percent of adults scored at or below the lowest literacy level, compared with 28 percent here — and at a price less than half of what it rose to in the United States?</p><p>It’s difficult to see how the corporatized, highly centralized industry is walking away blameless from killing off one of its former darlings — the affordable paperback. Clearly it’s easier to focus on fewer higher-income readers than on a multitude of Americans whose lives you have no social connection to. Clearly decisions were made — ones that no doubt have had a major effect on American reading habits. And clearly the highly intertwined media establishment is not going to second-guess them.</p><p>But maybe you should.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/books-publishing-reading-mass-market-paperback?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-12T12:00:00.125Z</published><summary type="text">In 1939, the 25¢ paperback made America a nation of readers, delivering thrillers, classics, and Pulitzer-winning books. So why did the Big Five publishers just kill the mass market paperback?</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/phillips-curve-inflation-unemployment-labor</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/phillips-curve-inflation-unemployment-labor"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/131922518974.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/131922518974.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/131922518974.jpg"/><title type="text">The Philips Curve Is a Tool for Waging Class War on Workers</title><updated>2026-10-12T11:30:00.261577Z</updated><author><name>Silas Xuereb</name></author><author><name>David Moscrop</name></author><category label="Policy" term="Policy"/><category label="Wages, Productivity, and Unemployment" term="Wages, Productivity, and Unemployment"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>For nearly three-quarters of a century, central banks and policymakers have relied on the Phillips curve: the idea that inflation can be kept in check by disciplining worker power and putting restraints on employment levels. In 2026, does that theory, and the depoliticization of monetary policy that accompanies it, still make sense? Perhaps the real question isn’t whether every inflation spike has the same cause and cure, but whether central banks should use higher unemployment as their default tool to stabilize prices at all.</p><p>Jacobin’s David Moscrop recently talked with <a href="https://www.taxfairness.ca/en/about/people/silas-xuereb">Silas Xuereb</a>, a researcher and policy analyst with Canadians for Tax Fairness and a coauthor of the <a href="https://www.taxfairness.ca/en/resources/reports/new-robber-barons-quarter-century-wealth-concentration-canada">report</a> <cite>The New Robber Barons: A Quarter Century of Wealth Concentration in Canada</cite>.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><hr/></header><dl><dt><p>David Moscrop</p><p>What is the Phillips curve?</p></dt><dd><p>Silas Xuereb</p><p>In the simplest terms, the Phillips curve is an idea in economic theory that there’s a trade-off between unemployment and inflation. So, if unemployment is low, that will lead to high inflation. And if we want to get inflation low, we might have to endure some high unemployment.</p><p>It was named after a New Zealand economist, Bill Phillips, who wrote a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2550759">paper</a> back in the 1950s observing a close link between the two variables — between unemployment and wage inflation in the United Kingdom. The work was extended by American economists in the 1960s who observed the same phenomenon: that there’s a close curve relationship between the inflation rate and the rate of unemployment in the United States. And this is what became known as the Phillips curve.</p></dd><dt><p>David Moscrop</p><p>So, it’s been around for nearly three-quarters of a century. Does the theory still hold in 2026?</p></dt><dd><p>Silas Xuereb</p><p>It depends on what you mean. In the 1970s in the United States, you had what people call stagflation: high inflation, high unemployment, and stagnant growth. This didn’t fit the theory of the Phillips curve. And so, ever since then, economists have tried to adapt the theory in various ways in order to better explain the data that we’ve subsequently seen.</p><p>But in my opinion, and I think from the perspective of a lot of left and post-Keynesian economists, there’s kind of a fallacy here. In some ways, the entire premise of the Phillips curve confuses correlation with causation. An empirical pattern was observed in the data at a certain point in time, but it was extended to inform central bank policy. The idea was that technocrats and the central banks could use the tools of central banking to control inflation and, in doing so, affect unemployment in a direct, one-to-one way. But that direct causal relationship was never really there.</p><p>So, is the theory still valid? In some ways, sometimes, there is a relationship between inflation and unemployment, but it’s not universal. It’s not a one-to-one causal relationship.</p></dd></dl></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Monetary Policy Is Political</h2></header><dl><dt><p>David Moscrop</p><p>How has the theory of the curve been used by economists, policymakers, and politicians since the 1960s?</p></dt><dd><p>Silas Xuereb</p><p>The most famous implementation of the theory’s logic occurred in what’s known as the <a href="https://jacobin.com/2018/12/paul-volcker-federal-reserve-central-bank">Volcker shock</a>. Starting in 1979, Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker quickly and significantly increased interest rates in an effort to fight inflation in the United States. He was aware, based on the assumptions of the Phillips curve model, that this could mean increased unemployment. And it did. So, in that instance, the Phillips curve was to some extent correct, in the sense that fighting inflation meant accepting higher unemployment. This had significant class implications. Workers were really hurt. Millions of US workers lost their jobs because of this central bank policy.</p><p>The curve has been contested, and the theory behind it has been adapted over the years. A great deal of nuance has been added. But the idea that central banks should use monetary policy to fight inflation and accept the impacts that it has on unemployment has remained. We saw this in Canada in the post-pandemic years: while inflation was rising, the central bank resorted to these same kinds of tools, raising interest rates in an effort to bring it down. This approach is driven by the theory that high inflation is being driven by workers bidding wages up too high — that workers are asking for too much and that’s what causes prices to increase.</p><p>But what we know is that, in the post-COVID-19 period, workers’ wages were not what was <a href="https://jacobin.com/2024/07/profits-inflation-covid-tax-policy">causing inflation</a> at all. The pandemic created significant shocks to supply chains, while some corporations raised prices to pad their margins, using their market power in the post-pandemic period. That’s really what drove that post-pandemic inflation. So, the conventional tools that the central banks rely on are not going to be as effective in this context because inflation has a variety of different causes at different points in time. It’s not always caused by workers asking for too much. You have to know what is happening at each particular point in time to understand how policy should respond.</p></dd><dt><p>David Moscrop</p><p>I’ve seen some people argue that one way to address inflation is to raise taxes. If the concern is a bidding up of wages or an increase in the amount of money floating around, using the state and fiscal policy to rebalance through taxation is also a solution. Was that ever a viable response? Is there a reason the policy response is: “We’ve got to lay people off?” Is the standard central bank approach designed to discipline labor rather than rely on the state’s taxation powers?</p></dt><dd><p>Silas Xuereb</p><p>This question gets at the depoliticization of a lot of policy and at the arbitrary distinction that has been made in capitalist countries between fiscal and monetary policy. We have this notion that monetary policy is <em>the</em> tool for fighting inflation — that governments are incapable of imagining other ways to do so. In reality, monetary and fiscal policy are both very political beasts. Both affect inflation and the distribution of resources; both shape class conflict and class outcomes.</p><p>Fiscal policy could also be used to fight inflation. It would depend on how taxes are structured and whom they affect. That’s ultimately a political question. I think a lot of people recognize that fiscal policy is political, but we don’t often recognize that monetary policy is also political and also has significant distributional consequences.</p></dd></dl></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>The Labor Power Curve</h2></header><dl><dt><p>David Moscrop</p><p>Who benefits from the failure to make that connection and that distinction? Is it a conscious decision by political and economic elites to essentially pretend something is technocratic and administrative — or even scientific — and not political?</p></dt><dd><p>Silas Xuereb</p><p>The people who benefit from depoliticization are those who have the most access and influence over the levers of power. So, in a capitalist system where very wealthy people and corporations control investment and have a lot of influence over government — and are disproportionately politicians as well — those people are going to benefit from being able to take some decisions out of the democratic realm. That’s essentially what depoliticizing central banking is. It’s saying, “No, it’s not going to be a democratic choice. We don’t get to vote on what this decision is going to be. We’re just going to implement it because we know what’s best or that conventional theory is what’s best.”</p><p>Looking at the data, some people argue that the Phillips curve is no longer as strong, empirically, as an explanation of the relationship between unemployment and inflation. I think the reason for this is political, a matter of class power. Workers and the labor movement don’t have as much bargaining power as they did in the 1950s and ’60s when we saw a closer relationship. So even when unemployment is low like right now, workers are less able to bargain for the wage increases they won in the 1950s and ’60s.</p><p>We need to look at all of these concepts through the lens of class and asymmetric power. These are political questions. In a purely empirical sense, the Phillips curve is not as strong a relationship as it once was. But that’s not to say that there’s no relationship. Again, when the Bank of Canada repeatedly raised interest rates in the post-pandemic years, unemployment was at a low in 2022 and 2023, then began to rise. And that’s probably not a coincidence. So, there is still some relationship, but we can’t use it as a crutch or as our only explanation for inflation. We have to be able to look at the political processes and the bargaining relationships that are underlying these outcomes.</p></dd></dl></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/phillips-curve-inflation-unemployment-labor?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-12T11:30:00.261577Z</published><summary type="text">The Phillips curve holds that low unemployment drives inflation, meaning that controlling prices requires putting workers out of work. Its continuing influence shows how power over the money supply shapes class power.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/lonesome-dove-reading-novels-men</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/lonesome-dove-reading-novels-men"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/394425070955.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/394425070955.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/394425070955.jpg"/><title type="text">The Strange Resurrection of Lonesome Dove</title><updated>2026-10-12T22:35:00.128828Z</updated><author><name>Ross Barkan</name></author><category label="Books" term="Books"/><category label="Literature" term="Literature"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>On TikTok, there are dozens and dozens of videos of men and women, many of them young, staring into the camera to talk earnestly about an eight-hundred-page novel that was published forty-one years ago. “I didn’t see the western phase of my life coming, but I’m glad we’re here,” one woman <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@allyisreading/video/7597558870969470238?_r=1&amp;_t=ZP-9AJ8a4AuoCE">says</a>. “I want to talk about <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite>. . . . ” And this is what they do. They <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@tuhkyjuhslife/video/7578694841710791967?_r=1&amp;_t=ZP-9AJC9Hj5fuY">rhapsodize</a> over characters who “feel like they are a part of your life.” They <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@talesandtomes_/video/7526980072356498701?_r=1&amp;_t=ZT-9AJCAU6q4Mg">celebrate</a> the “absolute journey” and the “incredible” prose. “I’ve tried to find a better book than <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite> and I’ve failed miserably, many times,” a twenty-year-old British man <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@lyricallibrary02/video/7685094358072265986?_r=1&amp;_t=ZT-9AJCtgT7ujl">declares</a>.</p><p>What makes this all the more remarkable is that the novel’s author, Larry McMurtry, died more than five years ago and isn’t terribly famous. McMurtry, in his lifetime, enjoyed enviable success — <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite> sold millions of copies and won a Pulitzer Prize, his novels were adapted into popular films and television shows (including the 1989 hit <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite> miniseries) — but was overshadowed by many of his more prominent literary peers, including Philip Roth, John Updike, and Norman Mailer, even if he was commercially far more successful. Unlike with another contemporary who died not long ago, Joan Didion, there is no cult of McMurtry, no particular mystique for a man who was, in addition to his career as a novelist, a well-regarded antiquarian bookseller. <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite>, until not long ago, wasn’t even an especially remembered or revered novel of the late twentieth century — no <cite>Sophie’s Choice</cite>, no <cite>Ragtime</cite>. And unlike, say, John Steinbeck’s <cite>East of Eden</cite>, which is enjoying a resurgence because Zoe Kazan’s miniseries was just dropped on Netflix, the <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite> Netflix adaptation (also by Kazan) was only announced last month and has no official release date. Many of the TikTok videos precede Netflix’s announcement.</p><p>Why <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite>? Why <em>now</em>? And what does it mean for a publishing industry that, with few exceptions, no longer publishes novels — literary fiction, in particular — remotely like it? This is, indeed, a strange time for people who care about books. There is no shortage of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/25/style/fiction-books-men-reading.html">reports</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/07/opinion/men-fiction-novels.html">opinion pieces</a>, backed up by enough data, to show that America has a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/2026/08/reading-crisis-postliterate-age/687618/">literary crisis</a> and technology is eating away at our attention spans. Books still sell — the publishing industry is much more resilient than it looks — and physical bookstores proliferate, but it’s inarguable the literary novel matters much less to mass culture than it once did. Mostly gone, too, are novels like <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite>: lengthy, blood-drenched, and <em>male</em>-coded. Women, as TikTok has shown, can enjoy <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite> as much as men, despite a vicious gang rape later in the novel, no doubt thanks to its sharply written female characters like Lorena Wood, Clara Allen, and Elmira Johnson.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>The Disappearing Male Reader — and Novelist</h2></header><div><p>Of late, there has been much discourse about men and publishing, men and literary fiction. Are there still male readers? Is literary fiction just for women now? Is the swaggering male novelist of yore extinct for good? If so, is this good? Thornier questions arise, too, over race and sexuality. What of the <em>white</em> straight man? Jacob Savage, in a <a href="https://www.compactmag.com/article/the-lost-generation/">controversial essay</a> for <cite>Compact</cite>, argued that white heterosexual men had been systematically driven out of the worlds of the arts, denied the prestige that they once accrued. Regardless of whether Savage is correct, there are strong data points <a href="https://www.arts.gov/stories/blog/2025/men-women-split-reading-real-and-persists-amid-historical-rate-declines">that show</a> men, overall, really are reading less than women — fiction especially.</p><p>All of this hangs over the curious <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite> resurgence.</p><p>Set in the 1870s, <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite> is about two men, Augustus McCrae and Woodrow Call, who are cattle rustlers and former Texas Rangers. Their rustling operation includes Josh Deets, an expert tracker who is black, and Pea Eye Parker. Jake Spoon, another former Texas Ranger, is on the run for accidentally killing a dentist in Arkansas; he convinces his old buddies there’s big money to be made if they can drive a herd of cattle from Texas to Montana. The novel itself, <a href="https://www.woman-of-letters.com/p/the-last-cowboy-novelist">argues</a> the writer Naomi Kanakia, is not like other mythic westerns, because the supposed good guys can’t really protect the people in their care, including Lorena Wood, a prostitute hoping to get to San Francisco. Many characters meet brutal and bloody ends. And the novel is a slow burn, with a couple hundred pages of comical ruminating and set building before the violence commences. Many contemporary editors would have cut it down drastically. “What’s interesting about Gus and Woodrow is they’re basically existential heroes. Their task — running this cattle drive — is absurd,” Kanakia writes. “This book is definitely <em>not</em> a work of realism. The main characters are certified badasses, able to kill many times their number of Indians and bandits guys. Even minor characters are often able to undertake mythic feats, like Pea Eye, who at one point walks a hundred miles, naked, to bring help to Gus.”</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>The Death of the “Dad Novel”</h2></header><div><p>There are a few different ways, both sociologically and economically, to understand a novel like <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite>. Once, there were many more books like it, blends of the high literary and commercial that could be read, almost, as middlebrow — or <em>midcult</em>, as the famed critic Dwight Macdonald once derisively put it. Many of them were adapted into famous movies. Herman Wouk’s extremely popular, Pulitzer Prize–winning <cite>The Caine Mutiny</cite> might have fit the bill, as might the works of James Michener. “Dad” fiction, perhaps — books aimed at a certain kind of middle-class, aging male with a bit of disposable income and interest in losing himself in a novel for a few days or weeks. If novels like these are not totally extinct, they are not nearly as prevalent as they once were. Nor are popular new works that might have had a largely male audience in mind, like 2020s versions of <cite>American Psycho</cite> — a publishing sensation upon its release in 1991 — and <cite>Fight Club</cite>. Fittingly, both were adapted into now-iconic films.</p><p>If men still sit at the top of today’s publishing conglomerates, it’s college-educated women writing, editing, and agenting most of the novels of note. It’s these same women filling book clubs, going to book events, and entering master of fine arts (MFA) programs. Men are plentiful among the ranks of the most celebrated contemporary novelists, but few of them are under the age of forty. The buzzy twenty- and thirtysomething writers — from the widely known (Sally Rooney) to the more “book” famous (Emma Cline) to the beneficiaries of media hype cycles (Honor Levy) — are almost all female. Ultimately, novels exist in a marketplace, and women are simply reading more than men. They graduate college at higher rates, and it is in college where a person is usually exposed to literature at a greater and more lasting depth.</p><p>Why should a publisher take a risk on a book like <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite> when its market research tells it the audience for it might not even exist? Factor in the historical misogyny of the literary world, and a publisher can both feel virtuous and fulfill a capitalist imperative. Joyce Carol Oates <a href="https://x.com/JoyceCarolOates/status/1551210510389022723">once claimed</a> on X, to great consternation, that “a friend who is a literary agent told me that he cannot even get editors to read first novels by young white male writers, no matter how good.” It’s the sort of statement that is hard to prove — and hard to <em>dis</em>prove. One might say, as a rejoinder, the lack of vaunted young male writers, the neo–David Foster Wallaces or even Larry McMurtrys, is evidence of a talent gap, a group not showing up like it used to. Or it <em>could</em> be something structural — a publishing industry, and even the broader public, losing interest in a sort of person and perspective.</p><p>A more challenging question can be asked: If more books were published by men with explicitly masculine themes, would there actually be a wider male readership? It’s the old chicken-and-egg dilemma. The audience won’t emerge because the product isn’t there, and the product isn’t there because the audience is elsewhere. Men, obviously, can read and enjoy books by women, but there is the sticky gendered reality that, on balance, women will probably prefer reading women, and men may prefer reading men. Boys, especially, seem to long for male teachers and <a href="https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2021/11/2/22751904/male-elementary-school-teachers/">role models</a> in the classroom. As they age, and if they want to read, they might be drawn to the fiction of writers like Ernest Hemingway, Raymond Carver, and McMurtry. They might want literature that, at the bare minimum, <em>seems</em> masculine.</p><p>The movement of literature back into the feminine realm has some historical precedent. In the nineteenth century, as Ronnie Grinberg <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691193090/write-like-a-man">details</a> in <cite>Write Like a Man: Jewish Masculinity and the New York Intellectuals</cite>, “ladies were the main audience of literature,” with Jane Austen, George Eliot, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, the Brontës, and Harriet Beecher Stowe hailed as the leading practitioners of the novel, which was a form of common entertainment. Women were, at the same time, taking over the teaching profession. Men taught at the university level, but the vast majority of working men and women did not attend college. While women would remain in the teaching profession, the novel, according to Grinberg, shed some of its feminine associations in the twentieth century. Hemingway and the Lost Generation masculinized, along with a rising urban intelligentsia, the conception of the novelist. Suddenly, writing could be synonymous with a kind of machismo. There were women, too, who came to believe this. “It is not suggested that muscles write books, but there is a certain sense in which talent and experience being equal, they may be considered a bit of an advantage,” the literary critic and novelist Elizabeth Hardwick once said. “Of course the <em>best</em> literature by women is superior to <em>most</em> of the work done by men,” she added, yet “it is only the whimsical, cantankerous, the eccentric critic, or those who refuse the occasion for such distinctions, who would say that any literary work by a woman, marvelous as these may be, is on a level with the very greatest accomplishments of men.”</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Gambling, Porn, and Doomscrolling</h2></header><div><p>These sentiments would today rightly be considered retrograde. What Hardwick, who lived through much of the twentieth century and died in 2007, probably could not have foreseen was the decline of the male reader in the literary fiction space — and how that might impact what books end up in print. There’s evidence to suggest that the technological distractions of our age have corroded young men more than young women. Gambling and porn addictions, facilitated by smartphones, are overwhelmingly male vices. And if there’s dead time that might have been filled by a thick paperback, it now belongs to the phone, the infinite scroll. Other entertainments beckon, too: podcasts, immersive video games, and the betting sites Kalshi and Polymarket, which collectively gobble up idle hours.</p><p>If men are reading, they are probably headed to nonfiction: books about history, finance, or politics. <cite>This</cite> market, however, is shrinking. “What has happened in the last ten years is that the overall industry has grown modestly, but fiction and nonfiction have basically flipped positions,” Sean deLone, an editor at Atria, <a href="https://dearheadofmine.substack.com/p/the-nonfiction-book-market-is-collapsing">wrote</a> in a recent Substack piece. “In 2015, 6 of the top 25 bestselling hardcover books — this is a not-perfect but useful proxy for new books published — were fiction. In 2025, 18 of the top 25 hardcover books were fiction, meaning only 7 were nonfiction, almost an exact inversion of ten years ago.” This fiction-nonfiction inversion — the rise of one market at the probable expense of another — can likely be blamed on the collapse of male readership. “Yes, the nonfiction collapse is at its root connected to the continual, ever-devolving crisis of men. Proportionally we are gaining many more women as readers and losing our few men,” deLone argued.</p><p>It would be an exaggeration to say that there are no longer any popular literary novels by men that appeal, specifically, to male sensibilities, or even to the darker side of masculinity. Europe has stars like Michel Houellebecq and David Szalay, whose <cite>Flesh</cite> won the Booker Prize last year. Tony Tulathimutte’s 2024 short story collection, <cite>Rejection</cite>, which tackles inceldom and lurid gay male sex fantasies, won critical acclaim and sold well. There very well could be more novels like these in the near future. Publishing is a trends-based industry, and the success of <cite>Rejection</cite>, at the minimum, has probably spurred on at least a few editors at large houses to acquire similar works.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>Will the Publishing Industry Learn From <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite>’s Resurrection?</h2></header><div><p>More intriguing, perhaps, will be what the publishing world makes of <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite>’s TikTok popularity. How much notice will it take? Many of the videos praising the novel are produced by women. This blood-soaked western has found a female audience. Ideally, this would motivate publishers to acquire more novels like <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite> in the future. New fiction tends to be much shorter — longer books cost more to print — and there’s a feeling among publishers that readers will shy away from thick books in this distractible age. <cite>Lonesome Dove</cite>’s online success could upend that thinking or force publishers, at least, to take more risks. A young writer, a male even, working in the vein of McMurtry needn’t see his many query emails go unreturned.</p><p>It’s not up to book publishing, of course, to <em>fix</em> men, but it wouldn’t hurt if more boys and young men, too screen-obsessed these days, wanted to read and then become writers. A novelist, like anyone else, can be toxic, but the acts of reading and writing are the very opposite — they are cleansing and enlightening and do wonders for the soul. Let the men, in deep contemplation, dream of rustling cattle all the way up to Montana.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/lonesome-dove-reading-novels-men?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-11T13:00:00.37Z</published><summary type="text">Larry McMurtry’s 1985 cowboy epic is finding a new generation of readers online. Its revival raises an awkward question for publishing: What happened to the big, bloody, male-coded literary novel and to the men who used to read and write them?</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/philosophy-liberty-society-law-well-being</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/philosophy-liberty-society-law-well-being"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/863998278388.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/863998278388.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/863998278388.jpg"/><title type="text">How Much Liberty Should We Limit?</title><updated>2026-10-11T12:30:00.043911Z</updated><author><name>Sarah Conly</name></author><author><name>Nick French</name></author><category label="Society" term="Society"/><category label="Health" term="Health"/><category label="Theory" term="Theory"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>In the political culture of the United States, individual liberty is frequently thought of as possessing intrinsic and overriding importance. The political right and the political left in the United States have long competed to be seen as the true champions of individual freedom, and each has tried to advance its own goals under the banner of liberty.</p><p>For the Right in recent decades, individual liberty has often meant the right of corporations and the wealthy to do whatever they want with their property, unconstrained by government regulation or obligations to pay taxes or collectively bargain with their workers. The Left, at its best, has stood up against <a href="https://jacobin.com/2025/03/trump-free-speech-khalil-deportation">state</a> as well as <a href="https://jacobin.com/2023/08/wga-sag-strike-workplace-democracy-control-uaw-teamsters">employer tyranny</a> and for the kind of <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/03/mamdani-cohen-freedom-affordability-speech">economic security</a> that enables people to live truly autonomous lives.</p><p>These questions of economic coercion and exploitation aside, greater individual liberty is clearly not always an unalloyed good. The consumer bounty of twenty-first-century America has included the invasion of smartphones, social media, and live streamed audiovisual content into more and more corners of our lives — with evidence mounting that these developments are causing <a href="https://jacobin.com/2025/06/ban-smartphones-tech-society">significant harm</a> to our well-being and <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/03/politics-after-literacy">cognitive capacities</a>. The rise of <a href="https://jacobin.com/2024/08/sports-betting-taxation-robinhood-draftkings">sports betting</a> apps, which allow users to gamble on their phones from anywhere at any time of day, is a <a href="https://jacobin.com/2024/10/sports-betting-legalization-gambling-campaign">scourge</a> on young men’s finances and their mental health. Meanwhile, merchants of offline vices like kratom, a drug linked to addiction, overdose, and liver disease, are getting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/01/us/kratom-trump-administration.html?eafs_enabled=false">free rein</a> from the Trump administration.</p><p>The corporate purveyors of addictive social media platforms, gambling apps, and dangerous supplements would no doubt argue that they and their customers should have the freedom to contract however they see fit. But we can reasonably ask in these cases and others whether imposing some restrictions on individual choice might not be to the benefit of consumers, or to society more broadly.</p><p>Sarah Conly is an emerita professor of philosophy at Bowdoin College and the author of <cite>The Limits of Liberty</cite>, published by Oxford University Press last year, as well as <cite>One Child: Do We Have a Right to More</cite>? and <cite>Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism</cite>. She argues that modern philosophy and American popular culture alike have misconstrued the value of autonomy. On Conly’s view, more restrictions on individual liberty are warranted than has generally been appreciated — ranging from bans on cigarettes and restrictions on restaurant portion sizes, to limitations on how much meat one can consume, to prohibiting promulgation of “dangerous falsehoods.” <cite>Jacobin</cite> editor Nick French recently interviewed Conly to discuss her argument that autonomy is only of instrumental value, her views on when individual freedom might be limited on paternalistic grounds, and the potential dangers of endorsing greater restrictions on liberty.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><hr/></header><dl><dt><p>Nick French</p><p><cite>The Limits of Liberty</cite> develops the argument that liberty (or autonomy) is of only instrumental, rather than intrinsic, value. What do you mean by this? And how does this position set you apart from other philosophical thinking about liberty?</p></dt><dd><p>Sarah Conly</p><p>When we say something has intrinsic value, we mean that it has value in itself, regardless of what it may produce. We generally think that humans have intrinsic value, for example, so that the death of a human is always a loss. That is why we believe that it is almost always wrong to kill a person, even if that person is disagreeable and unproductive.</p><p>Other things, though, have value only for what they can give us. Take toothpaste — it’s valuable, but only because it helps to protect your teeth. If we had a better way of protecting teeth, all those tubes of Crest and Colgate would land in the trash. Some things, of course, have both kinds of value: my dentist has intrinsic value because he is a human being, and instrumental value because he can keep those teeth healthier.</p><p>I argue that liberties have only instrumental value. That is, freedom of action of a particular kind is valuable only if it has good consequences; to be more specific, if it has more good consequences than bad consequences. Some liberties have a great deal of value — the liberty to vote, for example. Others have none at all, because they have no good consequences, or because their good consequences are outweighed by their bad consequences. Losing those liberties is no loss.</p><p>This has not been a popular position in modern philosophy. Immanuel Kant is the philosopher most closely connected to the idea that liberty is a good in itself, and that our autonomy is what gives us value, but there are many others. John Locke believed in the value of liberty and greatly influenced Thomas Jefferson, who wrote in the Declaration of Independence of our unalienable right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” John Stuart Mill wrote <cite>On Liberty</cite> to defend the value of liberty of action. And there are many contemporary libertarians who think that the protection of liberty is paramount; Robert Nozick is the best known of these.</p></dd><dt><p>Nick French</p><p>You’ve argued also that, in many instances, there’s no good reason to think that people are particularly well-equipped to make decisions that actually advance their real goals or values. In those cases, autonomy is clearly not instrumentally valuable. In your 2013 book, <cite>Against Autonomy</cite>, you support this claim by reference to the wealth of research in behavioral economics purporting to show that humans are systematically irrational decision-makers.</p><p>Some of that research (like that of <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/09/they-studied-dishonesty-was-their-work-a-lie">Dan Ariely</a>) has since come under serious fire. But do you think the basic picture is still supported empirically? There are also the closely related arguments of people like evolutionary biologist <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/737466/fed-up-by-daniel-e-lieberman/">Daniel Lieberman</a>, who has argued that humans evolved to have certain tendencies that are “mismatched” to modern life — our love of sugar, for instance. I wonder if you see those sorts of arguments as bolstering your position?</p></dt><dd><p>Sarah Conly</p><p>I am always shocked when I read that a respected researcher has produced shoddy work. I shouldn’t be, though; it happens in every field. Remember <a href="https://www.bps.org.uk/psychologist/rethinking-psychology-gone-wrong">Cyril Burt</a>‘s infamous twin studies? And much more recently, there was Marc Hauser’s <a href="https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2012/09/hauser-research-misconduct-reported">sloppy research</a> into animal cognition at Harvard, which resulted in him leaving academia. Whether it is overconfidence, overambition, or a series of innocent oversights, mistakes creep in.</p><p>Fortunately, most scientific discoveries are founded on reliable, replicable work, and that is true in behavioral economics too. The groundbreaking work by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman is still very well-regarded, and Kahneman, sometimes referred to as “the grandfather of behavioral economics,” received a Nobel Prize for his work. Richard Thaler received a Nobel more recently for his own contributions to behavioral economics.</p><p>Behavioral economics has been a very hot field with lots of people jumping on the research bandwagon, and no doubt some of them have not done the solid work they need to before sharing their supposed results. But the field itself is strong and has yielded and will yield valuable insights into our behavior. And yes, parallel work by evolutionary biologists contributes to our understanding that we are not purely rational agents who are always motivated in a way that results in getting what is best for us.</p></dd><dt><p>Nick French</p><p>Although many readers may find your position here to be radical or counterintuitive, you argue that, in many contexts, it’s already clear we regard autonomy as having merely instrumental value. Could you unpack this claim a bit, and give one or two examples of where we treat autonomy in this way?</p></dt><dd><p>Sarah Conly</p><p>We use a lot of language that suggests that liberty is intrinsically valuable, which shows up everywhere from the Declaration of Independence, as I just mentioned, to popular country songs today. But that isn’t the way we act.</p><p>People talk about freedom of speech as a precious thing, for example, but we all want restrictions on speech. We don’t want people to be able to give away state secrets, or make threats, or commit libel or slander, or engage in false advertising. We make those things illegal. Cyberbullying is becoming illegal in more and more places, precisely because we are discovering how harmful it can be. Our laws evolve when we see that protection is needed, and we generally regard that as a reasonable practical matter.</p><p>Or, consider driving: We love the freedom of the road. However, we accept speed limits, drunk-driving laws, vehicle safety standards, no-passing zones, traffic lights, and the highway patrol, because we know that otherwise we can get killed. We don’t want the roads to be completely free; we don’t want some maniac driving one hundred miles an hour through a school zone to express his freedom of choice.</p><p>Our standards as to what is acceptable liberty change all the time, because circumstances change, and a liberty that once might have been harmless can become dangerous.</p><p>We see this in medical practice: before the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), you were free to buy any so-called drug you wanted. Then the FDA came along and said that remedies had to be tested to see that they were helpful and not harmful, because too many people were being scammed by snake oil salesmen. We see it in environmental law: Is it okay to burn your trash outside? It was once, but with larger and denser populations, individual households all burning their trash is harmful, so most municipalities don’t allow it.</p><p>My position is that we could make these changes more efficiently if we just admitted that what we are doing is looking at the consequences that arise from a given liberty and judging whether it should be allowed.</p></dd><dt><p>Nick French</p><p>There seem to be two major reasons to limit liberty. The first is when leaving people to their own devices leads to collectively suboptimal outcomes. The second would be when individuals’ choices lead to negative outcomes for the individuals themselves: for instance, because of addiction, reasoning problems, systematically incomplete information, and so on — basically, when a paternalistic justification for coercion is in order. How should we think about the distinction between individual-level and social-level justifications for limiting freedom?</p></dt><dd><p>Sarah Conly</p><p>Both individual-level and social-level restrictions on liberty are important. Both kinds require the same justification: Is allowing a liberty doing so much harm that restricting it would be beneficial, even given the costs of restricting it?</p><p>Many liberties, of course, affect both the individual and the society around that person, but some more greatly one or the other. Seat belt laws, for example, are primarily justified by the good they do for the individual. The death or injury of a person who didn’t wear a seat belt does have costs to others, but the primary loss is to that person. So, we have seat belt laws because sometimes individuals are shortsighted about their own safety.</p><p>Social-level restrictions on liberty are familiar to us, because many have been accepted since societies first formed. Theft is illegal, for example. It might be quite beneficial to the individual thief if stealing were allowed, but it is bad for society to have that be a practice. So we try to restrict stealing by threatening punishment.</p><p>Of course, many restrictions are extremely beneficial to both the individual and society. Requiring vaccinations against a highly dangerous and highly contagious disease protects both the individual and the society in which that person lives.</p></dd><dt><p>Nick French</p><p>I’m particularly interested in your arguments around coercive paternalism. Maybe we could start by talking about what types of paternalistic interventions you see as broadly justified and those you think wouldn’t generally be justified.</p></dt><dd><p>Sarah Conly</p><p>Individual-level restrictions are tricky to design.</p><p>First, it is harder to know what will benefit an individual. We can be pretty certain that some social policies are desired by society — like laws against theft — but less sure of what will benefit a particular person, who may have unusual goals.</p><p>Second, if we did want to enforce restrictions for the sake of the individual — paternalistic restrictions — we might find the costs of such restrictions too great. How could we make people eat their five servings of vegetables a day? We don’t want diet monitors because the costs would be silly — not just the financial costs but the psychological costs to the people being monitored. It is not worth it. It’s easier to promote the accessibility of fresh vegetables.</p><p>So when it comes to individual-level restrictions, we want to restrict liberties generally recognized to be harmful, which we can restrict without excessive cost. I would make cigarettes illegal, for example. There is plenty of reason to think that people start to smoke with a lot of what are called cognitive biases, basically poor thinking (including as to how easily they will be able to quit, and how harmful smoking is likely to be to them). And for just about everyone, we know that cancer, heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and other smoking-related diseases are contrary to their long-term goals. I don’t think anyone on his deathbed says, “I’ll never see my grandchildren or enjoy another sunset, but it was worth it to smoke all those Marlboros.” And people who don’t start smoking don’t miss it.</p><p>So it seems best to just prevent smoking. And this is doable, because it won’t require monitoring individual people — it requires shutting down an industry devoted to producing addictive carcinogens.</p></dd><dt><p>Nick French</p><p>To zoom in on some particular policy questions: There seems to be increasing evidence that smartphones and social media and the various activities they enable have very deleterious effects on people’s mental health and cognitive abilities. Facebook and Instagram parent company Meta recently settled a major lawsuit by most US states in part by agreeing to put restrictions on minors’ use of their platforms. But I’ve heard many people argue that perhaps similar restrictions are warranted around adults’ use as well.</p><p>What do you make of that idea? How do you think we should go about considering whether, and what kind of, restrictions on adult use of social media platforms or, say, sports gambling apps are justified?</p></dt><dd><p>Sarah Conly</p><p>I don’t know enough of the facts about cell phone usage to know what would be right here, honestly. How much harm is it doing? How much do people enjoy the unrestricted use of their phones? How painful would it be to change their habits, and for how long would that pain last? Are there policies that would reduce phone usage that would be less costly than a restriction (incentives to put the phone down, for example)? How would this restriction occur? Would it allow incursions into privacy that could be dangerous? Would it just drive people crazy? Answers to all these questions need to be known before we know if a restriction on liberty is justified.</p></dd><dt><p>Nick French</p><p>In your most recent book, you argue for several coercive policy interventions for the sake of collective well-being, including: mandatory vaccinations for dangerous and highly communicable diseases; restricting how much meat people can consume for the sake of environmental sustainability; and even imposing legal liability for speech that spreads “dangerous falsehoods.” Many on the Left who may share your goals, I think, have worries about these sorts of policies.</p><p>First, there is a concern about authoritarianism, what you characterize as a “slippery slope” argument. Especially given who is now in charge of the US government and the way they have wielded executive power to attack both political enemies and the idea of scientific expertise, it seems rational to be extremely wary about granting the state more power to regulate our individual choices. In other words, we might think of liberty as an important good because it is a check on tyranny and domination by other actors. How do you respond to this concern?</p></dt><dd><p>Sarah Conly</p><p>Do we want the state to abuse its power? No, we obviously don’t. But abuses can take many forms.</p><p>Telling businesses they have the liberty to pollute is an abuse of power; telling commercial fishermen that they have the freedom to fish all they want in what was previously a five-hundred-thousand-square-mile protected national monument is an abuse of power; gutting environmental protections so that developers have the liberty to clear forests, drill, and build on land without regard to endangered species is an abuse of power.</p><p>All of these moves allow the government to curry favor with certain groups, even though they are a huge loss for the rest of us. A release from restrictions can be as bad as a restriction.</p><p>If you elect terrible people, they will find a way to do harm. And again, the policy I promote is not “Let the state do whatever it wants.” It is that liberty is valuable as a means to an end. Thus we should evaluate, carefully and thoroughly, individual liberties as to their effects and act accordingly. In some cases, liberty should absolutely be protected. In others, liberty should be restricted — including the liberty of the state to act in certain ways if that liberty is used to do harm.</p></dd><dt><p>Nick French</p><p>I broadly agree with all of that. But isn’t there a difference between saying, for instance, the state should limit the liberty of massive corporations to pollute and destroy the natural commons, and that it should have the authority to regulate what individuals put in their bodies?</p></dt><dd><p>Sarah Conly</p><p>Sure, there is a difference. In one case, we are limiting giant corporations who are hurting us, and in the other we are limiting individuals who might hurt both themselves and us. But the underlying premise is the same: sometimes a liberty hurts us in a serious way.</p><p>If we want to limit you, an individual, from hurting me in a serious way, we accept that: no one objects to a law that stops you from stealing from me. If we want to limit you, an individual, from hurting yourself, we already accept that in many cases. We think it is right to require prescriptions for many medications, because the world of medicine is incredibly complicated and reading <cite>WebMD</cite> doesn’t actually make you an expert — you could kill yourself, and that is definitely not what you want. We think it is right to have safety standards for cars instead of making you do all your own research into which cars are safe and which might, in an unregulated market, essentially be heavy-duty cardboard, because you don’t have the time or expertise for that.</p><p>One bad choice and, again, you might kill yourself when the cheap car you choose implodes when you are in a fender bender. I am just saying there are more cases like this than we may have realized, and being aware of them and responding to them will help us, as individuals, get where we want to be.</p></dd><dt><p>Nick French</p><p>There is also a strategic concern with these sorts of policies. Even if we are less worried about the government abusing its power, it seems likely that attempts to regulate people’s choices in some of the ways you’ve described will generate resentment, mistrust, and anti-government backlash. I think we saw this kind of reaction to some of the public health interventions during COVID-19, for instance.</p><p>I know your focus is on normative issues rather than questions of political strategy, but what do you think about this idea? Might less heavy-handed policies be more effective at achieving goals like promoting environmental sustainability and public health?</p></dt><dd><p>Sarah Conly</p><p>I am quite old. Thus, I remember, for example, getting a smallpox vaccination, since this was required if you wanted to go to public school in the state of Virginia. I do not remember, or know, when this regulation was enacted, or how it was greeted at that point. But certainly, by the time I was entering school, no one was fussing about it. It was just one of those things you did. Well, I am sure I fussed about getting a shot, but whether it was required by the state was not an issue.</p><p>I do remember the enactment of desegregation, however. While <cite>Brown v. Board of Education</cite> was decided in 1954, many schools in the South did not start to integrate until after the 1964 Civil Rights Act. At that point, there was more than fussing; there was, in many places, an uproar. But now, how many people are outraged by the fact of school integration? No doubt there are some, just as there are neo-Nazis and flat-earthers, but it is accepted by every reasonable person.</p><p>I similarly remember the introduction of drunk-driving laws, and how that was resented. “I drive better drunk than most people drive sober” was a common refrain, and yes, there were complaints that such laws were an infringement on personal liberty. Yet now people take laws against drunk driving to be completely reasonable.</p><p>The point here is that while we do sometimes resent a restriction when it is first enacted, if it is in fact beneficial, we come to accept it. We want integrated schools and safe driving. Once we learn more about such restrictions and experience them, we often begin to think them necessary to a functioning society. Politicians don’t like to do anything that will make them even temporarily unpopular, but with enough social support they can make necessary changes. We need to think about what is best for us as individuals and as a society in the long term.</p></dd></dl></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/philosophy-liberty-society-law-well-being?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-11T12:30:00.043911Z</published><summary type="text">At its best, the Left has championed the cause of freedom against both political and economic tyranny. Does the spread of scourges like social media addiction and sports betting justify more restrictions on individual liberty than we’ve typically accepted?</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/france-insoumise-pope-catholicism-bagayoko-melenchon</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/france-insoumise-pope-catholicism-bagayoko-melenchon"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/181144306801.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/181144306801.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/181144306801.jpg"/><title type="text">La France Insoumise Won’t Cede God to the Far Right</title><updated>2026-10-11T12:00:00.245824Z</updated><author><name>Phineas Rueckert</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><category label="Religion" term="Religion"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>In the <a href="https://www.instagram.com/reel/DduTubZqABL/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&amp;stkn=MzRlODBiNWFlZA==">video</a>, a lanky, crisply-dressed Muslim man of Malian descent walks through a cathedral to the heady sounds of organ music. Several seconds later, he is pictured shaking hands with the most important figure in the Catholic Church: Pope Leo XIV. Off camera, the two exchange gifts and a few words.</p><p>Later, on French public <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WqTgIg2D0j4">television</a>, Bally Bagayoko — the mayor of Saint-Denis and a member of Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s left-wing France Insoumise party — spoke of how, despite being of the Muslim faith, he shares many parts of his worldview with the pontiff. Last Friday evening, Leo had come to Saint-Denis, just north of Paris, for a prayer event for young people at the Stade de France football stadium. Bagayoko, who swept into office in this March’s municipal elections, used the opportunity to platform progressive issues, including the fight against Islamophobia, support for social mixing, and the recognition of the genocides in Palestine, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.</p><p>For a brief moment, the eyes of France’s tens of millions of Catholics (and many others around the world) were on the poverty-afflicted Parisian suburb that Bagayoko represents. For once this was not because of the usual fearmongering about high crime rates, no-go zones and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood but rather to celebrate the city’s diversity and central role in the Catholic faith.</p><p>“From a political standpoint, it’s a powerful symbol. Precisely at a time when a faction of the Catholic far right has a hold on the Catholic Church, we can see that there are elements in this visit that stand in opposition to that movement,” Théo Moy, founder of the progressive Catholic magazine <cite>Le Cri</cite>, told <cite>Jacobin</cite>.</p><p>Moy cautions about extrapolating too heavily from the youth prayer event, which was held in Saint-Denis primarily on account of the seating capacity of the Stade de France stadium. Still, he says that the symbolism of the pope’s brief “republican” encounter with Bagayoko and other left-wing figures like the Communist MP Stéphane Peu is not to be underestimated.</p><p>“Saint-Denis is not only the city where the cathedral housing the tombs of several kings of France is located, but it is also a very important site in the history of Catholicism in France,” he explains. “At the same time, it’s one of the cities that embodies a form of cosmopolitanism specific to the Paris region as well as the creolization of French society,” using a <a href="https://tocqueville21.com/tribunes/french-left-reimagining-multiculturalism/">term</a> which refers to France’s layers of cultural mixing.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>A Mixed Bag</h2></header><div><p>That cosmopolitanism was on display at the Stade de France, according to Ombline Damy, a PhD student in literature at Sciences Po who was in attendance on Friday night. “It was a mixed bag,” she tells <cite>Jacobin</cite>. “The event was for young people from the age of eighteen to thirty-five, and it really felt like they were trying to put together a ceremony that appealed to that entire group.”</p><p>From theatrical live-action-role-play-style performances and fireworks displays to speeches from non-Catholic youth of color, the event felt like an attempt to appeal to a wide variety of people without necessarily taking a party-political stand, she explains. Damy is part of a progressive Catholic group called CVX Jeunes, which had reserved several dozen seats at the event. Around another 1,500 seats at the event with the pope were reserved for young people from Saint-Denis regardless of their faith.</p><p>To Damy, some elements of the evening nonetheless “felt like the Puy du Fou” — a popular historical theme park founded and run by identitarian Catholic groups that has been accused of rewriting history. SOS Calvaires, a far-right organization bent on fighting what it sees as the rise of diversity over traditionalist Catholicism — and which has also <a href="https://cartofaf.streetpress.com/liste/sos-calvaires/">received funding</a> from billionaire Pierre-Édouard Stérin — installed a gigantic cross at the Stade de France for the ceremony.</p><p>Other moments, however, like a speech from the archbishop of Saint-Denis, Étienne Guillet, presented an opposing vision: of a France secure in its diversity and welcoming of difference. On his tour, the pope has highlighted interreligious dialogue, making it a key part of his discourse, Moy says. “We can see that there was a clear intent to make this a moment of interfaith unity,” he says.</p><p>Bagayoko, speaking to French television channel LCI, also centered Guillet’s speech and the message it sent about Saint-Denis: “It gave me chills,” he said. “He spoke so profoundly of the deep, visceral attachment that the people of Saint-Denis and Pierrefitte have for their city — and especially for its youth. While we might not necessarily share the same religious beliefs, we must still be sensitive to one another. Even if we have a different skin color, that doesn’t prevent us from loving one another.”</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Spiritual Leadership</h2></header><div><p>Bagayoko was not the only left-wing French politician to connect his message to that of the visiting pope. In advance of the papal tour, Mélenchon, who is currently polling above <a href="https://www.facebook.com/PureTVofficiel/posts/-jean-luc-m%C3%A9lenchon-arriverait-tr%C3%A8s-largement-en-t%C3%AAte-chez-les-18-24-ans-en-vue-/1514823630692374/">40 percent</a> with young people between eighteen and twenty-four years old, posted on Instagram: “The Pope is welcome in France. I would like to express my esteem for the spiritual leadership he embodies.” Mélenchon highlighted Leo XIV’s first <a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/encyclicals/documents/20260515-magnifica-humanitas.html">encyclical</a> — “Magnifica Humanitas: On Safeguarding the Human Person in a Time of Artificial Intelligence” — saying it has a “little taste of humanism.”</p><p>Like Pope Francis before him, Leo has made serving others, including the poor and working class, a key part of his message; in speeches, he has also <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/06/pope-leo-xiv-encyclical-ai-economy">highlighted</a> tech overreach and crony capitalism while taking the fight to US President <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/04/vatican-trump-administration-war-catholicism">Donald Trump</a>. On other key progressive issues, however, Leo has been seen as less progressive than his predecessor, including on abortion and euthanasia — which on Sunday he <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/pope-blasts-assisted-dying-as-false-compassion-at-french-shrine-known-for-miraculous-cures">called</a> “false compassion,” as French debate rages over a controversial assisted dying bill that came into effect in August.</p><p>Critiques of the pope from the Left have been largely muted, however, as young people are increasingly drawn to faith movements, Moy notes. “Today, there’s a major movement — a renewal among Catholic youth, and part of it is driven by the far right, which is gaining a lot of traction,” he says. This includes through the far right’s appropriation of media, including television channels and newspapers increasingly bought up by right-wing billionaires like Stérin and fellow Catholic Vincent Bolloré, and its effective grassroots organizing.</p><p>“But there’s also a resurgence of a new kind of young left-wing movement that’s coming together,” he adds. Though many of these new Catholics come from traditional conservative backgrounds, they have drifted left in search of answers to larger questions about ecology and other progressive issues. “It’s important to note that Catholics vote on many issues other than their faith,” he emphasizes.</p><p>Moy’s magazine, <cite>Le Cri</cite>, has been a fundamental part of the renewed left-wing interest in church issues. He notes that other progressive news outlets, including the Communist <em>l’Humanité</em> and the center-left daily <cite>Libération</cite> also dedicated surprisingly in-depth coverage to the pope’s visit.</p><p>On Friday, <em>l’Humanité</em> titled its cover story “Pope Leo’s Way of the Cross,” a term that means both “pilgrimage” and “burden to bear.” Despite some movement on the Left, the newspaper notes that in 2022, 45 percent of self-defined Catholics voted for far-right Marine Le Pen in the runoff against Emmanuel Macron — slightly above her overall score. “We are, in effect, experiencing within the church a form of polarization that’s similar to that of the political world,” Marielle Ménard, the president of the left-wing <em>Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne</em>, told <em>l’Humanité</em>. “The voices of young Catholics are increasingly invisible in societal debates.”</p><p>But this time, despite the best efforts of the far right to once again capture the media spotlight, during this papal visit it was a black, left-wing Frenchman with immigrant parents who may have had the last word.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/france-insoumise-pope-catholicism-bagayoko-melenchon?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-11T12:00:00.245824Z</published><summary type="text">Religious identity has become an unusually prominent battleground in next year’s French election. During the pope’s visit to the country last week, left-wing France Insoumise resisted ultraconservative attempts to monopolize Catholic identity.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/russia-ukraine-war-eu-nato-escalation</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/russia-ukraine-war-eu-nato-escalation"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/492869557735.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/492869557735.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/492869557735.jpg"/><title type="text">The War in Ukraine Is Spiraling Out of Control</title><updated>2026-10-10T16:58:32.830182Z</updated><author><name>Branko Marcetic</name></author><category label="War and Imperialism" term="War and Imperialism"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>War is in the air in Europe. Over the four years and counting that it’s raged, the Ukraine war has often been compared to the two world wars, being the largest land war the continent’s seen since the second of those and having surpassed the length of the first this past June. But unlike those disastrous conflicts, the fighting in Ukraine has not become a true continent-wide affair that’s dragged the rest of Europe’s powers into the fray — so far.</p><p>It is becoming alarmingly uncertain how much longer that will hold. For nearly five years, both Russia and European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states have been at pains to avoid being pulled into direct war with each other. But as Ukraine’s war effort falters, there are mounting signs of the conflict spiraling into generalized warfare. Between escalations, accidents, and a thick haze of sometimes purposeful misinformation, the risk that the conflict may spin out from yet another European bloodbath to something even more cataclysmic has perhaps never been higher.</p><p>It’s a bitter vindication for antiwar voices who warned for years that NATO member states were sleepwalking into a wider, more dangerous confrontation with Russia. The question now is what can be done to forestall their darkest predictions.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Threats and Accidents</h2></header><div><p>The stakes of a direct Russian-European war are high. Experts have long <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/10/cold-war-ukraine-nuclear-war-russia-putin-us-nato-de-escalation-diplomacy">argued</a> that any such conflict would <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/10/ukraine-russia-us-nuclear-war-putin">quickly</a> turn <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/10/nuclear-accident-ukraine-russia-putin-nato-negotiations">nuclear</a>, precisely because, as a 2022 Brown University paper <a href="https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/paper/threat-inflation-russian-military-weakness-and-resulting-nuclear-paradox-implications-war">argued</a>, Russia’s conventional military weakness versus NATO makes it more likely to reach for the nuclear option.</p><p>“I think the mainstream media has downplayed these risks, because it would severely undermine support for Ukraine,” says Lyle Goldstein, senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, and the author of that report.</p><p>With Russia and NATO’s non-American member states holding nearly <a href="https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/">five thousand</a> active nuclear warheads between them, any nuclear exchange between the two would not just likely kill millions but imperil the very future of humanity. This is why world leaders for decades painstakingly restrained any conflict between the alliance and the then–Soviet Union, right down to their public rhetoric.</p><p>And yet hardly a month goes by these days without European and Russian officials openly threatening one another.</p><p>This past April, Vladimir Putin ally Dmitry Medvedev, the former president of Russia who now serves as the deputy chair of its security council, publicly <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/04/16/potential-targets-moscow-releases-data-about-european-firms-making-drones-for-ukraine">declared</a> a list of European drone-making facilities a “register of potential legitimate targets”; a month later he <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/5901241-dmitry-medvedev-eu-russia-drone-attack/">warned</a> EU citizens that their “peaceful sleep is over” and that their leaders had “unilaterally entered into a war with Russia.” Meanwhile, the head of Germany’s air force has <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/06/15/luftwaffe-chief-warns-russia-german-ready-to-fight-for-nato/">vowed</a> to swiftly bomb Russia in the event of war, while Poland’s foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, has <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/84430">boasted</a> that Europe could destroy Russian fuel refineries in “six days” and defeat it in a war “quite quickly.”</p><p>These verbal salvos hit an alarming peak last week, after Moscow — which two years ago officially <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/19/world/europe/putin-russia-nuclear-weapons-missiles.html">lowered</a> its threshold for the use nuclear weapons — formally <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-issues-nuclear-warning-nato-tensions-rise-baltic-2026-09-30/">warned</a> NATO that it was prepared to use nukes against the alliance, which it charged with taking steps that risked “the outbreak of direct armed conflict.” It came <a href="https://abcnews.com/International/wireStory/russia-warns-nato-nuclear-response-kaliningrad-cut-off-136893915">in the wake</a> of statements and <a href="https://ua.news/en/world/nato-maie-plan-ataki-na-kaliningrad-na-vipadok-napadu-rf-na-baltiiu">leaked</a> <a href="https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland-und-internationales/nato-drei-strategien-gegen-putins-angriff-im-baltikum-6a7dc5d00773f8de24672c4f">plans</a> identifying Kaliningrad — the Russian exclave between Lithuania and Poland that serves as a key Russian military outpost — as a top early target in the event of a war between Russia and NATO.</p><p>All the while, a monthslong <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/we-must-be-ready-to-fight-germany-army-chief-christian-freuding-warns-of-rising-russia-threat/">drumbeat</a> of <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/is-russia-going-to-war-with-europe-469168/?source=baltic-states">warnings</a> has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-09-26/european-leaders-warn-of-russian-threat/107192690">sounded</a> from NATO state <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-fears-valdimir-putin-window-opportunity-nato-test/">officials</a> and <a href="https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/europe/cia-drone-europe-russia-ukraine-b3055605.html">intelligence</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/20/baltic-spy-chiefs-warn-moscow-is-preparing-for-more-decisive-action-in-europe">agencies</a> that war with Russia may be right <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/24/russia-could-attack-a-nato-country-within-months-danish-intelligence-says">around the corner</a>, or is already <a href="https://x.com/general_ben/status/2100959338391040250">underway</a>. The Baltic states have <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/09/27/poland-and-lithuania-preparing-cross-border-evacuation-plan-for-baltic-states">put in place</a> mass evacuation plans, German hospitals are <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-09-16/germany-s-hospitals-prepare-for-war-and-mass-casualties-as-russia-threat-looms">bracing</a> for future mass casualties, and the British government wants <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cmn0jke547r5o%22">citizens</a> to start stockpiling food and water. European capitals are <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/06/27/germany-considers-compulsory-conscription-defence-russia/">hearing</a> <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/2250382/uk-army-general-warns-conscription">talk</a> of military conscription to meet what seems like an almost inevitable conflict.</p><p>This war of words is a function of what increasingly resembles a <em>literal</em> war.</p><p>European officials accuse Russia of a <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/10/05/russian-intelligence-agencies-wreaking-havoc-west/">spree</a> of <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/08/23/russia-targets-weapons-factories-in-new-campaign/">sabotage incidents</a> at defense industrial facilities and other sites across Europe, just as Medvedev warned in April — most infamously, a set of explosive-laden <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/25/germany-drone-suspected-military-explosives-found-near-leipzig-airport">drones</a> <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/failed-attack-leipzig-wider-russia-campaign-attacks/">discovered</a> at and around Leipzig airport, a logistics hub for NATO’s supplies to Ukraine. One German commentator <a href="https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/leipzig-waere-fast-deutschlands-11-september-geworden-201210107.html">described</a> the incident as the country’s version of 9/11 — a questionable comparison, since no one died at Leipzig, but an ominous one given the US foreign policy choices that followed those attacks.</p><p>This adds to a growing list of accidental incursions. During Russia’s now monthslong air assault on Ukraine, Russian munitions, drones, and other <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2026/09/23/russian-military-helicopter-violates-polish-airspace/">aircraft</a> have crossed into the airspace or onto the soil of NATO states <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russias-drone-war-comes-to-moldova-and-romania/a-79239591">dozens</a> of times, including just <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/09/30/drone-crashes-in-moldova-as-russia-attacks-ukraine-overnight">last week</a>. Russian drones have reportedly violated NATO member Romania’s airspace twenty-three times this year: more than all such incidents over the previous three years <a href="https://abcnews.com/International/russia-drone-incursions-nato-airspace-jump-exponentially-2026/story?id=135771388">combined</a>.</p><p>So far none have reached the danger of November 2022, when an errant pair of rockets wrongly blamed on Russia killed two farmers on the Polish side of the border, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/11/16/how-a-lightly-sourced-ap-story-almost-set-of-world-war-iii/">triggering</a> calls for war and an urgent NATO meeting to discuss a response — an emergency only defused when it turned out that Ukraine had been accidentally responsible.</p><p>“If any one of the incidents that we’ve seen in the past four months had happened in 2023, it would have been game-changing, everyone would’ve been freaking out about it,” says Emma Ashford, senior fellow with the Stimson Center’s Reimagining US Grand Strategy program. “We’ve become so inured to this conflict going on, there was not a huge reaction to any of these.”</p><p>But it may be a matter of time: in another <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/15/nato-jets-shoot-down-drone-violating-lithuania-airspace-kaunas">instance</a> last month, a Russian warship fired two emergency flares at a Danish helicopter conducting surveillance, narrowly missing it.</p><p>“As these hybrid incidents get more frequent, their kinetic nature intensifies,” says Jennifer Kavanagh, director of military analysis at Defense Priorities. “Without a dialogue channel, there’s always a risk that Russia inadvertently steps over a line and triggers escalation.”</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Tit for Tat for Tit for Tat</h2></header><div><p>That risk became viscerally real last month, after a Russian drone destroyed part of a train near the Ukrainian-Polish border mere minutes after a group of US and European officials were shuttled away. Seemingly calibrated to be a near miss, the attack could have easily triggered what one ex-CIA official <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/09/18/wave-russian-strikes-plots-raises-fears-conflict-spiraling/">described</a> as an “escalatory chain” leading to war had it been slightly off.</p><p>“The Russian motivation here is to impose costs on Europe, to retaliate for the costs that Ukraine is imposing on Russia,” says Kavanagh. “The Russians understand European money is funding Ukraine’s war effort and that Europe is giving it drones.”</p><p>Those drones have, by Putin’s own <a href="https://abcnews.com/International/wireStory/ukraine-claims-attacks-half-russias-oil-refining-capacity-136996326">admission</a>, been used to inflict damage on Russia worth 1 percent of its GDP, or, according to Kyiv, to knock out half of its oil refining capacity. NATO states have not just furnished the arms to do this but, through the US and French governments, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5ca782bd-5c4a-45f8-9a7a-5793d800321d?syn-25a6b1a6=1">provided</a> the intelligence that Ukraine has used to select targets and help its drones evade Russian air defenses.</p><p>As heartening as this might be for Ukraine’s war effort, it has come with real risk, as the line blurs between simply providing military support, which NATO states view themselves as doing, and becoming full-on cobelligerents. To get a sense of how potentially inflammatory such support might be in Moscow, consider the outrage <a href="https://www.themirror.com/news/politics/leavitt-slammed-dismissing-russia-helping-1723467">sparked</a> in <a href="https://www.facebook.com/RepJoshG/posts/im-outraged-by-reports-that-russia-is-sharing-intelligence-with-iran-to-help-tar/1499309828217682/">Washington</a> and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-iran-war-european-allies-intelligence-help/">Brussels</a> when it was revealed earlier this year that Russia was providing Iran with a similar kind of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/06/russia-iran-intelligence-us-targets/%20">support</a> to what NATO states are now giving Ukraine.</p><p>Consider, too, that this support blows well past the lines that Western officials themselves drew earlier in the war to limit the risk of escalation. Long gone are the days when US and European officials <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/19/us/politics/us-ukraine-russia-escalation.html">thought</a> that merely helping Ukraine obtain fighter jets was too risky, let alone approving long-range strikes into Russian territory. Instead, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/06/01/ukraine-f-16s-biden-russia-escalation/">convinced</a> that the lack of Russian retaliation for these moves over the years <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/arming-ukraine-without-crossing-russias-red-lines/">meant</a> that “Putin’s red lines are just a bluff intended to scare the West,” as the hawkish Atlantic Council <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-is-becoming-entangled-in-his-own-discredited-red-lines/">put it</a>, Western leaders appear to be throwing caution to the wind.</p><p>“It’s notable how far escalation has progressed without a real Russian response,” says Kavanagh.</p><p>“There is definitely a school of thought in the Western securicratic community that suggests that Russia’s a paper tiger, so we can cross as many red lines as we want,” says Leonid Ragozin, a Russian journalist and Putin critic in exile. “They believe Russia can be provoked endlessly and at some point it will reach a breaking point. But if you hear the signals from Moscow, I think they are quite unequivocal, they are going to retaliate.”</p><p>In other words, Moscow’s sabotage campaign currently threatening to draw Europe directly into the conflict may well be a Russian attempt to belatedly restore deterrence.</p><p>“That is absolutely the viewpoint in Moscow, that they needed to demonstrate that Europe could not continue to do the things it was doing with impunity,” says Ashford.</p><p>That Moscow is now making good on the warnings it issued for years should be sobering, given how frequently and consistently it has similarly warned about its willingness to reach for the nuclear option — and how often those, too, have been dismissed in the West. The <cite>Financial Times</cite>’ Gideon Rachman recently <a href="https://app.ft.com/content/b49f5459-92fc-4b91-92c4-d8f2a6f87893">observed</a> that Putin’s failure to follow through on past nuclear threats perversely means they “no longer work” as a deterrent.</p><p>Yet both former CIA Director <a href="https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/business/money-report/cia-director-saw-genuine-risk-of-russia-using-tactical-nuclear-weapons-early-in-ukraine-war/3639847/">Bill Burns</a> and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14751798.2026.2635157">Colin Kahl</a> say Russian leaders were dead serious about reaching for a nuke in fall 2022, when then-President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/09/us/politics/biden-nuclear-russia-ukraine.html">told</a> a group of donors the world was hurtling toward possible “Armageddon.” Since then, Russian military strategists have <a href="https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/ukraine-and-nuclear-weapons/">continued</a> to <a href="https://topwar.ru/281794-karta-spora-o-chem-govorjat-rossijskie-voennye-jeksperty-i-gde-zdes-baluevskij.html">talk about</a> the need to keep nuclear use on the table against a complacent West and have carried out <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/putin-says-russia-tested-poseidon-nuclear-capable-super-torpedo-2025-10-29/">tests</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/06/world/europe/russia-tactical-nuclear-weapons-drills.html">military exercises</a> to that end.</p><p>“For many years I’ve been concerned that Russian admirals are making the argument to the Kremlin, ‘The West has really lost its mind, we need to take out a French frigate to teach them a lesson about what happens when you mess with the Russians,’” says Goldstein. “I really feel that we’re close to that moment.”</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Fog in a Spiral</h2></header><div><p>This would all be fraught enough in a perfect information environment. But a combination of the fog of war and deliberate misinformation has made it especially hard to sort what’s true from what isn’t.</p><p>“We know both sides distort the truth pretty systematically,” says Goldstein.</p><p>The intelligence agencies and leaders of <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/finland-alexander-stubb-warns-europe-overreaction-russia-threats-sabotage/%20">Finland</a>, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b4141b98-0118-4624-8cb0-5d158ba0751d">Denmark</a>, <a href="https://valisluureamet.ee/doc/raport/2026-en.pdf">Estonia</a>, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/sep/29/ukraine-russia-war-odesa-overnight-lithuania-mark-rutte-europe-latest-news-updates?page=with:block-6abb80958f089b242570098b">Lithuania</a> as well as the NATO <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/no-imminent-threat-nato-territory-russia-rutte-says-2026-09-30/">secretary general</a> and the EU <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/sep/30/russia-ukraine-war-strikes-zelenskyy-putin-poland-romania-macron-sanchez-spain-europe-latest-news-updates">defense commissioner</a>, have all come out in the past week to say there is no imminent threat from Russia nor intelligence suggesting one. Yet, for months, many of these same voices were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/26/russia-provocation-baltic-states-poland">saying</a> the exact opposite, sowing public fear.</p><p>“When I talk to sources particularly in Ukraine, they connect the hype to the adoption of the long-term budget of the EU for the period 2028–2034,” says Ragozin. “They believe it boils down to a battle for funding for the next six years.”</p><p>“Some of the language coming out of Germany and the UK seems to me mostly driven by generating the political appetite for defense funding,” says Kavanagh.</p><p>Sure enough, some European governments appear to be using the specter of war with Russia to lay the groundwork for a pump-priming policy of military Keynesianism, including in Britain, whose new chancellor has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/46c33655-91ec-4120-8d0f-f0062835aa1b?syn-25a6b1a6=1">promised</a> a “new age of industrialization” centered on rebuilding naval infrastructure. In Poland, meanwhile, a top official in the president’s office <a href="https://www.polsatnews.pl/gosc-wydarzen/2026-09-25/nawrocki-poda-reke-putinowi-na-szczycie-g20-kazdy-bedzie-mial-problem/">accused</a> Sikorski and Donald Tusk, who is prime minister, of exploiting fears of Russia for their own political purposes.</p><p>Experts are skeptical about the appetite of either side to actually make good on their most hawkish rhetoric.</p><p>“I think they know in the backs of their minds how devastating this would be,” says Goldstein.</p><p>Some European officials have <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/84893">effectively</a> <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/uk-not-ready-for-war-with-russia-defense-official-claims-sa-011626">acknowledged</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/50-battle-ready-germany-misses-military-targets-despite-scholzs-overhaul-2025-02-13/">outright</a> they’re <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/uk-not-ready-war-russia-stark-warning-4343515">not yet ready</a> to take on Russia. Meanwhile, for a Russia that believes it’s winning what has become a grinding attritional war, getting Europe involved could be a complication it can’t afford.</p><p>Still, as countless military crises have shown, intentions don’t always matter. One reason is the way that adversaries tend to misread both each other’s actions and the way their own actions appear to the other side.</p><p>If Moscow’s sabotage campaign was intended to send a message of deterrence to NATO, European and US officials are instead <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2026/09/26/us-europe-worry-russia-is-testing-nato-with-hybrid-attacks-sabotage/91941001007/">reading</a> it as a deliberate “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/24/russia-could-attack-a-nato-country-within-months-danish-intelligence-says">test</a>” of, or attempt to <a href="https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7784/Artykul/3732674,polands-tusk-warns-of-possible-russian-strikes-on-ukraines-allies">weaken</a>, the alliance’s solidarity — one that calls for their own efforts to restore deterrence <cite>against Russia</cite>, since in their view, this behavior confirms that “<a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/04/merz-makes-surprise-visit-to-kyiv-germany-pledges-further-aid-to-ukraine">strength</a>” is the “<a href="https://euobserver.com/240045/interview-putin-understands-only-strength-eu-envoy-in-kyiv-urges-stronger-air-defences-and-hybrid-war-response/">one language</a>” that Putin understands. To that end, the EU is now <a href="http://www.ft.com/content/5513b441-a575-4c73-8532-cb09216c4406">exploring</a> a NATO-like way to respond with their own form of “hybrid warfare” that, like Russia’s, theoretically falls short of a full-scale attack but proves “painful in a similar way.”</p><p>“The Russians think they’re signaling that Europe is getting too comfortable with the idea that they can aid Ukraine, and Europe is seeing it as a Russian attempt to escalate conflict with them,” says Ashford.</p><p>“Europe wants to believe they’re not combatants, that what they’re doing is normal and non-threatening,” says Kavanagh. “Of course, the Russians don’t see it that way and want to make that clear. Europe sees all the escalation from the Russian side and don’t seem to recognize the ways in which their own behavior is contributing to the escalation spiral.”</p><p>The other reason is the extent to which European leadership has staked their own prestige on an increasingly unlikely outcome: Ukrainian military victory.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>The Best Outcome for All</h2></header><div><p>The level of physical destruction inflicted on Russia notwithstanding, Ukraine’s drone campaign this past summer proved to be just the latest costly <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/is-ukraine-winning-the-war/">military gambit</a> that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/8/11/ukraines-40-day-campaign-has-not-brought-the-war-closer-to-an-end">failed</a> to achieve its goals: when the dust had settled, they had not succeeded in pressuring Putin to end the war or in engineering political unrest within Russia. And while Ukraine has regained some territory since, the overall state of the battlefield hasn’t fundamentally changed in its favor.</p><p>“There has been tangible success, but at the tactical not strategic level,” says Ragozin. “Ukraine is showing resilience on the battlefield, but there is no breakthrough. The picture isn’t rosy for the Russians, but it’s pretty dark for the Ukrainians.”</p><p>The Ukrainian government is now mired in a <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/as-walls-close-in-zelensky-lashes-out/">mushrooming</a> <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/zelenskiy-facing-growing-domestic-crisis-as-support-in-his-own-party-melts-431558/">political crisis</a> of its own, suffering from serious (and sometimes literal) political <a href="https://bneeditor.substack.com/p/tension-in-ukraines-government-mounting?r=1d2v81">infighting</a> and looking at a massive <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-scrambles-money-fight-war-russian-strikes-batter-economy-2026-10-05/">budget shortfall</a> — all as it weathers the most brutal Russian bombing campaign yet with little ability to defend itself, the US war with Iran having drained global supplies of missile interceptors. After years of European leaders insisting not only that Ukraine <em>would</em> win the war, but that it <em>must</em>, predicting a dark future for all of Europe if it didn’t, Ukrainian officials are now starting to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-needs-changes-avoid-losing-war-ousted-defence-minister-says-2026-08-25/">openly</a> <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/86182">say</a> that their country is losing.</p><p>“The leadership in Europe is so invested in this narrative of Ukrainian victory, to even slightly walk back from that and say, ‘Well, everything we’ve said for the last five years is over the top’ — they’re not going to do that,” says Goldstein.</p><p>The alternatives are to escalate further — with all the risks that come with it — in the hopes of some future breakthrough or an option that European officials have tended to frame as being just as unacceptable as defeat: making painful concessions in peace talks.</p><p>“It’s been clear for years what Russia wants, what its conditions are,” says Ragozin. Those conditions include Ukraine formally relinquishing its aspirations to joining NATO and, most contentiously, giving up Crimea, the Donbas, and other territories that Russian forces have illegally occupied since 2022. While Zelensky has publicly <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/zelensky-admits-ukraine-cannot-retake-crimea-and-donbas-m5vwpfzqh">acknowledged</a> that Ukraine lacks the means to militarily retake the Donbas and, <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/04/25/7509209/">especially</a> Crimea, the idea of formally relinquishing these territories in negotiations <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/zelenskyy-ukraine-will-not-give-up-territory-russia-peace-plan-us/">remains</a> a <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky-says-ukraine-wont-withdraw-from-donbas-wont-lose-dignity-as-peace-talks-stall-on-territory/">nonstarter</a> in Kyiv.</p><p>“The problem with Russia is it’s absolutely entrenched in those positions and not moving an inch,” says Ragozin. “Russia is ready to negotiate, but it’s not ready to compromise.”</p><p>Yet the longer the war goes on in the hope of avoiding this unjust outcome, the bleaker Ukraine’s future looks.</p><p>According to Poland’s Tusk, Ukraine is suffering a staggering casualty rate of <a href="https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7784/Artykul/3732674,polands-tusk-warns-of-possible-russian-strikes-on-ukraines-allies">27,000</a> killed or wounded per month, prompting talk of <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-draft-women/">drafting women</a> and leading to aggressive and unpopular recruitment tactics that have met with increasingly violent <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-forced-conscription/%22">resistance</a> from Ukrainians. Together with a mass exodus to avoid both the war and the prospect of fighting in it, the country’s population has dramatically <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-stares-down-barrel-population-collapse-2025-12-04/">shrunk</a>, and its birth rate now lags <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/ukraine-s-death-to-birth-ratio-worsens-to-3-55-in-1h26-456316/">way behind</a> its mortality rate, foreshadowing future demographic, pension, and labor crises. Under air strikes that it can no longer repel, the country’s iron and steel industry — about 5.5 percent of its GDP last year — has effectively <a href="https://new.intellinews.com/articles/ukraine-s-steel-industry-stops-for-the-first-time-in-100-years-471220">shut down</a>.</p><p>In other words, seeking a negotiated end to the war, however, unfair the terms, could not just help shut off the current escalatory spiral and avoid a Europe-wide catastrophe but may also in the long run benefit Ukraine.</p><p>“We should recognize any peace is going to be bad. No one is going to like it. It’s still better than continuing the war,” says Kavanagh.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/russia-ukraine-war-eu-nato-escalation?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-10T16:58:32.830182Z</published><summary type="text">After years of warnings that the war in Ukraine could spiral into a full-on Russia-Europe conflagration, the conflict has reached a point where this is a real possibliity. It’s a prospect that threatens not just European lives but the entire globe.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/college-greek-life-elites-alienation</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/college-greek-life-elites-alienation"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/258916805330.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/258916805330.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/258916805330.jpg"/><title type="text">Greek Life Endures by Offering a Simulacrum of Solidarity</title><updated>2026-10-10T18:21:33.002527Z</updated><author><name>Katie Gatti Tassin</name></author><category label="Society" term="Society"/><category label="Education" term="Education"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Four thousand two hundred and twenty-nine dollars. That was the <a href="https://www.uapanhellenic.com/cost">cost</a> of joining the University of Alabama’s Delta Delta Delta Panhellenic sorority, affectionately known as “Tridelt” to its members, for the 2025 fall semester. The spring semester will run you another $4,005, and if you’d like to live in the 44,294-square-foot <a href="https://treanor.design/portfolio/delta-delta-delta-sorority-at-the-university-of-alabama/">sorority house</a> that sleeps seventy-eight, add another $2,886 in the fall and $2,490 in the spring.</p><p>This is, as Alabama sororities go, on the affordable side. The most expensive sorority, Zeta Tau Alpha (or simply “Zeta” for those in the know), estimates that a full school year of dues and in-house living totals $19,898, or nearly double the average <a href="https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/articles/paying-for-college-infographic">in-state tuition</a> at an American public university. The cost includes room and board, which is fitting, because Greek life tends to be all-consuming. You will learn to eat, sleep, and breathe it.</p><p>I was a ’Bama Tridelt from 2013 to 2017, a few years before the “Bama Rush” phenomenon barnstormed TikTok like a wealthy, white, womanly NFL draft of indistinguishable twangy freshmen. In my day, the dues were closer to $6,000 per year if you lived out of the house. I remember this clearly because, after learning the cost, my parents told me in no uncertain terms that the only reason I could join a sorority was that my scholarship paid for tuition.</p><p>I suspect they regretted this almost immediately when I called them, eighteen years old and very drunk, on a bus to our “pledge retreat” — at the four-star-resort-cum-convention-center in Birmingham where we were whisked hours after receiving our “bids,” or invitations to join — crying about how I felt homesick. But they must have estimated, despite not participating in Greek life themselves, that the economic opportunity it would afford me would be worth the money and trouble. That the $6,000 per year was in some sense an investment in my future. They were right.</p><p>As the nation reels from yet another fraternity rape story, this time out of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/29/nyregion/cornell-university-rape-investigation-chi-phi-fraternity.html">Cornell</a>, some interlocutors have <a href="https://time.com/article/2026/10/07/in-the-wake-of-cornell-should-fraternities-be-banned-/">wondered</a> whether <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/why-dont-colleges-just-ban-fraternities-cornell.html">banning</a> Greek life outright might solve the problem, eliminating the most fetid hotbeds of sexual assault on college campuses.</p><p>The debate raises plenty of worthwhile questions about institutions’ role in shaping microcultures, the legality and efficacy of outright abolition, and whether fraternities should be understood as a symptom of misogyny and sexual violence or the virus itself. But I have a simpler question: Why, in a culture defined by atomization and largely devoid of any semblance of associational life, has Greek life — at times <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/fraternity-pledges-sued-over-hazing-death/">deadly</a> and <a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/products/among-the-bros-max-marshall?variant=41509299290146">destructive</a> — endured? Every year the ranks of those belonging to churches, clubs, leagues, and unions shrink, and yet, as evidenced by the fervor of RushTok, the number of <a href="https://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2026/02/fraternity-and-sorority-recruitment-sees-influx-in-registration">new recruits</a> to Greek life <a href="https://www.sc.edu/uofsc/posts/2026/08/rushtok-hashtag-uofsc-sorority-recruitment-greek-life-usc-most-potential-new-members.php">continues</a> to rise.</p><p>According to a now-archived <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140615225453/http://dos.cornell.edu/greek/about_our_office/powerof2.cfm">web page</a> from, ironically, the Dean’s Office at Cornell University, only 2 percent of the US population is or was involved in Greek life. But, the page notes, “80% of the top executives of Fortune 500 companies,” “76% of current United States Senators and Congressmen,” “40 of 47 Supreme Court Justices,” and “all but two” presidents were fraternity members. (The page claims the information comes from an undated and unlinked <cite>New York Times</cite> article that I was unable to locate. If you poke around enough university agitprop for Greek life, though, you’ll find these phantom stats repeated.) The Cornell missive approvingly dubs this “the power of the 2 percent,” commending fraternities for their “leadership, independence, scholastic achievement and service to their various campuses and communities.”</p><p>As a former-participant-turned-skeptic, I think fraternities and sororities are better understood as subscription services for access and advantage, a hyperreal allegory for the promises and problems of American capitalism writ large. They are rare, membership-based organizations that bolster, rather than threaten, the power structures that dominate American life, which explains much of their staying power.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Elite Reproduction</h2></header><div><p>Within just a few weeks of joining my sorority, an older member approached me in the campus Starbucks — “the largest Starbucks by square feet in the world,” the student tour guide had boasted on my campus visit, to my awestruck approval. No doubt the older member had noticed me sitting in the pumpkin-spice latte holding pen fondling my newly treasured Tridelt sweatshirt. She heard I was a public relations major, she said, and wanted to help integrate me in the enormous communications school.</p><p>It is hard to overstate the impact this woman had on my college experience and later employment prospects. At the time she was the “agency director” of the campus’s premier communications extracurricular, a student-run PR firm that glistened on résumés. Her approval fast-tracked my acceptance into the program, I’m sure, which accepted only a few dozen students. By senior year, I was the agency director and had — I can only assume now — three solid job offers because of it.</p><p>This type of networking is a major function of sororities and fraternities, but that wasn’t why I joined. At eighteen, I joined for all the most humiliating and human reasons — my concerns were shallow, selfish, superficial. I was not thinking about my labor market prospects or elite reproduction. I was thinking about the fact that I wanted to be at once special and assimilated. I wanted acceptance from and association with people who I sensed — in some proto-class-conscious way, nascently alert to its hierarchy but not yet disgusted by it — were better than me, a kid from a no-name town in Kentucky known only for its sprawling Amazon regional fulfillment center. And I wanted to get drunk with boys!</p><p>But my experience — being plucked out by a high-achieving and generous older member then ushered along the path to accolades and social capital — is indicative of the particular privilege inherent to the Greek system, which can transform the metaphoric big city into a close-knit small town. The mechanism is far less organized than outsiders may assume. There’s no formal process by which alumni committees funnel applications through the side door of Fortune 500 companies. The power of membership is softer, more discreet — less outright patronage than fast-tracked human resources. For those with hiring power, it’s a sanctioned way of assuring “cultural fit,” identifying applicants who’ve been exposed to the same milieux, traditions, and, it should be said, socioeconomic background as yourself.</p><p>It’s telling, then, that one of America’s last enduring civic institutions in an era otherwise characterized by alienation is a social club predicated on reproducing class and racial hierarchy, culled from an already-elite subgroup of the population with the time and money to spend on a college education.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Greek Mythology</h2></header><div><p>But some <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3257025">scholarship</a> on the topic suggests the correlation between participation and career advancement is spurious; that kids with the sort of wealth and access that can lead to illustrious job prospects also tend to be the kids who end up in a sorority or fraternity. It was a <em>reduction</em> in grade point average that was associated with membership, the researchers found, and they were unable to identify any causal “Greek salary premium.” My experience demonstrates how it can grease the wheels of campus involvement, but the benefits are far more tenuous at a population level. And the oft-repeated-by-universities statistics about the success of members (e.g., “all but two presidents”)? Also <a href="https://www.franbecque.com/u-s-presidents-and-fraternity-men-first-ladies-and-sorority-women/">vastly overstated</a>. The real figures, across every vaunted category listed above, are closer to one in four, not three in four. Still disproportionate representation, to be sure, but far from the majority.</p><p>These realities — scant evidence that membership itself actually improves career prospects; a battery of self-aggrandizing, invented statistics that make fraternities look like an impenetrable fast track to a congressional seat or executive boardroom — are all part of the carefully constructed myth. The relationship between Greek life and American privilege is obvious and undeniable, yes, but <em>overstating</em> its benefits, power, and impunity risks further boosting the self-mythologizing. That it is above both the law and grubby proletarian economic concerns is a powerful component of the legend that persists, in large part, because it has been permitted to. Time after time, the system’s worst offenses are deemed acceptable-if-unfortunate downsides for all that perceived membership upside.</p><p>So much about the realities of Greek life and its influence was fuzzy even from the inside, mixing the real with the unreal as mythology often does. Before rush week even began, I heard rumors that Phi Mu’s initiation involved nakedly sitting atop a running washing machine and having whatever jiggled circled with a Sharpie. Tridelt’s supposedly involved swallowing a live goldfish. Those were both false. Other rumors swirled about a shadowy cabal-like meta-fraternity called The Machine that drove political outcomes in both student government and Alabama state politics. This was true: Senator Katie Britt, famed owner of an enormous diamond cross necklace and an unsettlingly <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/katie-britt-kitchen-gop-donald-trump-women?srsltid=AU7gw4Wz1iEHDMSEGKqzizZ-rVdXZFLqaQPzPZTmge4VYktWjnLkUCw3">bare kitchen</a>, was the <a href="https://www.al.com/educationlab/2022/11/who-is-katie-britt-inside-her-time-in-university-of-alabama-student-government.html">Machine-backed</a> student body president at the University of Alabama in 2003.</p><p>It was and is an insular world of bizarre rituals and rigid intragroup hierarchies, and it surprises me in retrospect how seamlessly I became fluent in its language and assented to its terms and conditions; how quickly a sort of <cite>Capitalist Realism</cite>–style foreclosure of alternatives made it seem like the only viable option.</p><p>This disorienting blend of fact and fiction seems most relevant to me now: that Greek life brings advantages but fewer than you might assume; that it is uniquely harmful, and yet is, in many ways, no different from every other elite institution with too much money. After all, a poisonous cocktail of nepotism, grotesque wealth, and unpunished sexual violence aptly summarizes the president of the United States, a man who has turned all of Washington into the fraternity he never had.</p><p>I had been permitted to enter this world, I can see now, but only conditionally. That acute sense of conditionality thrummed beneath my time there — my membership conditional on my parents’ continued willingness and ability to pay and my acceptance conditional on my continued ability to conform to social norms that were harder to define, most of all a slippery but narrow vision of modern Southern womanhood.</p><p>But what I remember most about that time, humming beneath the raucous roar of tailgates and lifted Chevy Tahoes, was the loneliness. It was usually muffled by the bluster and grandiosity my participation seemed to afford me, but sometimes, on the rogue Sunday night, it crept in.</p><p>In other words, the broader cultural alienation existed <em>within</em> this structure, too, a simulacrum of solidarity that sent me searching in adulthood for the real thing. In this way it would come to resemble my experience navigating the economy writ large, the creeping, inescapable knowledge that the advantages I was being sold were more often than not predicated on many more people’s exclusion from them.</p><p>This unshakable discomfort is what led me to embrace a socialist politics, a vision for the world that offered a sturdier and more scalable means of belonging and flourishing conditional only on something none of us can afford to lose but that the status quo so creatively degrades: our humanity.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/college-greek-life-elites-alienation?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-10T15:26:36.801Z</published><summary type="text">While unions, churches, and leagues are losing members, fraternities and sororities are drowning in new recruits. Their staying power comes from bundling belonging with elite advantage.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/vance-catholicism-economics-memoir-trump</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/vance-catholicism-economics-memoir-trump"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/049841174124.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/049841174124.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/049841174124.jpg"/><title type="text">The Gospel According to J. D. Vance</title><updated>2026-10-10T13:36:25.683662Z</updated><author><name>Scott D. Moringiello</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><category label="Religion" term="Religion"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>J. D. Vance is the vice president of the United States of America, and in that position, he is president of the United States Senate. He is the highest-ranking Roman Catholic member of the executive branch. He has a law degree from one of the best law schools in the country. He’s a Marine Corps veteran, a former venture capitalist, and a former senator from Ohio. And he’s the author of a much-discussed memoir, <cite>Hillbilly Elegy</cite>, which was made into a movie. J. D. Vance is, by any sane measure, one of the elites in this country.</p><p>I am a Roman Catholic. I’m a professor at a Catholic university who teaches and studies the history of Catholic theology and its interaction with politics and literature. J. D. Vance and I have some mutual acquaintances. I was hoping to find something in his <a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/products/communion-j-d-vance?variant=45116963192866">latest book</a>, <cite>Communion: Finding My Way Back to Faith</cite>, to think about, to argue with, to learn from. But Vance has committed the worst sin for a writer: he’s written a boring book. Because I’m not a priest, I can’t offer any absolution. I can, however, offer some explanation.</p><p>Though the title has been billed as a spiritual memoir, the book barely attempts to be one. Just twenty-four of its 288 pages deal specifically with his conversion to Roman Catholicism. The rest of the book oscillates between Vance complaining about “the elites” and offering half-baked policy ideas that show no real engagement with the Roman Catholic social teaching that he says he so admires.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Faith Without Works</h2></header><div><p>Vance notes that he was drawn to Catholicism for “intellectual reasons,” citing authors including “J. R. R. Tolkien, G. K. Chesterton, Saint Augustine, and Saint Thomas Aquinas” as well as C. S. Lewis. He spends a few pages discussing Pope Leo XIII, whose encyclical <cite>Rerum Novarum</cite> is, as Vance notes, “one of the foundational Catholic texts about political economy.” (The current pope took the name Leo to honor Leo XIII.) Yet apart from one extended quotation from Chesterton’s <cite>Everlasting Man</cite>, one extended quotation from Augustine, two passages from <cite>Rerum Novarum</cite>, and one passage from the twentieth-century Dominican priest — and Marxist — Herbert McCabe, Vance offers very little insight into the intellectual reasons for his conversion. There is no real engagement with theological or philosophical ideas that one would hope to find in a purported spiritual memoir.</p><p>Perhaps it is unfair to expect the vice president to enter into especially perceptive dialogues with Aquinas on truth, Augustine on love, Chesterton on paradox, and Tolkien on myth. But it is not unfair to expect a former senator and sitting vice president to describe how joining the Roman Catholic Church materially affected his political views and votes. Vance gestures at that question in the chapters “Of New Things” and “A Dismal Science.” The first is where he discusses Leo XIII. His account of the encyclical is reasonably competent, correctly noting that the encyclical “forcefully advocates for the rights of individual workers, for labor unions, and for traditional families — even presaging the ‘family wage’ that would later become a critical part of stable industrial societies.” Leo argued for the application of the Christian understanding of human beings as social creatures, bound by familial and community obligations, to the state’s obligations to its citizens.</p><p><cite>Rerum Novarum</cite> should be read more widely by Catholics and non-Catholics alike, and leftists in the Western world would do well to enter into a fruitful dialogue with it and the tradition on which it draws. We could all learn much from <cite>Rerum Novarum</cite> and the series of encyclicals that were written in its wake. Important examples include <cite>Quadragesimo Anno</cite> (1931), <cite>Pacem in Terris</cite> (1963), <cite>Populorum Progressio</cite> (1967), <cite>Centesimus Annus</cite> (1991), <cite>Caritas in Veritate</cite>(2009), <cite>Fratelli Tutti</cite> (2020), and Pope Leo XIV’s <cite>Magnifica Humanitas</cite> (2026).</p><p>As you can imagine, there are innumerable resources from the twenty centuries of Christianity that lay out principles for thinking about human beings, political community, state power, allocation of resources, and the like. But imagine you must, because Vance doesn’t discuss the church’s reflection on these matters at all.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Turning Away the Stranger</h2></header><div><p>At the end of his chapter “When in Rome,” Vance asks, “What would a Christian approach not just to marriage and family, but to economics in the modern era look like?” In the following chapter, “A Dismal Science,” he lays out all the ways in which thinking about the human person solely as <em><a href="https://www.behavioraleconomics.com/resources/mini-encyclopedia-of-be/homo-economicus/">homo economicus</a></em> falls short — which, as the kids say, fair — but offers no sustained reflection on the policies that would do justice to human beings as the social creatures that we are. As Vance notes, “An economy geared toward creation and dignity may very well produce more real prosperity than one geared toward finance and accumulation.” So far, so Leo XIII. But that is as far as Vance goes.</p><p>In fact, Vance’s political life is about as far from Leo’s vision as one can imagine. When former <cite>New York Times</cite> columnist Ross Douthat <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/18/opinion/jd-vance-iran-trump-communion.html">asked</a> Vance on a podcast what policies marked the Trump administration as particularly Christian, he replied that the administration had lowered taxes.</p><p>The Trump administration clearly believes that an economy geared toward dignity involves lawless Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials terrorizing nuns on their way to Mass. Presumably, dignity must also involve bombing an Iranian school for girls.</p><p>If Vance believes that social media companies “bombard” children with “images and influences that have left them isolated, depressed, and increasingly at risk of self-harm,” what legal obligations should a government committed to human dignity impose on them? Vance leaves this question to the imagination. And whatever his lionizing of <cite>Rerum Novarum</cite>, Vance has done nothing as a senator or as the vice president to strengthen union membership in this country. He appears content to entirely disregard the encyclical’s robust defense of labor unions.</p><p>The great Danish philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard says somewhere that Christian ethicists make it their job to tell people that what Jesus demands in the New Testament isn’t really a demand. Vance’s chapter “When in Rome” does much the same. To be clear, what the Holy See says as a state and diplomatic entity does not carry the same weight as the Gospel or centuries of Christian teaching. And when Vance says that he is “one Christian statesman who would welcome an institutional faith less focused on platitudes and more focused on reality,” I agree with him. But his book is nothing if not platitudinous.</p><p>Take, for instance, immigration. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, whatever its faults as an organization, is much more focused on the realities of <a href="https://www.usccb.org/news/2025/us-bishops-issue-special-message-immigration-plenary-assembly-baltimore">immigration</a> than J. D. Vance, Stephen Miller, and Tom Homan.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Tales Told With a Lying Tongue</h2></header><div><p>The sad thing is that Vance used to care about reality. In <cite>Hillbilly Elegy</cite>, he made the argument — controversial, to be sure, but it was a real argument — that the problems of the white working class were not reducible to economic decline alone but also resulted from family breakdown and destructive cultural habits. The book made him famous and arguably brought him to the Senate and the vice presidency. In a 2020 article for <cite>The Lamp</cite> magazine, Vance wrote “How I Joined the Resistance,” a moving account of his conversion to Catholicism and how his new faith recast his relationship with his family. If you are interested in Vance’s conversion, skip <cite>Communion</cite> and read that piece instead.</p><p>In John’s Gospel, Jesus says that he is “the way, the truth, and the life.” What exactly that means has taken up two thousand years of Christian reflection. I appreciate that Vance does not claim to be a theologian. He defends the rationality of Christian belief and practice, and he has kind words for Pope Francis, whom many so-called Christian conservatives did not like.</p><p>On the Christian account, the truth is always surprising and challenging. The idea that love sustains creation, and that love became incarnate in an itinerant Jewish preacher, is, if nothing else, interesting. It makes demands on its hearers. But the vice president has a complicated relationship with the truth. He infamously claimed that, if he had to make up stories about Haitian immigrants to get the attention of the mainstream media, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/sep/15/jd-vance-lies-haitian-immigrants">he would</a>. <cite>The</cite> <cite>Washington Post</cite> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/09/27/what-jd-vances-private-trump-comments-tell-us/">showed</a> that he lied about the timing of his embrace of Trump.</p><p>In “How I Joined the Resistance,” Vance wrote, “I try to keep a little humility about how little I know, and how inadequate a Christian I really am.” And in <cite>Communion</cite>, he writes, “The Gospel is inherently an inconvenient message. It demands much of us — so much, in fact, that it tells us up front that every single living person will fail in some profound way.” Indeed.</p><p>At the heart of the Christian message is the idea that, in order to be yourself, you must love, and in order to love, you must tell the truth. The social order, as the Christian tradition from the New Testament through Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to Leo XIII and Leo XIV has insisted, must attend to people’s material and social needs so that they can love and tell the truth. The church is nothing other than the community of people helping one another to do that. Unfortunately for readers of <cite>Communion</cite>, the J. D. Vance of 2026 is much more comfortable with lying and being boring — which are two ways of saying the same thing — than the Vance of 2016 and 2020.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/vance-catholicism-economics-memoir-trump?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-10T13:36:25.683662Z</published><summary type="text">J. D. Vance’s spiritual memoir is short on the spiritual and long on hypocrisy, oscillating between complaints about “the elites” and half-baked policy ideas that show little engagement with the Catholic social teaching he professes to admire.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/bauhaus-nazis-afd-art-censorship</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/bauhaus-nazis-afd-art-censorship"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/028049641766.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/028049641766.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/028049641766.jpg"/><title type="text">Germany’s Far Right Is Attacking Bauhaus Again</title><updated>2026-10-10T12:50:10.286906Z</updated><author><name>Alexander Görlach</name></author><category label="Architecture" term="Architecture"/><category label="Art" term="Art"/><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>A hundred years since the opening of Walter Gropius’s Bauhaus building in Dessau, Germany, there may be no centenary. This December 4, the winner of the election in the surrounding state of Saxony-Anhalt, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), does not intend to throw a big party for the Bauhaus Foundation, but to shut it down.</p><p>According to the AfD, the Bauhaus is a “misguided path of modernism,” whose works are impersonal and uninviting. From there, it’s only a stone’s throw to the word “degenerate” — the term used in the Third Reich to describe “un-German” art, that is, art by Jews or art whose aesthetics did not conform to the Nazi regime’s propaganda glorifying “racial purity.”</p><p>If the AfD succeeds in forming a government in Saxony-Anhalt, after scoring 44 percent of the vote in the September 6 state election, the Bauhaus would not be the only victim of its “cultural policy.” Still, it would certainly be the most prominent. The party’s cultural-policy spokesperson in the state parliament, Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, already demanded during the campaign that, in the future, all theaters and cultural institutions that want state funding must sign a declaration of their “commitment to the state, democracy, and German culture.” The statement is supposed to confirm that each recipient of public funds treats German cultural tradition “with respect.” Tillschneider leaves open exactly what this means. Naturally, cultural professionals in the state are up in arms over this demand.</p><p>As it stands, theaters and orchestras in Saxony-Anhalt are almost entirely funded by public money, with €276 million flowing into the state’s municipal theaters between 2024 and 2028 — a good €55 million annually — plus a total annual cultural budget of around €192 million for museums, libraries, independent organizations, and historical preservation. Effectively, such an obligation to declare their loyalties would hit all theaters and cultural institutions in the state. What is exhibited, shown, screened in theaters, and staged in Saxony-Anhalt would thus depend on the approval of the far-right AfD.</p><p>There’s a reason why the Bauhaus is being singled out here. In doing so, the AfD is directly appealing to those of its voters who can clearly be classified as far right. After all, the Bauhaus was already an abomination to Adolf Hitler’s Nazis. His National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) initially suspected the faculty of the Dessau Academy of Design of being Bolsheviks; only later did it accuse individual professors of creating “degenerate art.” On October 1, 1932, almost four months before Hitler became Reich chancellor, the Nazis closed the Bauhaus in Dessau because the party had won a majority there in the 1931 city council elections and subsequently cut off all subsidies to the municipally funded school (the AfD now wants to revive this tactic of cutting off public funding and apply it throughout the entire state).</p><p>The last Bauhaus director, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, moved the school to Berlin at his own expense and continued to run it privately there until the Gestapo raided and closed it in April 1933. In the 1937 propaganda exhibition <cite>Degenerate Art</cite> held in Munich, several former Bauhaus teachers were publicly paraded, and their art was denounced as “degenerate.” Tillschneider’s statements about the Bauhaus sound like an echo from that era: “The Bauhaus raped the human need for security and comfort in every possible way,” he said on October 24, 2024, in the Saxony-Anhalt state parliament. The AfD has held seats in that parliament since 2016; the party has been represented in the neighboring Free State of Saxony’s state parliament since 2014. During the Weimar Republic, the province of Saxony and the Free State of Anhalt were early Nazi strongholds. The AfD’s early successes here seem to indicate a certain continuity of right-wing ideology that has persisted through the era of the East German dictatorship (GDR). In any case, no other state chapter has called for a ban on the Bauhaus or for a “cultural commitment” like the one Tillschneider seeks to impose.</p><p>Protests against the closure of the Bauhaus in 1932 were unsuccessful. To prevent history from repeating itself, the federal culture minister, Wolfram Weimer, has called on civil society actors to form a united front against the far-right wrecking ball: fourteen institutions and associations, including the Academy of Arts, the Chamber of Architects, the German United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Commission (the Bauhaus has been a World Heritage Site since 1996), the German Association of Cities, and the major Christian churches in Germany have signed the resulting “Bauhaus Manifesto 2026.” It declares that they are “proud of the Bauhaus” and want to defend its “creative freedom and social inclusivity as a model” against “any anti-democratic attacks.” The AfD is not mentioned in this manifesto.</p><p>For its part, the AfD, now the largest party in Saxony-Anhalt, has not commented on the manifesto but is tightening its demands for “Germanness.” According to a parliamentary motion by the party, the Saxony-Anhalt state branding slogan is to change from <em>moderndenken</em> (modern thinking) to <em>deutschdenken</em> (German thinking). Just as with its cultural commitments, the party has yet to explain exactly what the “German” aspect of this way of thinking entails.</p><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/bauhaus-nazis-afd-art-censorship?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-10T12:49:51.227Z</published><summary type="text">It’s been 100 years since the opening of Walter Gropius’s Bauhaus building in Dessau, but the Alternative für Deutschland wants to cut funding from centenary events. The winner of recent state elections, the far-right party labels Bauhaus un-German.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/platform-capitalism-internet-porn-camming</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/platform-capitalism-internet-porn-camming"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/303829227258.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/303829227258.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/303829227258.jpg"/><title type="text">Online Pornography Created the Model for Platform Capitalism</title><updated>2026-10-09T18:57:02.442974Z</updated><author><name>Patricia Nilsson</name></author><author><name>Bartolomeo Sala</name></author><category label="Society" term="Society"/><category label="Science and Technology" term="Science and Technology"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Online pornography is often seen as a corner of the web that doesn’t bear much analysis. And yet it can hardly be ignored. Firstly, that’s because of the sheer size of the adult-content industry — a sector that in itself is worth around $97 billion annually worldwide and that, at peak times, commands 10 percent of all internet traffic. But more than that, a discussion of its inner workings sheds light on the mechanisms that govern the special kind of attention economy and platform capitalism that we are all wrapped up in.</p><p>In <cite><a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/462785/guilty-pleasure-by-nilsson-patricia/9780241711293">Guilty Pleasure: The Pornification of the Internet, the Economy, and Everything Else</a></cite>, the journalist Patricia Nilsson discusses porn’s place at the heart of today’s digital ecosystem. As the <cite>Financial Times</cite> journalist explains, many of the technologies meant to hold and monetize our attention were pioneered by porn sites, and we can even say that digital life in general operates according to the same logic of endless titillation.</p><p>For Nilsson, “online culture runs on the onanistic logic of porn.” In this new creator economy, everyone is forced to perform a heightened and often openly sexualized version of themselves. In an interview for <cite>Jacobin</cite>, she spoke to Bartolomeo Sala about what effects this is having on relationships, users, and creators themselves.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><hr/></header><dl><dt><p>Bartolomeo Sala</p><p>You begin <cite>Guilty Pleasure</cite> by discussing the arguments for and against pornography originating in debates dating back to the 1970s.</p><p>You relay the criticism, shared by both second-wave feminists and conservatives, that porn should be censored, as it demeans women (“porn is the theory, rape is the practice”) and undermines social cohesion. On the other hand, you discuss the experience of sex workers and porn professionals who value it for its emancipatory, transgressive potential.</p><p>However, you continue by showing how this moral debate fails to consider the specific digital ecosystem in which porn is produced, disseminated, and consumed. Why do you think these old attitudes are no longer sufficient, and what do they miss about the current political economy of the porn industry?</p></dt><dd><p>Patricia Nilsson</p><p>That’s a big question. I’ll say two main things.</p><p>Firstly, if we talk about porn from the perspective of a traditional feminist critique, whether we should be for or against — I think I write at some point in the book that, to this day, we have not resolved what sex actually means to women. That’s the elephant in the room. I find what someone like Ellen Willis has to say very interesting: that women should be formulating their own sexual desires and fantasies and taking part in the world as equal beings. But the reality is that it’s still a world dominated by male experiences.</p><p>As to whether these debates aren’t really relevant nowadays, I think we’re so focused on sex that we have failed to form a better understanding of what pornography means today. Why is it so shameful, so taboo, to be a sex worker? The idea that you’re selling yourself? What does it mean to be a sex worker in this digital economy, where we have a paradigm of platform labor where we’re all more or less encouraged to monetize our image and to vie for attention online? A lot of these aspects you could see from sex workers, especially cam workers more than thirty years ago: thinking about your online persona and building a virtual self to attract attention and sell a fantasy other people can consume.</p><p>That is the core of platform labor today. So I think that a lot of the conversations we’re having today about sex work, especially pornography, miss the point that we have a virtual economy that’s now completely dependent on this type of self-exploitation, which goes way beyond the purely pornographic.</p></dd><dt><p>Bartolomeo Sala</p><p>The central idea of <cite>Guilty Pleasure</cite> is that porn, far from “a trivial sideshow,” is a key feature of the platform capitalism that rules every aspect of our lives. Many of the technologies that keep us glued to our devices, and that track, monitor, and analyze each and every one of our behaviors, were pioneered by porn sites.</p><p>Today most tube sites such as Pornhub and Youporn are owned by a handful of monopolists backed by big finance who, together with payment processors Visa and Mastercard, are ultimately the arbiters of what can or cannot be shown online. Can you tell us a bit more about how the architecture of the attention economy is a product of online porn?</p></dt><dd><p>Patricia Nilsson</p><p>When I say that the logic of porn shaped the business model of the internet, I mean that some of the first people who started making money online were making money in pornography. I remember speaking to this guy, who made a lot of money in the ’90s, who told me, “I never wanted to be a pornographer. I just wanted to make money on the internet. Pornography just happened to be the way.” A lot of these early sites were the first ones to play with how to attract huge amounts of people online — to get them to stay for as long as possible and return as often as possible — and how to make money from their attention.</p><p>Take things like affiliate marketing: when you host a link on your website, and then if someone clicks on it and goes somewhere else, you get paid for it. Fabian Thylmann — the German dude who is known for inventing tube sites’ business model by bringing Wall Street money into it — didn’t build tube sites. What he did was build one of the first affiliate marketing softwares, which essentially enabled tube sites to track people’s behaviors while on the platform. Or, if you look at camming, it pioneered live streaming. It was the place where people first got to experiment with such things as pay-per-minute models, taking people into private rooms, and using prepaid tokens for tipping. These are all driving the business model of platforms like Twitch and TikTok and attracting more and more people into this virtual economy.</p><p>But camming also brought a completely extraordinary notion of the online persona: the idea that we can be whoever we want to be or whoever the person on the other side of the screen wants us to be. This doesn’t apply just to ourselves but also to how normal it has become to consume others, to consume the image of others. By that I don’t only mean watching porn or following your favorite influencer on Instagram. Everything has become this form of consumption. This is how we date; this is how we follow our friends. I live in Germany now. I used to live in the UK. I know what’s happening in many of my friends’ lives because I’m consuming their feeds. So that’s what I mean when I say that the logic of porn has seeped through the internet and influenced everything.</p></dd><dt><p>Bartolomeo Sala</p><p>I think you perfectly replied to my next question, which was about your claim that “online culture runs on the onanistic logic of porn.”</p><p>Before we turn to the key takeaway of the book, however, I was wondering if you could tell me a bit more about how the modern porn ecosystem reflects the specific brand of capitalism we all live under. You discuss at length, for instance, how the current state of affairs, in which extreme concentration goes hand in hand with lack of accountability, was born out of a specific US federal law, Section 230, which in the name of freedom of speech shields consumer-generated platforms from liability so long as they remove content that’s violent, illegal, or simply uploaded without consent.</p><p>Can you tell me how all this came about? And how this arrangement, in which the right to censorship comes at the discretion of powerful financial actors, reflects a more general threat to freedom of expression?</p></dt><dd><p>Patricia Nilsson</p><p>Just before we get into Section 230, since you have mentioned it, what I mean when I talk about the “masturbatory business model of the internet” is that the entire virtual ecosystem is designed to be masturbatory to the extent that watching porn essentially is satisfying a psychosocial need on your own by staring at content that has been algorithmically engineered to appeal to you. That is what watching porn is today. And that is what being on your phone is today as well. You know, they’re the same thing. Are you familiar with gooning?</p></dd><dt><p>Bartolomeo Sala</p><p>Unfortunately yes, I remember the <cite>Harper’s</cite> <a href="https://harpers.org/archive/2025/11/the-goon-squad-daniel-kolitz-porn-masturbation-loneliness/">story</a> when it came out.</p></dt><dd><p>Patricia Nilsson</p><p>It’s not such a crazy thing as it is made out to be. Gooning is the extreme end of a spectrum that we’re all on in one way, shape, or form. That’s what I mean by the masturbatory business model of the internet: what we’re really doing is being caught up in this loop of self-gratification and self-soothing. That’s why we pick up our phones. We want to soothe ourselves.</p><p>On Section 230 and freedom of expression: I am not an expert on the issue of regulation. I am not “Section 230 ride or die.” I think it’s obvious to everyone that there is something deeply wrong with the online world, and that we need to change it somehow. At the same time, I argue in the book that regulation of the internet has, in many ways, historically been driven by an attempt to regulate pornography, and that has had a lot of unintended consequences. Section 230 was intended to stop private companies from having too much power over what individuals can say. And with the erosion of Section 230, this is exactly what we’ve been seeing.</p><p>Visa and MasterCard have become the de facto regulators of porn. They don’t want to have this role, but they have it. A couple of years ago, there was a pressure group that pressured them into taking down over ten million videos on Pornhub. Again, you might say, “we shouldn’t have porn uploaded by unverified accounts,” so maybe this is a good thing. But it misses the bigger point that this kind of pressure exists, and private companies can force content to come down this way. And in a world like ours where things are changing very quickly, you may imagine where that leads.</p></dd><dt><p>Bartolomeo Sala</p><p>One aspect of porn being algorithmically engineered to keep us hooked is how this loop of “compulsive self-gratification: craving, stimulation, and temporary relief” directly leads to the “extremefication of porn” and the consequent molding of people’s sexual preferences. If the name of the game is keeping your attention as long as possible, it makes sense that your preferences will be algorithmically nudged toward more intense and fetishistic material as novelty wears off and habituation kicks in.</p><p>However, I am more interested in asking you how these perverse incentives (pun intended) have also led to what you characterize as unprecedented commodification of the self. OnlyFans might be the most notable example of this new creator economy that blurs the distinction between not just pornographic and non-pornographic content but also between work and everyday life, intimacy and its performance. You write, on the subject of “thirst traps,” that “in the platform economy, sexual self-presentation is just another way to craft a personal brand that serves as both a source of validation and a potential revenue stream.”</p><p>Can you tell me more about this burgeoning economy: the careful staging of authenticity it requires but also the specific kind of alienation and burnout it breeds?</p></dt><dd><p>Patricia Nilsson</p><p>There’s a quote in the book from Bryce Adams, where she talks about why she decided to become an OnlyFans performer. She says if TikTok is just full of people, mainly women, performing these overt eroticized selves all the time, then logically, why not just make money from it, if I am going to be constantly performing as my sexual self in this way anyway?</p><p>I think this is so interesting for two reasons. On the side of the consumer: What happens to us when we are consuming this type of content? Can it actually start replacing reality? I think we’re starting to see that it can. A lot of people who, for whatever reason, have started spending a lot of time online find that nothing in reality can quite match the excitement, vividness, and speed with which they can feel gratified and validated online. And you can see why. If you’re constantly engaged with performers who are excited, optimistic, and positive, then it can feel quite anticlimactic to go out in the real world and have to negotiate real relationships.</p><p>However, this is something that I saw very strongly in performers as well, people who are choosing to do this sort of work. A lot of people I spoke to who are OnlyFans performers, or do camming, for example, don’t want to have a real job. That is the driver: the idea of having to go to an office every day and seeing people and having a boss and negotiating with colleagues. A lot of people I spoke to describe having deep anxiety or just not feeling comfortable being with people in person. Being an online sex worker and making money by having these mediated online interactions is just so much safer, because they don’t even have to leave their room.</p><p>In the last chapter, I interviewed a performer called Lizzy Capri, who was a YouTube mini-celebrity before she launched her OnlyFans. She told me that the way she sees the world is that we are all either consumers or performers, and she would much rather be a performer, a creator. She was telling me that if she didn’t have the incentive to film herself doing things and share them, she would often lack the motivation to do anything at all. She would just end up laying on her sofa all day.</p></dd><dt><p>Bartolomeo Sala</p><p>This is what is so dystopian about OnlyFans and performers such as Bryce Adams. It’s like the last stage of capitalist subsumption where life itself is turned into eroticized spectacle. Contrary to tube sites, it doesn’t act as a stress valve for our most primal sexual urges. It seems to respond to an all-too-real craving for connection, but it’s ultimately a simulacrum designed to suck us ever deeper in this voyeuristic sort of parasocial intimacy.</p></dt><dd><p>Patricia Nilsson</p><p>I think I say in the book that OnlyFans is the marriage of the pornographic undertones of the internet and the influencer economy that has stemmed from it. OnlyFans performers don’t need to learn any new skills. They are just doing the type of platform labor that we have all been taught to do since being children, which is essentially posting pictures of oneself and being “authentic” — and what I mean by that is this particular sort of performing of authenticity. What I found really interesting in the sort of conversations I was having with Bryce was the way she talks about how people are craving a new type of connection. What OnlyFans offers is this feeling that we’re behind the scenes, that we’re ultimately getting to know the real Bryce.</p></dd><dt><p>Bartolomeo Sala</p><p>In the book, you purposefully shy away from solutions. In the epilogue, you outline how AI, as the most perfect tool to aggregate and reproduce our darkest fantasies, could suck us ever deeper in this shadow world that thrives all the more as it works as a substitute for the intimacy and connection we lack in real life.</p><p>Still, you are careful to avoid stoking moral panic over pornography. Sexual mores are porous and ever-changing. You also show how censorship usually ends up damaging creators themselves, who are suddenly deprived of the revenue streams and protections afforded by digital life. What do you think should be the basic tenets of a progressive agenda to get serious about this subject?</p></dt><dd><p>Patricia Nilsson</p><p>For the porn industry specifically, I think it’s very difficult, because most of the content that is being consumed in a place like the UK is not made there, especially now that porn production has been almost outlawed. Take the women who, especially before the [Ukraine] war, were flown into Prague. These are not porn performers; these are just civilians who are brought in and told, “Hey, you can make, like, €5,000 in one week.” That is a life-changing amount of money. So people come in, and they do whatever they’re told. A lot of these women, of course, don’t speak Czech or English. But at the core of this issue is the fact that they are not EU citizens. That is why they can’t turn to the police if anything goes wrong.</p><p>The same thing happens in Colombia, one of the countries where the camming industry is growing absolutely the fastest. It’s completely unregulated, and many of these cam models are being forced to work almost every day. A lot of them would want to come to the West and do other types of work, but they can’t. I think very often we want to say, “Women are being forced into doing this, this is sex trafficking.” There are, of course, cases where women are put in coercive contracts they can’t get out of. But to a very, very large extent, it’s women choosing to do this. So the question becomes: Why are they choosing to do it? This can be extended to why so many people today want to be OnlyFans performers rather than, say, going to university and getting a job or working at an Amazon warehouse. What do these choices say about the choices that aren’t made or can’t be made?</p><p>All that aside, if you’re concerned about these women who are doing this type of sex work, what you want is legalization. You want the creation of some kind of framework where you can have some kind of standardization of wages and root out exploitative agents and studios. You want to create ecosystems where porn performers and online sex workers can go to the police if something bad happens to them, where they can help each other flag exploitative clients and so on.</p></dd></dl></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/platform-capitalism-internet-porn-camming?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-09T18:57:02.442974Z</published><summary type="text">Moral debates about sex work often overlook the wider effect of online porn in shaping our digital existence. More than just a corner of the internet, it has profoundly shaped how platforms keep our attention, and how we present ourselves online.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/uaw-elections-fain-barofsky-labor</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/uaw-elections-fain-barofsky-labor"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/885105544916.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/885105544916.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/885105544916.jpg"/><title type="text">Shawn Fain’s Slate Has Swept the UAW Elections</title><updated>2026-10-09T16:48:42.670668Z</updated><author><name>Chris Brooks</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><category label="Unions" term="Unions"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Shawn Fain and the United UAW slate are headed toward a sweeping victory in the union’s internal elections for its International Executive Board. The results will not be finalized for some time, but the unofficial results are unequivocal: United Auto Workers members are overwhelmingly backing Fain and the militant direction he is taking the union.</p><p>Voter turnout was low, about 10 percent of the total number of active and retired members, and appears to be on track for a lower total vote count than when the UAW held its first direct election of top union officers in 2022. Previously, officers were elected by delegates at the union’s annual convention, a system that helped entrench the ruling Administration Caucus in power for more than seven decades.</p><p>Fain eked out an upset victory against incumbent President Ray Curry in a runoff election and was officially sworn in as the first directly elected UAW president in March 2023. I worked for him as chief of staff at the UAW from 2023 to earlier this year. Now, three and a half years later, Fain is on track to become the first directly elected president to win reelection.</p><p>The field was considerably more crowded this time, with more candidates contesting the top officer positions and regional director seats. Fain’s UAW United slate fielded candidates for eleven of the twelve positions on the International Executive Board. Despite heavy opposition, United UAW candidates are winning by overwhelming margins, demonstrating widespread membership support for Fain’s aggressive approach to bargaining and organizing.</p><p>That support has been earned. Under Fain’s leadership, the UAW’s historic 2023 stand-up strike won record agreements at the Big Three, delivering 25 percent wage increases, eliminating wage tiers, restoring cost-of-living adjustments, securing bonuses for retirees for the first time in decades, winning the right to strike over product commitments, and bringing electric vehicle battery production under the union’s master agreements.</p><p>The union then institutionalized its aggressive, high-participation approach to bargaining and began rolling it out across the industries it represents, winning life-changing contracts for workers at Daimler Truck, American Axle, Allison Transmission, Cornell University, Rolls-Royce, and other employers. Following the success at the Big Three, the UAW successfully unionized the workers at Volkswagen’s sole US assembly plant in Tennessee, which became the first foreign-owned Southern auto plant to be organized in US history. Volkswagen workers won a first contract earlier this year.</p><p>The election results also send an unmistakable message to the federally appointed monitor, Neil Barofsky, who Fain and I believe has <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-dig-confronting-labors-crisis-w-chris-brooks/id791564318?i=1000793472346">repeatedly abused</a> the extraordinary power of his office to try to undermine Fain’s reelection chances.</p><p>Barofsky, an attorney with the law firm Jenner &amp;amp; Block, has publicly accused Fain and me of retaliating against other union leaders in a series of scathing reports. We have vigorously contested those allegations, which we believe are grossly inaccurate and politically motivated.</p><p>Those reports followed a <a href="https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2026/05/15/shawn-fains-uaw-is-facing-strong-headwinds/">remarkable confrontation</a> between Fain and Barofsky over the union’s support for a ceasefire in Gaza and opposition to Israel’s genocide against Palestinians.</p><p>In December 2023, the UAW became the largest union to call for a ceasefire. Following the announcement, Barofsky called Fain, ostensibly in his personal capacity rather than as the federally appointed monitor, to challenge the union’s position. During that call, Barofsky repeatedly suggested that the union’s statements were antisemitic and “crossed a line.” Fain understood the call as an implicit threat from a federal monitor wielding extraordinary authority over the union’s internal affairs.</p><p>Barofsky subsequently forwarded an email he had received from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) to the entire International Executive Board, clearly implying his support for concerns raised by the ADL about the growing support for the union’s ceasefire position among locals. These interactions culminated in a heated confrontation at the February 2024 board meeting, where multiple members of the board objected to the monitor’s interference in the union’s political affairs.</p><p>During that meeting, which was recorded in the official minutes, Barofsky denied saying the call was made in his personal capacity and claimed that he never characterized the union’s position as antisemitic. He also claimed that Fain had dismissed his concerns about the suffering of Jewish people as “bulls — t.”</p><p>Unfortunately for Barofsky, Fain recorded their conversation. In July 2026, <cite><a href="https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/uaw-shawn-fain-neil-barofsky-recording-israel-gaza">Drop Site News</a></cite> obtained, authenticated, transcribed, and published the recording. The transcript revealed that Barofsky did say he was calling Fain in his personal capacity and that he repeatedly raised accusations of antisemitism. It also showed that Fain’s reference to “bulls — t” concerned Israel’s killing tens of thousands of innocent civilians — not the suffering of Jewish people. Following publication of the recording, Democratic Rep. Rashida Tlaib called for Barofsky’s resignation.</p><p>Now, despite the monitor’s investigations, public accusations, and extraordinary interventions into the union’s internal affairs, UAW members are delivering a strong vote of confidence in Fain’s leadership. And Fain is already preparing for the next fight. The centerpiece of his strategy for the 2028 Big Three negotiations is winning back pensions and retiree health care for all autoworkers. Building on the historic 2023 agreements, these victories would eliminate two of the most consequential remaining tiers imposed on autoworkers over previous decades.</p><p>Much was at stake during these elections. The labor movement, as I have <a href="https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2026/01/15/is-labor-at-the-point-of-no-return/">argued elsewhere</a>, is in serious crisis. Fain ran for leadership of America’s most powerful industrial union on a platform of taking that crisis seriously by using the UAW’s resources to wage a real fight for working-class people in this country, both within the union and outside of it. It’s why I worked for him for three years. His opponents in this election wanted to return the union to the days when it was rolling over for the bosses and lacked a broader vision for what organized labor can do, even in its weakened state.</p><p>The message from UAW members coming out of this election is clear: they want their union to keep fighting, keep winning, and keep moving forward. Anyone who cares about building a fighting labor movement should be heartened.</p><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/uaw-elections-fain-barofsky-labor?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-09T16:48:42.670668Z</published><summary type="text">The message from United Auto Workers members in their recent internal elections, in which President Shawn Fain and his slate are poised to win big, is clear, argues former Fain Chief of Staff Chris Brooks: they want their union to keep fighting.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/hobsbawm-chabal-biography-history-communism</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/hobsbawm-chabal-biography-history-communism"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/816414761314.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/816414761314.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/816414761314.jpg"/><title type="text">Eric Hobsbawm, Historian of Defeat</title><updated>2026-10-09T15:37:37.028265Z</updated><author><name>Iker Itoiz Ciaurriz</name></author><category label="Books" term="Books"/><category label="History" term="History"/><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the communist historian Eric Hobsbawm published his best-selling history of the twentieth century, <cite>The Age of Extremes</cite>. The book presented a man coming to terms with the fate of the political project to which he had committed his adult life while trying to understand the twentieth century as a historical epoch. Though famous for its pessimism, the book, like the work of many left-wing authors in the 1990s, was also an opportunity to rethink what the project of the Left might become after the collapse of communism.</p><p>In its final pages, Hobsbawm reflected darkly on the future. The “titanic economic and techno-scientific” development of capitalism, he wrote, had unleashed forces capable of destroying “the material foundations of human life” while eroding the social bonds of the past, including the ones capitalism itself depends upon. “Our world risks both explosion and implosion. It must change.” Humanity could not survive the third millennium by prolonging the past or the present, he warned, and “the price of failure, that is to say, the alternative to a changed society, is darkness.”</p><p>Almost twenty years later, in 2011, mass protests erupted across the world. The Arab Spring overthrew dictatorships in Egypt and Tunisia, while the uprising in Syria descended into civil war. Elsewhere, Occupy Wall Street emerged in the United States, and the Indignados movement occupied the streets and squares of Spain. I was among those participating in these demonstrations and at the time was reading <cite>The Age of Extremes</cite> with my classmates. The book made a lasting impression on how we thought about both the past and the possibilities of the future. It was not only the history Hobsbawm was telling but the feeling that we were somehow living through the same story again. For a left that had struggled to articulate a vision of the future since the collapse of communism, the Indignados movement became a moment of political imagination, when a different future seemed possible. For a new generation of politically committed historians, the struggles of Eric Hobsbawm — a communist who had lived in Berlin when the Nazis came to power, been in Paris at the height of the Popular Front in 1936, and traveled to Spain during the civil war — could be inspiring.</p><p>I wasn’t alone. In 2018, the historian Emile Chabal traveled to Delhi where he encountered a group of left-wing students who admired Hobsbawm’s work. They encouraged him to search for the hashtag #Hobsbawm. To his surprise, he found numerous social media posts featuring the historian’s books: typically an open laptop flanked by a copy of <cite>The Age of Extremes</cite> accompanied by hashtags about the challenges of student life. But as Chabal asks, what can the life of Hobsbawm — the historical figure rather than the myth — teach us about the prospects of the Left today?</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>A Historian With a Historical Life</h2></header><div><p>Few twentieth-century historians have generated as much biographical interest as Eric Hobsbawm. Born in Alexandria in 1917, raised in Vienna and Berlin, and arriving in Britain shortly after Adolf Hitler’s seizure of power, Hobsbawm joined the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1936 and remained a member until its dissolution in 1991. He also became one of the most influential historians of the twentieth century, moving from the relatively confined world of British Marxist historiography to an extraordinary international readership. Emile Chabal’s <cite>The Age of Hobsbawm</cite> therefore enters crowded territory. Yet his new biography provides an excellent opportunity to revisit the life of a committed communist through the wider history of twentieth-century communism and to ask what Hobsbawm might teach us at another moment of profound uncertainty for the international Left.</p><p>Chabal is less interested in discovering an unknown Hobsbawm than in explaining the making of the historian and political intellectual. His is fundamentally an intellectual biography. Rather than separating Hobsbawm’s historical writing from his communism, journalism, friendships, travels, and political interventions, Chabal reconstructs the environments in which Hobsbawm’s ideas were produced. The result is something larger than a biography: a history of twentieth-century intellectual life viewed through an individual who moved between communism and academia, Britain and continental Europe, specialist scholarship and mass publishing.</p><p>As the historian Alberto De Bernardi has argued, antifascism needs to be reconsidered as a central component of European political culture, one that shaped political identities through the second half of the twentieth century. Hobsbawm belonged to what might be called the “generation of the October Revolution”: those who lived through the rise of Nazism, the antifascist response, and World War II. These experiences forged a powerful political commitment that, in Hobsbawm’s case, proved impossible to break even after the communist crisis of 1956. If 1945–48 marked the high point of communism’s appeal in Europe, the following decades witnessed its gradual decline and eventual collapse in 1989–91. Hobsbawm lived through all of it without renouncing communism. His generation was defeated and had to adapt to a world shorn of the project to which so many of them had dedicated themselves. Few intellectuals experienced these transformations with the same degree of proximity or persistence. Fewer still attempted, as Hobsbawm did, to interpret these upheavals historically while simultaneously participating in the debates that animated them. His political identity may sometimes have appeared understated, but the extraordinary reach of his historical writing ensured that his engagement was far from marginal.</p><p>While Hobsbawm’s formative years and the crisis of 1956 are among the best-known aspects of his biography, less attention has been devoted to Hobsbawm during the crucial middle and later decades of the Cold War. How did a committed partisan of the October Revolution navigate the successive downturns of communism, and what might his responses teach us about the prospects of the Left? Each major crisis — in 1956, ’68, and ’89 — prompted Hobsbawm to reconsider fundamental Marxist concepts such as revolution, class, and political organization. His responses were shaped by a combination of personal experience, scholarly research, and interactions with international political movements, particularly those in Latin America.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>A Communist in Retreat?</h2></header><div><p>Until 1956, Hobsbawm remained a loyal communist, even an open Stalinist. Chabal’s biography argues that the crisis of 1956 transformed him into a semidetached communist. He interprets Hobsbawm’s subsequent turn toward primitive rebels, bandits, and millenarian movements partly as an intellectual retreat. This is a persuasive interpretation. Yet a closer examination also reveals a Hobsbawm attempting to reconstruct a theory of revolutionary agency at a moment when old certainties had collapsed and the search for alternative models of political transformation increasingly led beyond Europe’s borders.</p><p>After 1956, the problem of who makes history, under what conditions, and through which forms of organization became increasingly central to his thinking. This inquiry took him beyond the industrial heartlands of Britain to the rural peripheries of Spain and Italy and, eventually, to Latin America. Between the early 1950s and the late 1960s, these travels became a means of thinking through some of the dilemmas exposed by 1956. In Andalusian villages, in the hills of Calabria, and later in the Andes and the Cuban countryside, he encountered agrarian worlds that appeared to exist outside conventional categories of modern politics, inhabited by millenarians, rebellious peasants, and bandits whose forms of resistance often predated the structures of modern class politics. These encounters culminated in <cite>Primitive Rebels</cite> (1959) and <cite>Bandits</cite> (1969).</p><p>His travels to Cuba, Peru, Chile, and Colombia exposed him to forms of political struggle that reshaped his understanding of Marxism. The so-called Third World became not simply an object of European theory but a generator of concepts and political strategies. The Cuban Revolution, Andean guerrilla movements, and the nationalist experiment of Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru suggested that radical political transformation might emerge from unexpected sources (armies, states, and rural insurgencies) rather than exclusively from the industrial working class.</p><p>Such encounters broadened the geographical and conceptual horizons of European Marxism. They also fed back into Hobsbawm’s reflections on the politics of his own continent. The global circulation of ideas that characterized the postwar left is often narrated as a one-way movement from metropole to periphery, but Hobsbawm’s trajectory reveals a more complex picture: Latin American thought and political experience helped transform European debates about revolution, development, and political strategy. In this sense, Latin American revolutionary movements contributed to what Christoph Kalter has termed the “decolonization of the imagination” within the European left.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Hobsbawm and ’68</h2></header><div><p>The second great crisis, 1968, represented by the events in Paris and Prague, exposed a widening gulf between Communist parties and the new social movements transforming political culture. It revealed tensions long present within Western Marxism: between cultural critique and political strategy, democratic aspirations and party orthodoxy, and working-class traditions and new political identities. For Hobsbawm, it raised a central question: What was the future of socialism in advanced industrial societies in which the traditional working class was changing, fragmenting, or losing its political coherence?</p><p>His answer evolved through his deepening contacts with the Communist parties and intellectual cultures of Italy, France, and Spain, the emergence of Eurocommunist strategies, and political events ranging from the Prague Spring of 1968 to Augusto Pinochet’s coup in Chile in 1973. They informed his important contribution to British politics in the late 1970s and ’80s, when he applied decades of intellectual and political reflection to the specific conditions of the United Kingdom. His landmark 1978 essay, “The Forward March of Labour Halted?,” argued that the working class was undergoing a profound transformation, that new social groups were emerging, and that the labor movement had failed to provide adequate strategic leadership. It sparked fierce debate.</p><p>Chabal critically reconstructs how Hobsbawm remained skeptical of, and at times openly hostile toward, aspects of the legacy of the New Left and postmodernism. One revealing example is a letter reproduced by Chabal in which Hobsbawm responded to a student who proposed reconstructing a historical narrative in which gender, race, sexuality, and subjectivity would be central rather than adjuncts to a “grand narrative.” Hobsbawm rejected the proposed approach as neither his “kind of history” nor, in his view, Karl Marx’s, and regarded the project as symptomatic of the retreat of the Left.</p><p>Hobsbawm’s attitude toward the New Left had two important and contradictory consequences. It left him poorly equipped to understand some of the new political forces that emerged after the 1960s, including feminism, identity politics, new social movements, cultural politics, and some forms of anti-colonial and postcolonial politics. It narrowed his political analysis, but in some respects it also strengthened it. Less attached to the revolutionary optimism associated with parts of the New Left, Hobsbawm became one of the first major Marxist intellectuals in Britain to confront directly the decline of traditional industrial working-class politics. By the 1970s, he was increasingly concerned not with proclaiming revolutionary possibilities but with identifying the social forces and political alliances capable of producing meaningful change. This suggests that Hobsbawm’s analysis of the relationship between Britain, the labor movement and the working class was shaped neither by British exceptionalism nor solely by the history of the British left. Rather, it emerged from global Cold War experiences and, in particular, from the history of international communism and Marxism during the critical years between 1956 and 1978.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>The End of the Cold War</h2></header><div><p>Finally came the collapse of communism in 1989–91 and the emergence of the post–Cold War world, an episode that, for Hobsbawm, brought the “short twentieth century” to an end. For some, the fall of the Eastern Bloc signaled the triumph of liberal capitalism and the exhaustion of ideological alternatives. For Hobsbawm, however, it marked the disappearance of the historical horizon that had structured the twentieth century. The collapse of the communist project did not vindicate capitalism in his eyes. Rather, it exposed the fragility of a world order deprived of a credible vision of collective emancipation. The post-1989 decades were characterized by what he and others perceived as a profound fragmentation of political and social life: the resurgence of nationalism, the assertion of American military power, and the deepening individualism of neoliberal societies.</p><p>For Hobsbawm, the collapse of communism was therefore not simply a geopolitical event. It represented the disappearance of the world that had shaped his political and intellectual imagination since his youth. Many welcomed 1989 as a moment of liberation; Hobsbawm experienced it as the closing of a horizon. The moment echoed earlier defeats that weighed heavily upon the Left’s collective memory, but it carried a deeper sense of finality. He faced fundamental questions: What remained of Marxism when the political project historically associated with it collapsed? How should a historian write in an age that appeared to have lost its belief in alternative futures? Could history itself function as a form of political intervention when political horizons had narrowed?</p><p>Confronting the end of the project that had animated his generation, he turned increasingly to history itself as a mode of political engagement. The collapse of communism did not silence him; it compelled him to find a different voice, one that combined melancholy with realism and realism with a persistent belief that historical understanding could still serve the cause of human emancipation. The Hobsbawm who emerged after 1989 was continuous with the earlier historian of rebels, revolutionaries, and Eurocommunists, but his task had changed. If the twentieth century had been defined by competing visions of the future, the world after communism demanded something different: an explanation of history in the absence of the very future that had once animated it.</p><p>His biography reveals that his greatest political strength was not his loyalty to a particular communist doctrine but his capacity to rethink socialist strategy after defeat. Yet it also shows the danger of letting loyalty to inherited categories blind the Left to new agents of change.</p><p>What, then, can Hobsbawm’s life tell us about the future of the Left? Hobsbawm belonged to a political world that has disappeared: the world of mass communist parties, powerful trade unions, organized industrial working classes, and a socialist project that, however compromised by the realities of Soviet power, appeared to millions of people to offer an alternative future. Yet this distance from our own political circumstances is precisely what makes his trajectory worth revisiting. Hobsbawm’s political life was defined not simply by commitment but by a succession of defeats that forced him repeatedly to ask what remained possible when inherited expectations no longer corresponded to political reality.</p></div></section><section id="sec-5"><header><h2>Wisdom in Defeat</h2></header><div><p>There is much in Hobsbawm’s answers that cannot simply be recovered for the present. His commitment to broad alliances could also become excessively cautious, privileging electoral viability over political mobilization. And his lifelong loyalty to communism sometimes prevented him from confronting fully the failures of a political tradition to which he remained emotionally attached.</p><p>Yet Hobsbawm also understood something that remains indispensable: political strategy cannot be constructed from desire alone. The Left has to begin with the world as it exists, identifying the social forces capable of changing it rather than assuming that the agents, organizations, and strategies inherited from an earlier period will somehow return. This was the enduring insight behind “The Forward March of Labour Halted?” The industrial working class that had sustained the European left was being transformed. The task was therefore not to abandon class politics but to understand class anew and to construct alliances capable of turning fragmented social interests into a political project.</p><p>This problem has hardly disappeared. The twenty-first-century left confronts a working class that is larger globally but transformed in its composition, fragmented across services, logistics, care, technology, and precarious employment. It confronts climate change, migration, and racial inequality alongside the older questions of exploitation and economic power. At the same time, the crisis of the neoliberal order has not automatically benefited the Left. Across much of the world, the far right has proved remarkably effective at transforming economic insecurity, political alienation, and anger at established institutions into nationalist and authoritarian politics. The contemporary challenge is therefore not simply to demonstrate that capitalism is in crisis. Hobsbawm knew better than most that capitalism could survive crises. The harder task is to build the social forces, organizations, and political imagination capable of turning crisis into progressive transformation.</p><p>Here Hobsbawm’s relationship with the New Left offers perhaps the most productive lesson. His skepticism toward its politics simultaneously narrowed and strengthened his analysis. He failed to appreciate the extent to which feminism, anti-racism, and new forms of political subjectivity were permanently transforming the meaning of emancipation. But his insistence on class, organization, strategy, and the construction of political majorities identified a weakness that continues to trouble parts of the Left. A viable socialist politics must be capable of incorporating the expanded understanding of emancipation produced after 1968 while recovering Hobsbawm’s insistence that political movements ultimately have to organize social interests into durable forms of collective power.</p><p>This brings us back to 2011. For those of us who occupied squares during the <cite>Indignados</cite> movement, as for those who participated in Occupy Wall Street and the movements that followed the Arab Spring, those months seemed briefly to reopen a future that had been declared closed after 1989. The years that followed demonstrated both the possibilities and the limitations of that political moment. Protest could recover political imagination, but imagination was not the same thing as power. The movements that emerged from the crisis of 2008 succeeded in changing political language, creating new organizations, and returning inequality, class, and capitalism to public debate. But they also encountered the old problems that had preoccupied Hobsbawm: organization, social alliances, political strategy, and the difficult transformation of popular mobilization into durable power.</p><p>This is why returning to Hobsbawm now is more useful than simply celebrating him as the great historian of a vanished left. The value of his life lies neither in nostalgia for twentieth-century communism nor in finding a political blueprint among his writings. It lies instead in his persistent willingness to ask difficult questions after defeat. Who are the agents of political transformation when the old working class changes? How can movements with different interests be brought into a common political project? How should the Left respond when its inherited organizations cease to command loyalty? And, most importantly, how can political defeat become an opportunity for strategic reconstruction rather than permanent retreat?</p><p>There is an irony here. Hobsbawm ended <cite>The Age of Extremes</cite> warning that humanity could not enter the third millennium by simply prolonging the past or the present. More than thirty years later, the warning appears remarkably contemporary. The climate crisis, deepening inequality, geopolitical instability, and the resurgence of the radical right make the future no less uncertain than it appeared to Hobsbawm after 1989. But the history reconstructed by Chabal also suggests that uncertainty need not mean political paralysis. Hobsbawm’s twentieth century was punctuated by moments when apparently settled political worlds suddenly collapsed, and new possibilities emerged from their ruins.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/hobsbawm-chabal-biography-history-communism?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-09T15:37:37.028265Z</published><summary type="text">Eric Hobsbawm was in Berlin when Adolf Hitler took power, in Paris at the Popular Front’s peak, and in the Communist Party when it all came down. Emile Chabal’s new biography follows a historian who always asked what remained possible after defeat.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/health-care-el-sayed-m4a-public-option</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/health-care-el-sayed-m4a-public-option"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/334348719443.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/334348719443.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/334348719443.jpg"/><title type="text">Abdul El-Sayed Isn’t Backing Down on Medicare for All</title><updated>2026-10-09T14:35:42.455068Z</updated><author><name>Matt Bruenig</name></author><category label="Health" term="Health"/><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><category label="Policy" term="Policy"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>The <a href="https://michiganadvance.com/2026/01/30/mcmorrow-says-el-sayed-flipped-on-medicare-for-all-experts-say-its-more-complex/">discourse</a> around Abdul El-Sayed’s position on Medicare for All is mostly confused. Reading most of the reporting on the matter would lead one to believe that El-Sayed initially supported Medicare for All but now merely supports a “public option.” This is not really true under conventional meanings of the phrase “public option.” El-Sayed seems to be inviting this understanding for rhetorical effect, but all he has really done is drop his opposition to a type of duplicative insurance that nobody would ever want to buy.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Conventional Public Options</h2></header><div><p>In the health insurance context, the phrase “public option” has typically referred to two types of arrangements:</p><ol><li><p>The government creates a health insurance plan and attempts to sell it in the employer and individual markets. People become insured under the government plan when their employer switches them onto it or when they select it in an individual health exchange. When people become insured in this way, they cease to pay premiums to private insurance companies and instead pay them to the government. This is how the <a href="https://lacare.org/">LA Care Health Plan</a> works.</p></li><li><p>The government provides free health insurance to people. It then allows private insurers to compete with the free health insurance plan. If people select a private plan, they cease to be covered by the government plan and become covered by the private plan. The government pays their premium. This is how <a href="https://www.medicare.gov/health-drug-plans/health-plans">Medicare Advantage</a> works.</p></li></ol><p>The key to these conventional public options is that individuals have to choose <em>between</em> the public plan and a private plan. They are not covered by both.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Medicare for All</h2></header><div><p>Medicare for All proposals do not work like this. Instead, every individual is enrolled in the public plan for free. Unlike under the second type of public option above, individuals are not permitted to opt out of this plan and select a private plan that the government pays for.</p><p>Typically, Medicare for All proposals have allowed individuals to buy <em>supplemental</em> private insurance for things not covered by the public plan but not to buy <em>duplicative</em> private insurance that covers the same things the public plan covers.</p><p>All El-Sayed did in his Medicare for All “flip-flop” was say that, unlike typical Medicare for All proposals, he favors a version that would not ban <em>duplicative</em> private insurance. This modification allows him to say things like “I will not ban private insurance” and “people can still keep their private insurance plans.” But in reality, virtually nobody is going to buy duplicative insurance when they already receive the same tax-funded coverage for free.</p><p>According to KFF, the average premium for an employer-sponsored family plan now <a href="https://www.kff.org/health-costs/annual-family-premiums-for-employer-coverage-rise-6-in-2025-nearing-27000-with-workers-paying-6850-toward-premiums-out-of-their-paychecks/">stands</a> at $27,000 per year. In the world El-Sayed is proposing, these families would receive this same sort of coverage from the government, and employers would no longer be required to provide private health insurance to their workers. In this scenario, employers are not going to put $27,000 of their labor budget toward a private insurance plan that <em>duplicates</em> coverage their employees already have. Nor would their employees want them to: they’d much prefer to have the cash, especially given that they are now paying taxes into the public health insurance system.</p><p>Even a superrich individual who is obsessed with insuring against health risks is not going to spend $27,000 a year to insure things that the government already insures. It would make far more sense for them to simply accumulate that money in a bank account so they can self-pay for concierge care.</p><p>Depending on how generous the Medicare for All plan is, some people might opt for <em>supplemental</em> private insurance that covers things Medicare for All does not. But this has always been allowed in Medicare for All proposals. And these would not be anything like the private insurance that currently exists. Even insurance plans that partially duplicate the Medicare for All package, if they are offered at all, would not look anything like the private insurance plans that currently exist.</p><p>So from my vantage point, El-Sayed is basically playing games here, for better or worse. Formally permitting duplicative insurance while making it uneconomical for anyone to buy or sell it unlocks certain rhetoric but does not really change anything about the reality of the proposal.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/health-care-el-sayed-m4a-public-option?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-09T14:35:42.455068Z</published><summary type="text">Some commentators are claiming that Michigan Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed once supported Medicare for All and now merely backs a “public option.” Matt Bruenig explains why this is not true.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/10/marx-shaikh-competition-inequality-labor</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/marx-shaikh-competition-inequality-labor"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/141755397555.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/141755397555.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/10/141755397555.jpg"/><title type="text">Anwar Shaikh’s Analysis of Capitalism Is Vital for the Left</title><updated>2026-10-09T13:58:02.82356Z</updated><author><name>Howard Botwinick</name></author><author><name>Stephen Maher</name></author><category label="Capital" term="Capital"/><category label="Economic Science" term="Economic Science"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Most economists assume that when workers with similar skills earn very different pay, something must be blocking normal competition. But for Howard Botwinick, capitalist competition itself creates those gaps. His book <cite>Persistent Inequalities: Wage Disparity under Capitalist Competition</cite>, first published in 1993 and reissued in 2017, shows how the everyday workings of capitalism split the working class into better- and worse-paid groups — no monopoly power required.</p><p>Botwinick came to economics from organizing. Early on, he helped workers win a union at an electronics plant, only to watch the company shut the plant down rather than deal with them. Looking for a better way to understand what he was up against, he went to the New School for Social Research to study with the economist Anwar Shaikh. Shaikh’s ideas about capitalist competition radically departed from the consensus, shared by many economists on the Left, that giant corporations had largely escaped it.</p><p>For Botwinick, this meant that if workers organized the most efficient firms in an industry, the ones whose costs set prices for everyone else, they could raise wages across the whole industry. It was, in other words, good news.</p><p>Botwinick spoke with Stephen Maher about his intellectual origins, what he learned from Shaikh, what the industrial unions of the 1930s got right, his objections to the idea of a Global North labor aristocracy, and the enduring potential of classwide solidarity.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><hr/></header><dl><dt><p>Stephen Maher</p><p>You were involved in labor politics before and alongside your academic work. How did you get interested in labor issues, and how did your experiences shape the kinds of economic questions you wanted to answer?</p></dt><dd><p>Howard Botwinick</p><p>As a college student in Madison, Wisconsin, I got interested in labor issues by studying <cite>Capital</cite> and US labor history.</p><p>After graduating, my first labor organizing job was in a newly built electronics assembly plant that made cable TV boxes — the kind everyone had sitting on their televisions. The workforce was predominantly women, wages were very low, and the assembly line work was very stressful.</p><p>I had just finished a degree in neoclassical economics, which basically painted the world as a perfect one where workers are paid exactly what they deserve. And if they aren’t treated properly, they are free to leave for a better job somewhere else. In reality, these women were trapped in these jobs because there were very few job opportunities. They were being paid less than a livable wage, and the way they were being treated was ruthless.</p><p>So I was helping to organize a union there with the United Electrical Workers (UE). After a year, we won the organizing drive, and we began negotiating our first contract. But three months later, they shut the entire plant down.</p><p>It was a labor-intensive industry, and the plant was basically a corrugated-steel shell on a concrete slab. Rather than deal with the union, they simply went back to Illinois. It was very cheap for them to move, and that was that. Eventually, almost all electronics work moved overseas for similar reasons. Although the wages were already very low in the US electronics industry, they were a hell of a lot lower in developing countries.</p><p>That taught me a lot about the importance of certain structural determinants in various industries that can either facilitate or hamper union organization. I also started thinking about capital mobility and how you become an effective organizer in a world like that.</p><p>After several years of ineffective labor organizing on my own in five different workplaces, I decided there must be a better way for me to help the labor movement. I started thinking about going to graduate school in order to deepen my understanding of Marxist political economy.</p><p>I wasn’t inspired by the contemporary work I was reading until I came across an article by Anwar Shaikh called “An Introduction to the History of Crisis Theories,” which was in a crisis reader put out by the Union for Radical Political Economics. I read it avidly, and I finally said: “There is a guy I can learn a lot from.” So I applied to the New School.</p></dd><dt><p>Stephen Maher</p><p>What did you find in Anwar Shaikh’s work that was missing from other approaches to Marxist political economy?</p></dt><dd><p>Howard Botwinick</p><p>Shaikh impressed me as someone who took Karl Marx’s method very seriously. He was poring over all three volumes of <cite>Capital</cite>, <cite>Theories of Surplus Value</cite>, and the history of economic thought. He took the process of inquiry that Marx went through very seriously.</p><p>As I began doing my own work on the labor market, I was impressed by that methodology. How do you carefully work your way down from the abstract level of the first volume of <cite>Capital</cite> to the most concrete levels where you are dealing with things like ongoing capitalist competition between and within various industries, differential wage and profit rates, the intertwining of capital and labor mobility, and finally, the effect that unions can potentially have on wages?</p><p>Those are very concrete questions. You have to be ready to arrive at the concrete properly; otherwise you are going to misunderstand a lot of what is going on.</p><p>Unfortunately, I saw many radical economists making two common mistakes. Some radicals would go from Marx’s abstract arguments in Volume I — or what they thought were his arguments — and then see that the real world was much more complex. They would then dogmatically insist that Marx was a genius, and that those concrete complexities don’t really matter.</p><p>Other political economists would make the jump to the concrete and say: “There is nothing here in Volume I of <cite>Capital</cite>. Marx doesn’t talk about wage differentials, monopoly power, effective demand, the role of the state, and all this stuff that is important to contemporary capitalist economies. There is nothing useful there in Marx.” And so, they jump to the concrete.</p><p>And who is mucking around in the concrete? Neoclassical economists. Because they skipped over a great deal of the journey Marx took, this second group is tempted to incorporate things from John Maynard Keynes and even from more conservative elements of neoclassical theory, like the theory of perfect and imperfect competition. It ends up an eclectic mess.</p><p>It is almost worse than useless, because you are taming Marx’s argument with neoclassical theory and not giving Marx the chance to speak through his own analysis and really test what his propositions are.</p><p>The other thing that was very impressive about Shaikh was that he felt that, once you had taken that careful journey and were ready to arrive at the concrete, you then had to test Marx’s theories. You have to test whether they really were the most powerful explanations for what is going on in the modern capitalist economy. And if not, you would need to find a way to incorporate other schools of thought or new dynamics that Marx was not able to consider.</p><p>And so, Shaikh initially spent several years with one of his grad students, Ahmet Tonak, developing a way to translate Keynesian income categories into Marxist value categories so that things like the rate of surplus value and the rate of profit could be accurately formulated, measured, and tracked over time.</p><p>Of course, after many more years of work, Shaikh eventually did carefully incorporate selected insights from the classical and Keynesian schools in his recent magnum opus, <cite>Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises</cite>. But he did this in a highly systematic way, largely retaining the critical importance of Marx’s arguments in Capital.</p></dd><dt><p>Stephen Maher</p><p>Shaikh’s idea of “real competition” was central to your work. How does it differ from the monopoly capital view?</p></dt><dd><p>Howard Botwinick</p><p>Before going to the New School, I had read Vladimir Lenin and all of the monopoly capital literature, and I was used to thinking in terms of monopoly capitalism. The things Shaikh was saying about Marx’s analysis of competition flew in the face of what I had learned, and I was skeptical at first. But I eventually reread <cite>Capital</cite> with different eyes, and I saw that Shaikh was right. Marx’s approach to capitalist competition was actually very different.</p><p>Paul Sweezy and many other radical economists assumed that when Marx was talking about capitalist competition, he was talking about something like perfect competition with tiny price-taking firms. Then, with the merger movements after Marx died, they argued that we now have much bigger firms and Marx’s analysis of competition is no longer relevant.</p><p>But Marx was never talking about tiny price-taking firms. After all, Marx was writing well into the Industrial Revolution in the 1870s. He made a big deal about large-scale investments with significant levels of fixed capital. He was never talking about the mythical kinds of firms that exist in neoclassical theory.</p><p>Instead, he was asking the following: How do these large firms, with large amounts of fixed capital and a good deal of uncertainty, effectively compete? No one has perfect information. They are taking a chance, making investments, and trying to get the most profit they can in order to grow and ultimately survive. How do they do this? His analysis of capitalist competition is about that real world.</p><p>How do these very sluggish, large capitals fight with one another over market share? As Shaikh often notes, the metaphor that Marx generally uses is that capitalist competition is like a war. You try to kill your enemy; you steal market share from them, reduce them, and damage them so that you can grow and expand.</p><p>You need to expand because a large-scale enterprise needs an expansive scale of production to take advantage of economies of scale. So you must expand, and you are going to come into conflict with other capitals that are doing the same thing. The larger you are, the more vicious the battle is. There is no notion in Marx that, as firms get bigger and more powerful, competition lessens.</p></dd><dt><p>Stephen Maher</p><p>How did this approach change your understanding of labor market segmentation and working-class differentiation?</p></dt><dd><p>Howard Botwinick</p><p>I realized: Wow, you do not need a modern theory of labor market segmentation and a new stage of capitalism to understand not only how capitalism brutally exploits the working class en masse but also how different segments of the working class are thrown — in Marx’s words — from pillar to post, from one industry to another.</p><p>If you do a careful reading of <cite>Capital</cite>, you see that capitalist competition is constantly differentiating the working class because it is also constantly creating differential profit rates between and within industries. And this places very different downward pressures on wage rates. And then you have the reserve army of desperate workers trying to find a job at any wage they can. So even the most inefficient firms and even dying industries can still find workers who are desperate enough to take jobs with substandard wages and conditions.</p><p>In sum, Marx’s analysis in <cite>Capital</cite> lays the basis for a complex structure of differentiation within the working class even as the relentless deskilling dynamics of technical change work to lower the overall levels of skill for the working class.</p><p>It is a far more complex analysis than labor market segmentationists and others had assumed about Marx when they quoted from the <cite>Communist Manifesto</cite>. From their superficial reading of Marx, they claimed that he primarily described the creation of a homogeneous working class that would famously become capitalism’s gravediggers. But since workers didn’t rise to the occasion and the segmentationists discovered significant and persistent inequality within the working class, they argued that we had now entered an entirely new period of heterogeneity and segmentation. In fact, Marx’s argument is much richer than that, and there is no need to posit a new stage of capitalism. Wage differentials among workers of similar skill have been around for a very long time.</p><p>The segmentationists also argued that the modern economy was a dual economy with a monopoly core sector and a competitive periphery. In the monopoly core that was organized by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in the 1930s (steel, auto, rubber tire, and so on), workers were supposedly able to raise their wages because those firms had monopoly power. The workers raised their wages, and the firms simply raised their prices.</p><p>By the same token, firms in the so-called competitive sector lacked monopoly power and could not pass higher wages on through higher prices. There was therefore very little workers could do to improve their wages and working conditions in this very large sector of the economy called the competitive periphery.</p><p>Well, I worked in the competitive periphery. I saw some lousy unions that were not doing much, but I also saw some good unions doing a great deal to improve wages and working conditions. That showed me immediately that there was much more room for workers to improve their situation than the segmentationists were suggesting.</p><p>My argument, based on Marx and on the rich detail of capitalist competition, taught me to pay far more attention to structures and technical conditions and to worry less about monopoly power. Once you start thinking that way, you find many other positive possibilities for labor to affect wages and working conditions. For example, many workers in service sectors like health care are highly organizable because capital cannot leave the areas where services are being delivered. They are a captive audience for unions, especially if they involve fairly large workplaces like hospitals.</p></dd><dt><p>Stephen Maher</p><p>What strategic conclusions follow from Shaikh’s theory of regulating capitals for unions operating under intense competitive pressure?</p></dt><dd><p>Howard Botwinick</p><p>One of the things that I got from Shaikh’s analysis was this notion that every industry has what he calls regulating capitals. I think Shaikh has a strong argument that the logic of this is just a further concretization of Marx’s notion of competitive prices of production.</p><p>Regulating capitals basically set the standard for those competitive prices of production. Each industry has firms with production facilities that embody the state-of-the-art, most efficient standards possible and are generally accessible to other capitals. This is not due to a rent situation or a monopoly over some scarce resource.</p><p>These regulating capitals effectively act as the competitive standard for the industry. My argument about wages is that, in the 1930s, the CIO unions confronted those regulating capitals — the most efficient capitals in the industry — and said: You now have to deal with us, and your conditions of production and competitive costs are going to change. We are going to organize all the regulating capitals in this industry. We are raising the cost of hiring labor, and we are raising other costs because we are going to improve our working conditions and slow production down. You have to deal with that.</p><p>The only way workers can do this is by organizing the entire industry. Then they raise the industry standards, and relative prices will eventually adjust under the new conditions of competition. Monopoly power has little to do with it.</p><p>Classwide solidarity is the only thing workers have to stand up against the relentless pressures of capitalist competition. If you go down the road of labor-management cooperation, you undermine that solidarity, and you cannot win the battle. You have to take wages and working conditions out of competition, and there are things workers can do to accomplish that.</p><p>You have to know your stuff. You have to understand how capitalist competition operates between and within industries. Then you can work out how to turn it against capital. Suppose you have a powerful firm under competitive pressure. Workers can respond by taking wages and working conditions out of competition.</p><p>That is essentially what the CIO did so powerfully in the 1930s. Workers said to capital: You can compete through new technology, advertising, and better-quality products, but you are not going to compete on our backs. You are not going to compete by destroying our health, forcing us to work at unsafe speeds, or paying us wages we cannot live on. That is off the table; it is outside the new dynamics of competition that we are creating. If you do not give us reasonable wages and working conditions, we are going to raise the costs of doing business as usual. We are going to work to rule and organize strikes or slowdowns, and your profits will be seriously squeezed.</p><p>That is how you turn competition against capital: recognize that employers are under the gun and impose costs on them. And ultimately, if all the regulating capitals are effectively organized, relative prices will adjust to these new costs of doing business.</p><p>To do this, however, you need militant democratic unions where the entire workforce and the surrounding communities are involved and ready to act. You cannot sit around a board meeting talking about labor-management cooperation from a position of weakness. You have to be strong and able to impose costs on capital, and you probably have to go on strike periodically in order to make your strike threat real. Then you can enter negotiations with the weapons you need.</p></dd><dt><p>Stephen Maher</p><p>How does the falling rate of profit change the horizon of class struggle?</p></dt><dd><p>Howard Botwinick</p><p>That is not a short-run question of strategy or tactics, which is what I was just discussing. But if Marx is right about the falling-rate-of-profit scenario — that capitalism passes through roughly thirty- to forty-year periods of growth followed by a serious profitability crisis and a prolonged downturn — it has broader implications. And this is something else that I learned from Shaikh.</p><p>During periods of growth, if workers are effectively organized and do not exceed certain limits — for instance, if they do not push wages up faster than productivity growth — there is room for real wages to rise. But that struggle becomes harder and more constrained when the profitability crisis arrives. Accumulation slows, the reserve army grows, and everything workers had to fight for before requires an even greater battle.</p><p>You hope that, during the period of growth, the labor movement has acquired sufficient organizational strength — and even better, it has organized its own political party that clearly represents its interests. Then, when the crisis comes, workers can say: “What kind of system is this? We have to fight constantly for a reasonable wage and to be treated like human beings even in the good times. Now we face massive unemployment and terrible destruction everywhere simply because the system is not profitable enough. It is time for a new system.”</p><p>Movements in profitability affect what is possible in different periods. But ultimately, if Marx is right that a crisis arrives every other generation, workers who fought hard and made important gains for themselves and their children will face losing many of those gains during the profitability crisis. That is a powerful argument that we have to move beyond the system. We cannot keep struggling only for reforms. And we haven’t even touched on how capitalism is relentlessly destroying our climate.</p></dd><dt><p>Stephen Maher</p><p>Many have claimed that workers in the Global North constitute a “labor aristocracy.” What are the implications of Shaikh’s notion of regulating capitals for this conception?</p></dt><dd><p>Howard Botwinick</p><p>From the post–World War II period until the 1970s, CIO unions had successfully fought to push up wages in highly capital-intensive industries in the North and Midwest. They were partly able to do this because those capital-intensive industries like steel and auto were difficult to relocate to cheaper labor in the US South. But as that wage differential between the North and South continued to grow, and those Northern plants continued to age, eventually capital moved part of its operations to the South when it needed to build new plants. Capital mobility was slower, but eventually it took place.</p><p>Now, is there any world where we would have argued that those low-wage workers in the South allowed Northern workers in those CIO industries to become a labor aristocracy that was indirectly exploiting those Southern workers? Quite the contrary — the CIO knew it would eventually be in deep trouble if it did not organize those workers in the South. In fact, many would argue that the lack of union organization in the South became one of the key causes of the post–World War II decline of the US labor movement.</p><p>It is not terribly different when you think internationally. When most of the regulating capitals were located in the United States, organized workers were able to raise their wages because those regulating capitals were able to incorporate higher wages in their competitive cost structures. However, those potential low-wage workers in developing countries were quietly setting long-term limits for how high wages in the US could go.</p><p>And as wage differentials continued to grow, capitals increasingly moved to less developed countries in order to take advantage of those lower wages. It happened first in the labor-intensive industries because they were less costly to move. Moreover, in these industries like textiles and shoes, wage costs were a much higher share of total costs, so there was far more to gain by relocating. But eventually, as the wage differentials grew across the border, even capital-intensive industries began to move: first to the US South and then on to even lower wages in Mexico, China, Vietnam, and Malaysia.</p><p>There is no point here where one could rationally argue that low wages in the US South or across the developing world allowed US workers to achieve higher wages at the expense of low-wage workers elsewhere. Downward wage pressure on workers in the first world is continually intensified by capital’s growing access to lower-wage labor elsewhere. There is no superexploitation and certainly no “labor aristocracy” that includes large segments of first-world workers.</p><p>In fact, if you do not organize all the regulating capitals across the globe — if you do not organize the entire global industry — your ability to raise wages is greatly constrained. Marx’s injunction “Workers of the world, unite!” is more powerful than ever under today’s increasing levels of globalization and multinational corporations.</p></dd><dt><p>Stephen Maher</p><p>Critics often argue that attention to capitalism’s laws of motion leaves too little room for human agency. How do you respond, and what does your analysis imply for racial and gender inequality?</p></dt><dd><p>Howard Botwinick</p><p>I would argue that you do not necessarily lose the space for human agency. Rather, you will understand far better how workers’ struggles must ultimately interact with very real dynamics that will make their presence felt whether you like it or not. Whether you ignore them or not, they are going to come down on your head — competitive forces, declining rates of profit, and so on. If you are not aware of and tracking these things, you will not have an effective strategy for dealing with what happens when you press against those limits.</p><p>In each industry, you have to pay attention to each firm’s profitability, the national location of the regulating capitals, and the particular dynamics of competitive pricing. That allows you to develop an effective strategy for both union intervention and public policy. Without understanding those things, you can claim to be entirely concerned with human agency, but you will be very ineffective and limited in what you can do. Ironically, my more determinate analysis of competitive wage determination actually indicates that workers have far more power to improve their circumstances in far more industries than the segmentationists ever suggested.</p><p>Very briefly, regarding issues of racial and gender inequality, it is useful to think about my work in two stages. The analysis in my book largely abstracts from race and gender, but it nevertheless shows how capitalism creates not equality but inequality throughout the working class. The combined dynamics of technical change, capitalist competition, and the reserve army of labor result in highly unequal slots within the labor market that have nothing to do with the skill or quality of individual workers. Once we understand this, we can then move on to the question of the discriminatory assignment of a disproportionate number of people of color and women to many of these low-paying and often highly unstable jobs.</p><p>This would then require a detailed analysis of the historical development of the different components of the reserve army of labor, paying particular attention to how various forms of discrimination and subordination have critically shaped the conditions of entry of both women and people of color into the capitalist labor force. And here, these institutional and historical dynamics may vary within limits in different capitalist countries.</p><p>However, the bottom line here is that if you fundamentally want to create a more equal society, you better have an understanding of the political economy of capitalism. There is no way around it. A political movement that recognizes these deep systemic dynamics of inequality will be able to develop a richer understanding of why these inequalities continue to occur, and we will be far more effective in uniting all of the different segments of the working class.</p></dd></dl></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/marx-shaikh-competition-inequality-labor?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-10-09T13:58:02.82356Z</published><summary type="text">In studying with Anwar Shaikh, economist Howard Botwinick learned that Karl Marx’s account of capitalist competition is far richer than his critics assumed. That insight, Botwinick argues in an interview, offers the working class a road map to victory.</summary></entry></feed>