Obstruction in Congress

This split has been most pronounced in the Colombian congress. Petro’s Historic Pact party was the largest single group in the 2022 congressional elections, with 17 percent of the vote and twenty seats, but this left it well short of a majority in the 108-seat assembly. The parties traditionally affiliated with the country’s elites have united with centrist factions of the Green Alliance to prevent many of the Petro administration’s reforms from passing.

Two of the biggest reforms that this alliance has blocked have been those concerning labor rights and health care. The labor reform essentially seeks to modernize Colombia’s legislation to mirror that of other OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, which would mean gradually cutting the working day to forty-two hours and strengthening the position of workers in the face of growing precarity.

The labor reform has even received the endorsement of the United States embassy in a surprising reversal of Washington’s history of repressive intervention in the politics of the region. However, this endorsement failed to defuse the opposition from the country’s elites to the reform.

The health reform aims to change Colombia’s existing neoliberal health care model, which favors the interests of private insurance companies, by providing more state resources and expanding the public system. This would significantly reduce what the average Colombian pays in health care costs and bring medical services to communities that have little access to it. Unsurprisingly, in an echo of the US experience, Petro’s reform has been met with strong resistance from media outlets owned by the elite and the companies that profit off of the current model.

Despite opposition from elite sectors, the Petro administration has still been able to pass significant reforms to the country’s pension system and tax structures that empower working-class people and the most vulnerable sectors of Colombian society. Outside the realm of congress, the government has been able to significantly change the country’s mode of environmental governance, setting the stage for a gradual move away from fossil fuel extraction and drastically reducing deforestation in the Amazon.

An Unfinished Peace

Another key pillar of Petro’s administration has been resuming the implementation of the peace agreement with the former FARC guerrillas that was nearly destroyed by his right-wing predecessor Iván Duque. The president has also sought to conduct successful peace talks with the dissident factions of the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), Latin America’s last major guerilla movement.

While there have been significant moves to implement the various aspects of the peace agreement, the administration has faced considerable opposition from members of the Colombian elite, who fear that the structural changes embodied in the deal, such as agrarian reform, will challenge their power. Because of this opposition, Petro has proposed a fast-track process to implement the peace agreement and has spoken of the possibility of drafting a new constitution that would include the broad reforms put forward in the agreement.

Despite Petro’s good intentions, many rural parts of the country are still immersed in a low-intensity conflict. His predecessor Duque’s record in office helped ensure that many of the areas traditionally under FARC influence came under the sway of other armed groups rather than the Colombian state. These groups range from the narco-paramilitary Gulf Clan to the leftist ELN to a potpourri of FARC dissident factions with varying degrees of politicization.

Against this backdrop, Colombia continues to be one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a social leader or environmental defender. This is a massive contradiction considering that many of those who now hold state power were themselves social leaders before taking office.

The Petro administration has nonetheless taken some significant steps to create lasting peace in the country. The most important are the negotiations with the ELN taking place in Venezuela. Petro has sent former comrades from the M-19 guerrilla movement to present a realistic plan for ending the conflict between the ELN and the Colombian state. The fact that a cease-fire with the guerilla group has now lasted for almost a year, longer than any previous truce, is a good sign that the talks are bearing fruit.

The talks with the various dissident factions of the FARC and the Gulf Clan have proved to be much more difficult and led to mixed results, but these efforts still form a key part of the Petro administration’s policy of “Total Peace.” The more politically inclined dissident factions show a willingness to negotiate, while those who have stronger ties with drug traffickers appear reluctant to seriously consider a peace deal that would harm their economic interests. We still have to learn if the administration will be able to secure the peace that rural Colombia yearns for.

A Growing Opposition

The biggest obstacles to Petro’s administration do not come from armed guerrillas but rather from the halls of congress as well as an elite-controlled media and corrupt public officials. With his party lacking a majority in congress, passing reforms was always going to be an uphill battle.

This balance of forces obliged the Left to make concessions to parties on the Right and center in order to pass legislation. Yet many politicians from the center have joined the far right to stop the reforms from passing despite offering initial support.

The congressional obstacles have been intensified by media disinformation campaigns that give a disproportionate voice to far-right members of the opposition associated with Duque and former president Álvaro Uribe. The leading platform for this campaign has been the magazine Semana.

Semana is owned by one of the richest families in Colombia, the Gilinskis. Its output includes a constant barrage of negative articles and social media posts about the government that range from gossip to McCarthyite disinformation. Other outlets have seen how Semana is able to successfully get clicks from misleading stories and have followed suit, creating a media landscape that severely distorts reality and represents the interests of the most privileged sectors of Colombian society.

Meanwhile, one of the biggest dangers to Petro’s popularity has come from within his own government in the form of corruption. A number of scandals have shown that the Left is not immune to the dynamics of corruption that characterized previous governments. Recently, an incident where the head of Colombia’s disaster response was accused of taking bribes led to a public apology by Petro. However, it is important to note that these cases have been less extensive than under previous governments and that members of the opposition have also been implicated in the scandals.

Sailing Against the Right?

With two years left in his presidential term and a constitutional bar on reelection, Petro still has the time to overcome the obstacles and consolidate structural changes in Colombia. These are changes that will ultimately benefit poor and working-class Colombians, like the drastic reduction in poverty that has taken place over the past two years.

At the same time, the possibility of a second Donald Trump presidency in the United States and a wider regional shift to the right could severely hinder any moves to reform Colombia and encourage the most radical sectors of the opposition.

Far-right politicians in the United States such as Florida representative María Elvira Salazar have called for cuts in US aid to Colombia. Argentina’s president, Javier Milei, has openly insulted Petro while promoting the opposition. In the event of a Trump victory, these actions could be further boosted by an interventionist right-wing policy in the region.

Whatever happens in the next two years, the presidency of Gustavo Petro should be remembered as an attempt to give a voice to the most oppressed sectors of Colombian society. Petro’s remaining time in office will show us how far those ambitions can be realized in practice and educate us about the potential for structural change in Colombia and Latin America as a whole.